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ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines the relationship between technological change and
spatial industrial restructuring through a case study of the 1840-1880 British ocean
going iron and steam shipbuilding industry. The study tests the hypothesis that a
shipbuilding center's share of the national British shipbuilding market was associated
with its ability to generate or rapidly adopt technological change.
The study begins by establishing iron steamship technological changes introduced
by British shipbuilders and the industry's attendant spatial restructuring. It then develops
two site-specific variables: industrial viability and innovative ability. Data for both
variables are obtained from the Lloyds Register of British and Foreign Shipping. The
industrial viability variable ranks each shipbuilding center's annual share of the total
national shipbuilding market in terms of its being a high, medium or low market share
center. Innovative ability establishes each center’s level of technological sophistication,
in terms of either a technological leader or laggard, based on significant component
technologies. These technologies are identified through a series of multiple regression
models which, in addition to identifying significant technologies, allow for the testing of
key assumptions in the historical literature regarding 1840-1880 British iron steamship
technological change.
The relationship is assessed by testing for a statistical association between the
industrial viability and innovative ability rankings using contingency tables in conjunction
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with the chi-square statistic. Additional analysis includes measurement of the strength
and direct o f the association and identification and assessment of individual table cells
that make significant contributions to the overall chi-square statistic.
The results demonstrate that industrial viability and innovative ability were
associated. Further, the association was positive, although weak to moderate, indicating
that innovative ability, while important, was not a precondition for an 1840-1880
shipbuilding center’s industrial viability. Also, small shipbuilding centers that produced
small, technologically lagging ships for the British coastal trade made a significant
contribution to the association. These findings suggest that other considerations, such as
access to markets, initial advantages, and factor inputs were as important as innovative
ability in explaining the industry's spatial restructuring.

xi
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The spatial industrial structure o f the United States and other industrialized
countries is undergoing significant changes. This restructuring process is characterized
by the shift of manufacturing activity from established industrial core regions to new,
formerly peripheral regions. Regional economists argue that these shifts are caused by
the peripheral regions' greater capacity for generating or adopting new products and
production processes, or technological changes. Following their lead, local economic
development agencies have implemented industrial recruitment policies that attempt to
attract what are perceived to be innovative firms and industries. These firms and
✓
industries, in turn, will serve as growth poles in attracting related support industries and
other innovative firms.
Such policies implicitly assume that the more innovative an industrial center is,
then the greater will be its regional and, by extension, local economic viability. While
economic geographers have examined this restructuring process, they have not directly
investigated the relationship between innovation and local economic viability. Two
reasons for this can be identified: first, economic geographers do not examine
technological change directly; and, second, they conduct their research at regional or
national scales that obscure the performance of individual places.

1
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This dissertation assesses the impact o f technological change on industrial
locational viability by examining the relationship between innovation and place. This is
accomplished through a case study of the 1840-1880 British deep-water iron and steam
shipbuilding industry. During this period, British shipbuilders perfected iron ship
construction and steam propulsion, developments which, according to British
shipbuilding historians, also rearranged the industry's spatial structure. Obviously,
industrial restructuring is a complex process and many different conditions and forces
interact to result in the emergence of new places. This study recognizes this complexity
from the outset but, still, will focus on the importance of technological innovation in this
process.
This study hypothesizes that innovative shipbuilding centers enjoyed a
competitive advantage over non-innovative shipbuilding centers. The hypothesis is
tested by: a) assessing each shipbuilding center's annual market share o f production to
establish its industrial viability; b) using the independent variables derived from multiple
regression analysis to rank the innovative ability o f individual shipbuilding centers, in
terms o f technological leaders or laggards, for each year they were in production; and c)
exploring the association between established levels of industrial viability and innovative
ability through the generation o f contingency tables used in conjunction with the chisquare statistic.
This study makes two contributions to the sub-discipline of economic geography.
First, it presents a dynamic analytical framework that investigates spatial industrial
restructuring induced by technological change using actual changes in technologies
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rather than changes in employment or other intermediate measures. Second, it
reincorporates the individual industrial center, the level most effected by these changes,
into studies o f regional and national restructuring.
1. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND SPATIAL RESTRUCTURING
One consequence of the spatial restructuring process over the past thirty years
has been the decline of manufacturing activity in traditional industrial regions coupled
with manufacturing growth in formerly peripheral regions (hUallachain, 1990; Wijers,
1985). Using the United States as an example, industrial restructuring has been
characterized by the migration of manufacturing employment out o f the old
Manufacturing Core and into the southern tier of US states, the Sunbelt, if not out of the
country altogether (Berry, Conkling, &nd Ray, 1997; Hanink, 1993; Johnson, 1989;
Rees and Stafford, 1979; Souza and Stutz, 1994; Weinstein, Gross, and Rees, 1985).
Many regional development specialists argue that the spatial restructuring
process has been caused by the failure of the traditional manufacturing core regions to
generate, or rapidly adopt, technological change. According to this explanation, the
traditional manufacturing regions once served as innovation seed-beds, areas from which
product and process innovations, technological changes, originated and then diffused to
peripheral regions (Rees, 1979; Norton and Rees, 1979). These regions, simply put, are
no longer competitive with the periphery because they do not generate or adopt
technological changes at the same rate as do industries in the emerging growth regions
(Wijers, 1985; Bailey and Chakrabarti, 1988).
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This interpretation follows from economists who argue that scientific advance
and technical change are necessary prerequisites for economic growth (Rothwell and
Zegveld, 1981). Based on the works of Schumpeter (1935) and Kuznets (1930), these
economists define technological change as the process of invention, innovation, and
diffusion (or imitation) which brings about productivity growth. Technology is
considered to incorporate physical tools and social processes, as well as the changes in
these tools and processes—technological change—which bring about productivity growth.
Productivity growth improves production efficiencies which, in turn, leads back to
greater increases in productivity growth (Berry, Conkling and Ray, 1997; Link, 1987).
Based on this interpretation, regional scientists and economic geographers,
especially the regional development specialists Hamilton and Linge (1983), argue that
technical innovation is the source of economic growth and regional economic change.
Following this line o f reasoning, regional planners have implemented industrial
development policies that attract innovative industries. These development strategies,
which are referred to as innovation-oriented as opposed to growth-oriented (Stohr,
1986), attempt to attract industries with higher than average rates o f technological
change. Once these innovative industries are in place, they foster agglomeration through
backward and forward linkages, thus promoting industrial competitiveness and
stabilizing regional employment (Fusi, 1990; Sweeney, 1987; Tsongas, 1981).
The implicit assumption behind these policies is that there is a direct and positive
relationship between technological change and a production center's continued industrial
viability. Unfortunately, neither the nature nor extent of the relationship between
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innovation and place has been appropriately tested. This lack is especially glaring in the
sub-discipline of economic geography, which is 01-equipped to address issues of
technological change-induced spatial restructuring because of methodological limitations
and problems associated with specifying models o f technological change. These
difficulties are further complicated by issues of scale and theoretical constraints.
In the first instance, geographers make no attempt to examine directly
technological change. By invoking the economist's black box, geographers equate
innovation with a product's perceived degree of technical sophistication (Delaney, 1993),
the number of patents granted to individual firms (Ceh, 1997), or an industry’s rate of
employment growth (Barkley, 1988; Norton and Rees, 1979). Unfortunately, these
approaches serve as surrogate measures and do not actually measure technological
change. The second problem with current geographical analyses o f technological change
concerns issues o f scale and theory. Neo-classical industrial location theory, because of
its concern with locationally-specific factors, would seem to provide a suitable analytical
framework (Smith, 1980; and Rees and Stafford, 1986). However, its analytical
techniques hold technology constant, effectively eliminating consideration o f
technological change. Structuralist industrial location theory, despite its concern with
the dynamics of change within larger economic spatial systems (Massey, 1979a and
1979b; Massey and Meegan, 1979), precludes consideration of specific industrial
centers and technological change across actual places and time.
Hie technological change induced spatial restructuring process can not be
understood until the relationship between technological change and the competitive
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ability of particular places is clarified. The question that needs to be examined, then, is
whether or not the individual production center’s ability to generate or rapidly assimilate
new products or production processes enhances that center's ability to compete
successfully with other production centers. Answering this question requires an
analytical framework that, first, develops a method to measure technological change at
individual production centers and, second, relates this measure to the changes in the
market share of these centers within the context of larger spatial industrial systems.
2. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
BRITISH IRON AND STEAM SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY
This dissertation investigates the relationship between innovation and place
through a case study o f the spatial restructuring of the 1840-1880 British iron and steam
shipbuilding industry. This industry and time period have been selected for study for
three reasons. First, shipbuilding analysts consider technological change to be both the
initiator ofi and a key determinant in, this industry’s periodic relocations (Harrison, 1983;
Todd, 1985). Second, between 1840 and 1880, British shipbuilders perfected iron ship
construction and marine steam propulsion and, in so doing, revolutionized ocean
transport (Gilfillan, 1935). Third, and more importantly from a geographical
perspective, the new ship technology relaxed the industry’s traditional locational
constraints and altered the industry’s spatial structure from the national to inter-regional
geographic scales (Pollard and Robinson, 1979).
hi the late 1830s, British shipbuilders introduced iron construction and steam
propulsion into ocean-going ships. The new ship technologies were then perfected
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during a forty year innovation cycle that lasted until 1880, when steel construction and
the quadruple expansion steam engine initiated a new cycle (Brock and Greenhill, 1973;
Rowland, 1971;Waine, 1976; Abell, 1981). As early as 1872. Britain dominated the
global iron-steamship market and, despite the fact that other national shipbuilding
industries were clearly capable of building iron steamships, its dominance remained
unchallenged until 1918 (Jones, 1957; Pollard, 1957; Pollard and Robinson, 1979).
2.1. Iron and Steam Shipbuilding Technological Change
Shipbuilding historians argue that Britain's early lead in the development of the
iron steamship was a result of the nation's early start in the industrial revolution. The
superiority o f the British iron and mechanical-engineering industries conferred
comparative advantages in these technologies and, with the growth o f the nation's
merchant marine, created demand and supply feedback loops between the shipbuilding,
shipping, iron and steel, and mechanical-engineering industries. Innovations in each of
these industries dramatically raised the technical efficiency and economic productivity of
the ship and accelerated the innovation process (Gilfillan, 1935; Thornton, 1959; Hughes
and Reiter, 1958; and Moyse-Bartlett, 1968).
Iron was introduced as a shipbuilding material in the late eighteenth century.
Experiments with iron shipbuilding were stimulated by increasing difficulties in obtaining
suitable timber for ships combined with declining iron prices created by technological
changes within the iron industry. As shipbuilders gained experience with the new
material, iron proved to be both stronger and more weight-efficient than wood. Coupled
with new hull forms and new ship designs made possible by iron construction techniques,
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ships became ever larger and more cargo efficient throughout the study period. By
1880, when the industry began to replace iron with stronger and lighter steeL, modem
construction systems, hull forms, and ship designs were in place.
Although experiments with steam propulsion occurred simultaneously in both
Britain and the United States, British shipbuilders were installing steam engines in iron
hulls by the early 1820s. and iron steamships successfully crossed the Atlantic Ocean
under continuous steam power in 1838. These ships demonstrated the practicality of the
new ship technology as an ocean-going cargo carrier. A series of improved engine
designs, steam boilers and condensers, and propulsion systems was introduced and
improved upon over the next forty years. The marine steam propulsion systems in place
by 1880 remained the industry standard until the introduction of the marine diesel engine
at the beginning of the twentieth century.
2.1.1. Ship Changes
By 1850, the new ship technologies had been accepted by the shipping industry,
and by 1872 the British iron steamship was the accepted world standard. Innovations
between 1840 and 1880 were directed toward increasing ship size and power. By 1880,
when steel construction and the multiple expansion engine introduced a new innovation
cycle, modem ship construction techniques, propulsion systems, and ship designs were
essentially established (Jones, 1957; Musson, 1978; Pollard and Robinson, 1979;
Whitehurst, 1986).
These changes can be seen in the following illustrations which document the
evolution of the iron and screw steamship during the study period. Figure I-1 shows the
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Figure 1-1: Great Britain, circa 1843
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Great Britain, built in Bristol. England and launched in 1843. This ship, 289 feet long
and 50 feet wide, was the largest ship built up to that time. It was also one of the first
iron and screw-propelled liners designed to carry passengers, mail, and high value freight
between Europe and North America (Rowland, 1970; Gilfillan. 1935; Cunningham,
1903). As indicated by the lines o f the bow and stem, the ship was designed like a
wooden sailing ship, and its six rigged masts demonstrate its capability to raise sail in
case of engine break-down or to conserve coal if favorable winds allowed.
By 1879, the packet liner had evolved into the Pacific and Oriental Line's Oriental
(Figure 1-2), the largest and most powerful ship o f her day. Differences between this
ship and the Great Britain are striking. Most apparent is the Oriental’s greater size,
made possibleby advances in both iron construction and marine steam engine
technology. Also, the fewer number of masts and minimal rigging indicate that sails
could be raised in an emergency to maintain headway, but the arrangement of the masts
and rigging reflect their primary use as cargo booms.
Although less romantic than the great packet liners, the contribution of small
coastal steamers and colliers to the new ship's acceptance by the shipping industry was
even more significant (Hughes and Reiter, 1958). The ship in Figure 1-3 is a traditional
wood and sail collier, built on the English North East Coast to haul coal from the
region’s coal fields to London and northern European ports (Abell, 1981; Waine, 1976).
These ships had two drawbacks: first, they could not sail against contrary winds and
tides; and second, they had to make their return voyage in ballast. The first iron and
steam collier, similar to that in Figure 1-4, was the John Bowes built by Palmers of
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Figure 1-2: Oriental, circa 1879
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Figure 1-3: Traditional Wood and Sail Collier
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Early Iron and Steam Collier, circa 1852
Source: Walne, 1976.
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Figure 1-4: Early Iron and Steam Collier
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Newcastle in 1852. Use o f the steam engine meant that cargo ships were no longer
forced to stay in port because of contrary winds and tides. Iron construction, in addition
to permitting larger ships, allowed for the fitting of water ballast tanks for stabilizing the
ship's trim when sailing without a cargo. Both changes meant that the same ship could
make many more voyages per year and that those voyages could be scheduled, which
revolutionized both the collier and coasting trades (Abell, 1981; Dougan, 1968; Waine.
1976).
By 1880, the coastal steamer had evolved into the tramp steamer, shown in
Figure 1-5. This particular ship, though built in 1890, is representative o f circa-1880
coaster/colliers and incorporates such modem features as cut down rigging and a raised
quarterdeck. These features are characteristic o f modem ocean-going cargo ships.
Their appearance by this date illustrates both the greater reliability and power of the
1880 marine steam engine compared to that of 1840, and the fact that modem ocean
going cargo carriers evolved during the 1840-1880 period.
2.2. Spatial Change in British Shipbuilding
One practical effect of the adoption o f the iron steamship was that it completely
altered the spatial structure of the British shipbuilding industry. Before 1840,
shipbuilding was constrained to locations with suitable river-ffontage and proximity to
raw materials and markets. These constraints favored rivers in the south o f England,
with the largest concentration of shipbuilding firms and shipyards found on the rivers
Thames and Solent (Figure 1-6). Tools and equipment were negligible, construction
methods primitive, and little capital was required for entry. As a result, the industry was
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made up of a large number o f highly competitive, small-scale producers characterized by
relatively easy entry and exit (Jones, 1957; Pollard and Robinson, 1979).
After 1850, when iron replaced wood, the industry’s scale and complexity
changed. As ships got larger, the construction process became more complicated and
required more space and capital. Shipbuilding shifted from an industry o f small
handicraft firms to large, highly capitalized firms with large labor forces o f semi-skilled
machine workers, laborers, and craftsmen using complex power tools. Not only did the
scale and complexity change, but shipbuilding activity experienced a profound spatial re
orientation toward the iron and mechanical-engineering industries located on northern
rivers: the most famous being the Clyde; and the Tyne, the Wear, and the Dees on the
English North East Coast.
The growth of Scotland's Clyde-side industry (Figure 1-6) has been attributed to
the joint ventures of shipowners and boiler makers. On the Clyde, many shipbuilders
began their careers as boilermakers and continued to rely on spatial proximity and
industrial linkages with iron manufacturers and mechanical engineers. From the outset,
the Clyde region's shipbuilders drew upon the external economies associated with the
region's iron, mechanical-engineering, and shipping industries to develop reputations for
highly efficient marine steam engines, boilers, and propulsion machinery (Bremner, 1969;
Robb, 1958; Tumock, 1982; and Walker, 1984).
England's Northeast Coast was already an established wooden shipbuilding
region, but a new market for colliers and other bulk cargo vessels gave the region's
industry new life. The new iron and mechanical-engineering industry formed the nucleus
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around which the iron and steam shipbuilding industry developed (Waine, 1976).
Although the first iron steamship was not built until 1850, the region's shipbuilding
enterprises established solid reputations for their screw propulsion systems, cargo ship
designs, and marine engines (Pollard and Robinson, 1979; Dougan. 1968; Smith and
Holden, 1953).
The standard explanation for the growth o f the British shipbuilding industry and
shipbuilding centers implies a positive relationship between technological change and
industrial locational viability. This interpretation, while intuitively appealing, is also
misleading because it is based on interpretations o f the post-1880 performance o f the
national shipbuilding industry and dominant post-1880 shipbuilding centers. All British
shipbuilding centers did not, in fact, benefit from the new technologies. For example,
London and Liverpool (Figure 1-6) were routinely recognized as the dominant centers in
the traditional wood and sad-based shipbuilding industry, but these centers did not
survive the 1840-1880 period. Both cities, however, developed reputations as
innovative iron and steam shipbuilding centers: London enjoyed a reputation for her
innovative marine engineers and naval architects and pioneered twin-screw propulsion
systems and machined boiler and engine parts. Liverpool's reputation was based on fast
paddle steamers while Birkenhead, across the Mersey from Liverpool, was known for
innovative warships. But, despite their renown, these cities declined in terms of gross
production and market share during the 1840-1880 period because o f factors unrelated
to innovation, such as high labor costs, congestion, and a lack o f cheap and readily
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accessible iron supplies (Banbury, 1971; Pollard. 1950; and Pollard and Robinson,
1979).
The fortunes of these British shipbuilding centers and regions reveal two
contradictions in the assumptions that link technological change and place. First, as the
London and Liverpool industries demonstrate, innovative ability need not necessarily
guarantee industrial viability. Second, local industrial changes are caused by the net
effects o f growth and decline within a spatial system's individual production centers.
3. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
One o f the purposes of this study is to introduce an analytical framework that
reconciles the consideration of structure and place in industrial locational analysis. As
the above overview indicates, both economic structure and locationally specific attributes
o f particular centers operated to reconfigure the British shipbuilding industrial landscape:
nineteenth-century technological changes were both introduced by shipbuilders and
imposed on them by changes in world shipbuilding and related industries. What is
needed, therefore, is an analytical framework which evaluates the effects o f technological
change on locational viability using both Structuralist and neo-classical techniques.
Although these two theories are often presented as antithetical, spatial restructuring over
time and space is the culmination of changes initiated at and imposed upon each and
every location within an industrial system. Therefore, their apparent conflicts may be
circumvented if analysis is conducted at multiple scales.
This study treats innovative ability as a locationally specific capacity for
generating or rapidly assimilating innovations, while industrial viability specifically refers
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to a center's growth or stability, in terms of share of total gross tonnage output vis-a-vis
the larger industrial system. The large scale-factors of time—the technological cycle—and
space—the individual components o f the industrial system—form the framework within
which the locationally-specific variables of innovative ability and industrial viability are
positioned. This framework allows for analysis o f the technological performance of any
center within the industrial system at any time during the technological cycle.
This study is not concerned directly with steamship productivity or efficiency
gains associated with technological change. Rather h assumes that innovation and
adoption are a response to efficiency and productivity gains and that their continued use
in the modem merchant ship sufficiently establishes the case for their superiority. Nor is
the study concerned with the original rationale for adopting these technological changes:
it is assumed that each shipbuilder’s decision to adopt a particular technology reflects a
rational assessment o f the prevailing economic situation, both within the shipyard and the
industry as a whole.
4. METHODOLOGY
The relationship between technological change and locational viability is assessed
by testing the hypothesis o f a positive association between a British shipbuilding center's
industrial viability and its innovative ability. Functionally, industrial viability is defined as
a center’s annual market share o f total national shipbuilding output, while innovative
ability is defined as a shipbuilding center's role as a technological leader or laggard.
The test o f this hypothesis requires three steps. First, the industrial viability of
each individual shipbuilding center for each year it was in production is determined by
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calculating its share of total national output for that year. The data on shipbuilding
output are obtained from the Lloyds Register of British and Foreign Shipping The
Register is an annually published listing, beginning in 1834, of all ships inspected and
certified by its ship surveyors. Once the individual ship data for each firm are aggregated
by center, each production center's annual output is categorized as either a high,
medium, or low production center. Based as it is on total annual tonnage output, this
ranking reflects the center's competitiveness within its industrial system for each year that
the center contributed a ship to the Register.
The second step establishes the innovative ability of each center through the
derivation of a synthetic measure o f component technologies which differentiates
technologically leading and lagging iron steamships. This is accomplished in the
following manner. First, a series o f multiple regression models, one for each o f four
shipbuilding cycles, are specified to identify significant component iron steamship
technologies (independent variables) that contributed to a ship's register tonnage (the
dependent variable). Next, the significant set of component technologies for each ship
are ranked and assigned a value ranging from one (lowest) to five (highest), based on the
range o f values for each variable. Each value is then summed to develop a score of each
ship's level o f technological sophistication. Finally, each center's annual status as
technological leader or laggard is established by summing the score for each ship built at
the center during a given year and assigning centers with scores above the mean to the
rank o f high (technological leader) and below the mean to the low rank (technological
laggard). The data are obtained from the Register
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The last step in this analysis connects the industrial viability and innovative ability
measures to investigate the relationship between innovation and place. The test is
carried out using contingency tables in conjunction with a chi-square test statistic. Each
center's industrial viability and innovative ability rankings are combined to produce four
three-by-two contingency tables, one for each shipbuilding cycle. The chi-square
statistic is then calculated to test for the presence of an association between innovation
and place.
5. CONTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH
Changes in regional US manufacturing employment have raised concerns over an
apparent lack o f innovative ability in the world's industrial countries and the effects of
this lack on the economic viability of established industrial centers and regions. These
concerns are based on the implicit assumption that industrial viability is related to
innovative ability, or the ability to generate or rapidly adopt technological change. At
the same time, the literature on technological change, capitalist growth, and spatial
industrial restructuring, all o f which attempt to examine technological change, ultimately
fail to examine this relationship because it does not deal realistically with the spatial
aspects of the restructuring process. Instead, this literature often obscures our
understanding of the impact of technological change on the individual production center
because it obscures the interaction between structure and place. Hopefully, this
analytical framework will provide us with greater insight into the problems facing
production centers during periods of technologically-induced spatial industrial

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

restructuring and help in the formulation o f strategies that anticipate, rather than react, to
change.
This study o f the relationship between innovative ability and locational viability
operates at two levels. First, it presents an analytical framework which reconciles the
broad macro-scale concerns o f the new economic development theories with the placespecific focus o f the more traditional regional scientists. This framework is presented in
a locational analysis of the technological change-induced spatial industrial restructuring
that accompanied British development of the iron steamship which tests the assumption
that locational viability is dependent upon a location's innovative ability. Understanding
this relationship is fundamental to understanding not only the nineteenth-century
restructuring of the British ocean-going iron and steam shipbuilding industry, but the
spatial shifts in industrial activity occurring today.
At a broader level, this study seeks to incorporate place into considerations of
spatial industrial restructuring. Although the current round of industrial restructuring
has raised the issue o f innovation and industrial viability, concern over theoretical issues
has obscured the relevance o f place in economic geographical analysis. While
geographers have examined the relationship between technological change and industrial
regions, few have examined the relationship between innovative ability and the individual
production center—the place where innovations emerge and where spatial changes are
most directly felt. In short, this study seeks to understand the interplay o f structural and
locational forces. This "squaring o f the theoretical circle" is needed if more realistic
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models o f the spatial restructuring process and more effective locational analytical
techniques are to be developed.
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CHAPTER n
LITERATURE REVIEW

The previous chapter introduced the argument that current studies of technological
change-induced spatial industrial restructuring are inadequate because they fail to
explicitly examine an important underlying assumption. This assumption is that the
greater an industrial center or region's ability to initiate or rapidly assimilate innovations,
then the greater its economic viability which translates directly as success in the market.
Further, two reasons for this shortcoming were provided: First, economic geographers do
not directly measure technological change; and, Second, they have not related
technological change to the viability o f individual production centers.
This chapter extends this argument through a review of the technological change
literature which directly informs this research effort. This literature intersects the fields of
economics, economic history, and economic geography. It begins by defining
technological change and discusses the ground breaking work o f two economists, Simon
Kuznets and Joseph Schumpeter. These scholars have had a profound influence on the
understanding and analysis of technological change and its relationship to economic
growth. Indeed, their work has framed scholarly research into technological change and
economic growth for much o f the past sixty years. Next, the chapter examines the
historical and historical-economic literatures on technological change in mid- to latenineteenth century British shipbuilding and the industry's spatial restructuring. Finally, it
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surveys the literatures o f regional science and economic geography that deal with
theoretical, analytical, and methodological issues associated with technological change and
the spatial analysis o f the effects of technology on industrial location.
1. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
This chapter will first define technological change and examine the contributions of
the two individuals who have made the greatest contribution to research in technological
change and economic growth. It begins by precisely establishing what is meant by
technological change and the related concepts of invention and innovation. It then
discusses the work o f Simon Kuznets and Joseph Schumpeter, the two scholars who have
provided the greatest insights into the relationship between technological change and
economic growth. Their contributions are then contrasted in order to demonstrate how
their views have influenced the analysis of technological and spatial economic change.
1.1. Definitions and Concepts
Technology is written or unwritten human knowledge applied in production
(Rossegar, 1986) and is the physical representation of that knowledge manifested by either
physical tools or social processes (Link, 1987). Usher (1954) viewed technology as being
the result of an innovation, and an innovation as the result of an invention (the emergence
o f "new things" requiring "act o f insight” going beyond the exercise o f technical or
professional skills). Accordingly, Mansfield (1968) regarded technological change as the
advance o f technology, often taking the form o f new methods for producing existing
products; new product designs with important new characteristics; and new techniques of
organization, marketing and management. These technological advances bring about
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productivity growth, which improves production efficiency, which in turn leads back to
higher productivity growth (Link, 1987).
1.2. Kuznets and Schumpeter on Technological Change
Although the classical economists, from Smith to Marx, recognized the importance
of technological change, interest in the subject languished among economists until the
1930s. During this decade, two economists. Simon Kuznets and Joseph Schumpeter,
began work that has profoundly influenced scholars interested in technological change and
spatial economic growth and change. Both individuals considered technological change to
be the primary cause of economic growth, and both identified technological change as the
primary cause o f regular, periodic cycles of economic growth and decline.
1.2.1. Simon Kuznets and Joseph Schumpeter
Simon Kuznets (1930, 1940, 1962) and Joseph Schumpeter (1939, 1950) both
argued that ceaseless change was the dominant characteristic o f the modem economic
system and that technological change was its primary cause. Both also argued that neo
classical analytical methods incorporating assumptions o f stable systems, or equilibrium
conditions, were unsuited to examine this change.
Kuznets believed that regional and national disparities in economic growth rates
were caused by differential rates of growth among industries. These disparities were due
to the positive effects of technological changes on a succession o f leading industries
coupled with the impediments to growth created by older industries for which the greatest
benefits o f technological advance had been realized. Technological change is realized
within an industry following the introduction of an invention. The invention is
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endogenous to the industry but stimulated by population growth or demand. The industry
experiences rapid growth as the original invention is perfected through a continuous
process o f innovation. However, vigorous expansion eventually slows because the rate o f
technical progress slackens; slower growing industries retard faster growing, but
complementary, industries; the relative amount of funds available for expansion decrease
as the industry expands; or the growth o f an industry in one country is retarded by
competition from the same, but rapidly expanding, industry in another country. This
results in the decline o f the industry and the regions dependent upon that industry. In this
sense, Kuznets' work was explicitly spatial.
Joseph Schumpeter (1939, 1950) also maintained that technological change was
the driving force behind capitalist growth because it produces regular and period
economic revolutions that greatly increase economic growth. These economic revolutions
are caused by radical technological changes that are exogenous to the industrial system
and that are introduced by new firms during depressions in an attempt to improve their
competitive position. For Schumpeter, technological change is a disequilibrating
mechanism rather than the series of adjustments to the equilibrium production function as
maintained by Kuznets and especially Salter (1960): the new innovations create entirely
new production functions as factors of production are shifted out of the old and into the
new techniques. As an innovation diffuses and techniques are standardized during periods
of economic prosperity, however, production functions begin to converge on, or
approach, equilibria. This convergence continues until all the benefits o f the original
innovation have been exploited and economic depression sets in, at which point a new

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

29

wave of innovations are introduced and the capitalist system is reinvigorated in what
Schumpeter termed the process of "Creative Destruction" (1950, pg. 83).
1.2.3. Contrasts between Kuznets and Schumpeter
While both Kuznets and Schumpeter identified technological change as the driving
force behind economic growth and identified a regular temporal pattern in the relationship
between technological change and economic growth, the similarities end there. First,
Kuznets considered technological change to be a continuous process endogenous to a
given industry. Since innovations are introduced continuously, the production function
continuously adjusts to a series o f equilibrium conditions which can then be analyzed using
neo-classical econometric techniques. For Schumpeter, economic growth is a stochastic,
disequilibrating mechanism because innovations radically alter the production function.
Accordingly, the student of technological change is required to the analyze the economic
and industrial system within which it originates, and neo-classical techniques are
inappropriate for such analysis.
The second major distinction between the two is their view of the business cycle.
Kuznet's business cycle focused on major industries or systems of related industries, so
that their impact on regional or national economies reflects the industry's importance
within that economy. Schumpeter's business cycles, conversely, were predicated on the
introduction o f revolutionary products and production processes. The new technologies
changed all that came before and continued to do so until the introduction o f the next
round o f new technologies that are initiated during the final stage of the cycle.
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2. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND 1840-1880 BRITISH SHIPBUILDING
This section reviews the literature relating to contemporary and mid- to latenineteenth century shipbuilding technological changes and related spatial industrial
changes. This industry is especially pertinent to an analysis o f the impacts of technology
on spatial industrial development because shipbuilding analysts consider technological
change to be the primary cause for the regular, periodic spatial restructuring of
shipbuilding activity. This section begins with a review of studies that establish the
importance o f technological change to the economic viability of the industry. It then
concludes with a survey of historical and historical economic studies o f the 1840-1880
British industry that deal with iron steamship technological change and the British
industry’s spatial structure.
2.1. Technological Change and Shipbuilding
The recent and significant declines of shipbuilding employment in North America
and Western Europe relative to Japan and other Pacific Rim countries have generated a
sizeable literature on the impacts o f technological change on the contemporary industry.
This literature identifies technological change as one o f the primary causes for the
industry’s "West to East" spatial shift and the resultant loss o f shipbuilding employment in
the West. Harrison (1983) argues that spatial shifts in the shipbuilding industry are the
consequence o f Schump eterian-type technological change cycles which significantly alter
either ships or ship-construction techniques. He identifies five periods o f spatial
restructuring, beginning with the dominance of the Dutch industry in the seventeenth
century and ending with the current dominance o f the Pacific Rim countries, and
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speculates that innovation is as important to continued growth as are management,
industrial relations, and productivity.
The most comprehensive work on the impact of technological change on
shipbuilding has been conducted by Daniel Todd (1985) in his examination o f the British
shipbuilding industry. Using case studies from the British experience, Todd maintains that
technological change is one of five factors that determine the location o f shipbuilding
activity. He argues that process and product innovations change the competitive position
o f individual firms, as well as regional and national industries that are best able to take
advantage o f those changes. Both Todd and Rother (1985) argue that the industry's shift
out of Western Europe and into Japan was due to both lower factor input costs and
product and process innovations introduced by the Japanese industry in the early 1960s.
In addition to lower wage rates and newer shipyard facilities, Frankel (1990) identifies the
increasing integration of the ship into intermodal transport systems as the most important
recent ship technological change. Hillings (1989) attributes ship intermodality to the
restructuring o f the British system of ports as cargo-handling capability shifts out of
larger ports and into revitalized smaller ports.
2.2. Nineteenth Century British Shipbuilding
Shipbuilding historians attribute the industry's domination o f the world shipbuilding
industry by 1872 to its pioneering efforts in and perfection of the iron steamship. The shift
o f world shipbuilding to Britain in the mid- to late nineteenth century is the third of
Harrison's (1983) five restructuring periods and, according to this author, was due to the
British industry's innovative leadership in iron steamship construction. Todd (985), in his
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examination of the origins o f British dominance, attributes the industry’s growth to the
shipbuilding industry's ability to introduce and perfect new shipbuilding techniques and
ship technologies.
Shipbuilding was one of the major industries that contributed to Britain's
nineteenth and early twentieth century dominance o f the world economy. Despite its
importance, however, the pre-1872 iron and steam shipbuilding industry and its spatial
change has not received a great deal of attention. Most o f the studies that have been
produced consist o f qualitative introductory analyses or regional shipbuilding histories.
This section examines these studies, by historians and economic historians, that either
directly or indirectly relate to technological change or the industry’s spatial restructuring.
2.2.1. Technological Change and Spatial Industrial Change
Since it was one of the few British industrial success stories o f the late nineteenth
century, the shipbuilding industry has generated its own significant body of literature.
Musson (1978) bases the shipbuilding industry's growth on the iron steamship revolution,
which resulted in advances in the established iron and steel and engineering industries, and
the increasing inter-relationship between these industries and shipbuilding. Pollard and
Robinson (1979) consider the industry to be so important to the national economy that
cycles in the demand for new ships affected the whole economy. These authors argue that
because Britain was an island nation with sheltered ports which notably controlled a large
share o f world trade and also held abundant capital, it was poised to become the leading
shipbuilding nation once an economical supply of raw materials were made available.
Finally, Deane and Cole (1962) emphasize the importance o f the industry by

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

demonstrating that the total value o f merchant vessels produced in British shipyards
during 1914 accounted for approximately 1.25% of British gross domestic product; more
than 2% of all wages; and 30% o f British steel production.
Introductory chapters in several books outline the British development o f iron
steamship technology and its revolutionary impact on raw materials, construction
techniques, and propulsion. Whitehurst's (1986) analysis of the decline of the United
States shipbuilding and repairing industries discusses the competition between American
and British shipbuilders following the repeal of the British Navigation Acts in 1849. He
argues that British shipbuilders revolutionized both the world shipbuilding and shipping
industries by developing the iron steamship while the American industry continued to build
wooden sailing ships. By the mid-nineteenth century British shipbuilders had significantly
lowered their production costs relative to the more traditional, and complacent, United
States industry. Jones (1957) considers Britain's head start in metal shipbuilding; cheap
materials, especially iron and steel; and abundant skilled labor as British advantages that
were established during the first half o f the nineteenth-century and fully realized during the
second half Further, and as a result o f these advantages, Britain was identified with iron
and steam shipbuilding by the 1870s and had displaced other countries as the world's
leading shipbuilding nation.
Studies o f the industry's role in keying Britain's impressive late-nineteenth-century
economic growth emphasize the demand and supply feedback loops between interrelated
industries and their impacts on the shipping and shipbuilding industries. Several authors
emphasize the shipping industry's need for fuel efficient and cargo efficient vessels as
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causes o f innovations in construction and propulsion (Cunningham. 1903; MoyseBartlett, 1968; MacGreggor, 1980 and 1984; and Thornton, 1959). Economic analyses
have also been conducted (Pollard and Robinson, 1979; Pollard, 1957; and Harley, 1974).
Other authors (Rowland, 1971;Waine, 1976; Abell, 1981; Jones, 1957; Parkinson, 1960;
Graham, 1958; and Gilfillan. 1935) emphasize technological changes in the iron-working
industries that lowered raw material prices, improved strength and malleability, and raised
the quality of high tolerance machine work.
The spatial impact o f these technological changes have also been studied. Bremner
examined the role of technological change on the growth o f the Clyde shipbuilding region
in a series of articles originally published in 1868 (1969). More contemporary work on
the importance technological change on the Clyde's growth includes Robb (1958),
Tumock (1982), and Walker (1984). Relatively little has been written concerning the
English North East Coast, but Smith and Holden (1953), Dougan (1968), and especially

Waine (1976) relate the region's growth and mid-nineteenth-century importance to the
development and implementation of product and process innovations in iron and steam
shipbuilding.
Other authors have examined the decline of shipbuilding activity in traditional
shipbuilding regions as well. Banbury (1971) and Pollard (1950) have examined the

London industry, arguing that shipbuilding declined because its pioneering and highly
innovative marine engineers and iron shipbuilders could not overcome such disadvantages
as river congestion, high land and labor costs, and the distance from raw materials. Pollard
and Robinson (1979) make a similar argument for the decline o f the Mersey industry, and
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add that Liverpool's harbor management board, in addition to driving up waterfront land
prices for shipbuilders, refused to provide them with adequate rail facilities.
2.2.2. The Technology and Productivity Debate
The economic impacts of the mid-nineteenth century British iron screw steamship
have stoked a lively debate among economic historians that began in 1958. In this year,
Hughes and Reiter (1958) examined technological changes in the 1860 British iron
steamship merchant fleet. These researchers argued that iron construction and the marine
steam engine increased cargo-carrying capacity and ship speed, and that these new ship
technologies accounted for the dramatic shipping productivity gains o f the British
merchant fleet between the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
This argument was challenged by Max Fletcher (1958) and Douglas North (1958,
1968). Fletcher argued that the opening of the Suez Canal had the greater impact on
shipping productivity gains because it rendered the sailing ship obsolete and directed ship
technological changes, for both iron screw steamships and traditional sailing ships, toward
those that best exploited the "least distance" trade routes afforded by the CanaL North
explicitly challenged the view that technological change is the most important factor in
economic growth by contending that shipping productivity gains pre-dated the
introduction of the iron steamship and that these productivity gains were the result of the
development of new regions that produced agricultural staples and provided paying cargos
for both legs of the ship's voyage. Other changes that reduced shipping costs were the
decline in piracy and improved business organization within the shipping industry. These
arguments have been examined in more detail by North's students Walton and Shepherd
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(1979). Ville (1986) also argued that British shipping productivity gains, at least in the
coastwise coal trade, predate the introduction o f the iron and screw collier, a bulk cargocarrier used to haul coal from the English North East Coast to London and other coal
markets. According to Ville, the factors contributing to lowered shipping costs included,
among others, improved cargo-handling techniques, lower manning requirements, stable
insurance costs, and quicker turnaround time and. hence, more voyages.
The arguments of North and Ville have been challenged on a number of points,
however. Harley (1988) noted that North only considered US and Caribbean shipping
data (and made several computational errors at that). Based on his analysis of a much
larger dataset incorporating a greater diversity of trade routes, Harley contended that
worldwide improvements in shipping began with the application of the iron steamship to
ocean transportation because the new ship saved on factor inputs and increased
competition in the shipping industry. Hausman (1987), in a discussion o f Ville's article,
maintained that productivity gains in the coal trade had little impact on the British
economy and were much smaller than for those in other industries. He also observed that
the single most dramatic change in the technology of the shipping industry was the
adoption o f the iron screw steamer, and thus, the actual question to be answered is why
shipping costs did not fall even more rapidly.
3. TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND INDUSTRIAL LOCATION
The concerns o f the shipbuilding-specific literature mirror the essential components
o f the broader debate regarding the overall importance o f technological change and both
economic and regional economic growth. Due to its interest in the spatial distribution of
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economic activity, the sub-field o f economic geography has generated a sizeable literature
on the impacts o f technological change to the spatial distribution of economic activity in
general. Since the late 1970s especially, this literature has focused on the role of
technological change in the industrial location decision and regional economic
development. This literature is often characterized by what might best be described as an
at times acrimonious debate among two competing paradigms.
3.1. Industrial Location Theory
This section reviews the two most commonly used industrial location theories, the
neo-classical and the structuralist. It also notes their analytical shortcomings, namely,
their inability to realistically explicate the links between technological change and spatial
industrial restructuring. Further, it argues that elements o f both theories in synthesis,
rather than one or the other, are required to understand this phenomenon.
3.1.1. Neo-classical Industrial Location Theory
The older o f the two theories, the neo-classical economic location tradition, held
sway until the industrial and employment dislocations within the US and Western
European economies in the early 1970s. Up until the 1970s, it was generally accepted that
net investment, rather than technological change, was the primary cause o f economic
growth (Link, 1987). However, these social disruptions raised questions about the utility
o f investments in explaining the spatial restructuring process and attendant job losses. At
the same time, neo-classical theory, which holds technological change constant, was also
found wanting.
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Neo-classical industrial location theory regards locationally-specific factor
endowments or factor costs to be the primary determinants in the industrial location
decision. The analytical approach was first introduced by Weber (1929). Weber’s
analytical framework identified the "best" location for a manufacturing establishment using
neo-classical micro economic theory. He argued that industrial locations are
fundamentally determined by differences in costs, and that cost differences are due to
natural conditions, such as climate, transport costs, or the spatial distribution of raw
materials and labor. Further, cost differentials can only be changed by technical progress
or by economic or social conditions which alter interest rates, labor skills, and living
standards. However, only transport and labor costs vary with location, so that the
identification o f the optimal, least-cost location requires the identification of cost
differentials from one production location to another. The result was a transport and
labor deterministic modeL
The approach has been broadened, however, by factors other than transport and
labor costs, and as Smith (1981) argues, neo-classical location theory still provides a valid
framework for examining the location decision. The framework is still used extensively by
economic geographers who are concerned with locationally-specific attributes that
influence the location o f industrial activity. Oakey and Cooper's (1989) locational analysis
o f high technology firms, which emphasizes locational considerations such as psychic
income, least cost location, and agglomeration, explicitly points out the utility of neo
classical location theory in understanding the locational behavior o f these firms. Cornish
(1997) analyzes the spatial interaction of innovation and new product introduction to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39

argue that innovative activity is a function o f the spatial proximity between producers and
markets and is based on locationally specific attributes. The neo-classical framework is
also used extensively by economists and regional scientists, with examples being Jin's
(1991) analysis of technological change and Chinese industrial structure using CobbDouglas type production functions, and Frenkel and Shefefs (1996) modeling o f regional
innovativeness that employs a LOGIT behavioral model to evaluate the probabilities o f a
firm's adoption o f innovations.
Neo-classical industrial location theory provides a framework for identifying the
considerations involved in the individual firm's location decision. However, it is ill
equipped to consider technological change for two important, if overlooked, reasons. The
first is that while its practitioners are aware that technological change alters factor
availability and price, neo-classical assumptions of economic equilibria assume away
adjustments to factor inputs that are the result o f the dynamic process of technological
change. This is a fundamental problem for regional scientists: their methodological
approaches adequately describe a steady-state system, but such approaches become
awkward when change over time is introduced to the analysis. The second drawback is
that traditional locational analysis, because o f its emphasis on the individual firm or
industry, takes a bottom-up approach that does not consider the economic and
organizational environment within which the location decision is made.
3.1.2. Structuralist Industrial Location Theory
Currently, the most commonly used theoretical framework for assessing the
industrial location decision is Structuralism. Structuralist industrial location theory,
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strongly influenced by the Marxist critique of the capitalist system, regards the location
decision as directly related to the dynamic disequilibria of capitalism which is, in turn,
caused by technological change. The structuralist critique of neo-classical industrial
location was introduced by Massey and Megan in 1979 and has its origins in the social
dislocations associated with the "stagflation" of the 1970s (Freeman, 1982).
Massey ( 1979a) objected to neo-classical marginalist economic theory and its
idealized, but unrealistic, model of the firm. She argued that neo-classical industrial
location theory cannot account for spatial behavior because its approach, which begins
with the firm and then works up to the broader economy, eliminates historical and
individual variations in behavior. As a result, it ignores the dynamics o f the system in
which the firm exists. Her observations, in many ways, reflect the Marxist view expressed
by Storper and Walker (1989) and Sayer (1983) who see technological change as a
negative consequence of the capitalist economic system, Le., as the instrument o f uneven
spatial economic development. To correct these deficiencies, Massey and Meegan
( 1979b) introduced a structuralist, top-down analytical approach which isolates conditions
within the larger economic structure and traces their impact down to the individual firm
and its locational strategy.
Structuralist industrial location theory has been widely adopted by economic
geographers interested in the relationship between technological change and industrial
restructuring. Freeman (1982) stressed that accelerated economic growth is associated
with major innovations but that hierarchical regional industrial structures concentrate
research and development efforts in a few select locations. This view is echoed by
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Sweeney (1987) who has argued that self-generating economic growth requires high rates
o f innovation and the formation o f new firms, but that regions differ as to their innovative
and entrepreneurial ability. Markusen (1985), whom we will discuss later in relation to
her Profit Life Cycle, takes an explicitly structuralist view, while Faberberg et al. (1997)
explain unequal European regional growth of gross domestic product in terms o f the
unequal distribution of research and development activities. The structuralist approach is
also used in formulating the "new economic development theory" which promotes the
endogenous creation o f innovative firms based on the existing industrial structure and
composition of a region or area (Teitz, 1994).
Models based on structuralist industrial location theory, based as they are on
dynamic disequilibrium, offer a powerful analytical framework for understanding the
relationship between technological change and spatial industrial change. They are
predicated on the fret that spatial industrial behavior cannot be understood unless the
dynamics of change, conditions in the overall economic system, and variations in firm
behavior are taken into account. At the same time, however, the approach is limited by
the level of generalization at which it operates. Studies using the structuralist framework
take a top-down analytical approach, confining themselves to regional level studies rather
than investigating the impact o f technological change on individual production centers. As
Smith (1981) observed, focusing exclusively on larger economic systems overlooks the
site-specific factors upon which industrial viability is contingent. Warren (1991), in his
industrial location analysis o f the Consett Iron Works, concluded that any study which is
based exclusively on theoretical considerations and disregards the experience of actual
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firms or locations inevitably ignores discrepancies in the performance of individual centers
and their larger industrial region.
3.2. Life Cycles
Kuznets' and Schumpeter’s concepts o f the business cycle, although differing on
major points, have had a profound impact on economists and economic geographers
because they provide a framework for examining technological change through time.
Schumpeter has had an especially strong influence because the employment dislocations
over the course of the past twenty-five years have been directly linked to the stagnation
and depression phases of his business cycle model. Schumpeter is often invoked by
scholars who consider new industries, especially information technology industries, to be
the leading sectors of a new industrial era (Berry, 1991, 1997; Mensch, 1978).
The first explicit use of the business cycle as an analytical framework for
understanding the spatial dynamics o f technological change was Raymond Vernon's
Product Life Cycle (1966). Vernon's cycle provides Kuznets' model o f industrial growth
with a spatial dynamic and allows for the assessment o f location decisions based on the
industry's trajectory in particular phases of the cycle (Norton and Rees, 1979; Rees, 1979).
Vemon postulated that an industry goes through three development phases: an innovation
phase leading to the industry's spatial concentration in areas offering agglomeration
economies; a growth phase during which production becomes standardized, allowing for
new firms and production locations to become established, and during which the industry
is characterized by increasing sales and competition; and a standardization or mature phase
characterized by declining sales, intense competition, and a production process so
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standardized that the industry becomes "foot loose" and seeks out new low cost
production locations. The Product Life Cycle has been used by geographers to link
technological change to the North-South shifts in US manufacturing activity (North and
Rees 1979; Rees, 1979) as well as to the growth and decline (circa 1979) o f the PetroCrescent along the US Gulf Coast (Weinstein, Gross, and Rees, 1985; Weinstein and
Gross, 1987).
An important structuralist reformulation of the Product Life Cycle has been
presented by Markusen (1985, Markusen et aL, 1986). She argues that the changing
regional distribution o f plants and jobs in any industrial sector reflects the priorities of
corporations at each stage of an evolutionary profit cycle. Locational strategies vary over
the course o f the five stages that range from an emphasis on innovative activities in early
stages to the creation o f market power and/or rationalization in its final stages. Each
strategy has unique sets o f demands on factor inputs and market access which, in turn, are
unevenly distributed across regions. The model is therefore market-driven as opposed to
technology-driven.
Although both the Product Life Cycle and Profit Life Cycle provide valuable
analytical frameworks for conceptualizing technological change-induced spatial
restructuring through time, these theories are controversial Examples o f the debate over
the utility of the Product Life Cycle are Sherwood-Coll's (1992) use o f the framework to
confirm the geographic dispersion o f the electrical components industry, while Johnson
(1991) contends that a complete explanation ofbranch-plant locations in the nonmetropolitan US South cannot be obtained within the Product Life Cycle framework.
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Clark (1989) considers the Profit Cycle to be one of the most sophisticated theoretical
tools for conceptualizing the regional growth process, but he reserves doubt on the impact
of cyclical or structural patterns. Similarly, Sorenson's (1997) empirical tests o f
Markusen's key hypotheses of regional industrial composition and cycle trajectories
produce mixed results
3.3. The Measurement of Technological Change
This section concludes with a review o f the techniques used by economic
geographers and regional scientists in relating technological change and place. As Acs and
Andretsch (1991) acknowledge, measuring technological change presents researchers with
serious difficulties. The problem is one of measuring new knowledge and its contribution
to technological progress. As Kuznets (1962) observed thirty years before, the difficulty
lies in finding meaningful measures of innovative inputs and outputs. Because o f this
difficulty, investigators have relied on three proxy measurements: input-output analysis;
the market share of new products relative to old products; and the measurement of
investment in research and development.
The two most commonly used methods in the regional science and economic
geography literature for measuring technological change are based on the surrogates of
research and development expenditures and production functions which measure
technological change. The first method is based on Gilriches study of the social returns of
hybrid com, while the second is a variant of the Hicks-neutral technological change
production function developed by Solow. An example o f the first approach is the general
equilibrium model o f North-South trade developed by Segertrom, et aL (1990) in which
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research and development expenditures are used to determine the rate of new product
development. An example o f the second approach is an estimation of a firm's ability to
incorporate innovations by Green et al. (1991) in which the error term from the
production function is split to isolate random variations which are outside of the firm's
control and those which can be attributed to the firm's technological inefficiency.
The largest component of the economic geographic literature examines the spatial
behavior o f high technology industries such as electronic components and bio-engineering.
These studies make no attempt to determine the innovative ability of the industry being
studied. One example of this approach is Delaney's (1993) study of the urban
agglomeration o f bio-engineering firms in which innovative ability is treated as a given.
More rigorous approaches rely on either proxy measurements such as employment
change, research and development expenditures, or patent counts to establish spatial
innovative ability. Examples of these approaches are Sherwood-Coll (1992) and
Markusen (1985, Markusen et al. 1986). Many o f these studies are methodologically
sound and provide valuable insights into the relationship between technological change
and place. An example is Feldman and Florida's (1994) study that models the
geographical distribution o f innovation in the US in 1982 in which the number of
innovations originating in a state is a function o f university research, industrial research
and development, networks of related firms, and specialized business services.
The approaches discussed above provide methods for measuring the impacts of
technological change and relating those changes back to the spatial system. However,
none o f these methods actually measure technological change. It is one thing to measure
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costs associated with research and development or the number of patents that originate in
a particular area (and to disregard the question o f whether or not the patents are ever
brought to the market). It is quite another to use actual data to measure the technical
changes that actually arise from research, development, and patents.
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has reviewed the literature that guides this research effort. It began
by defining technological change and introducing the work of Simon Kuznets and Joseph
Schumpeter, the two scholars who have had the greatest impact on contemporary studies
of technological change and spatial industrial change. It then discussed the historical and
economic historical literature concerning the 1840-1880 British iron and steam
shipbuilding industry. This literature has directed the discussion and analysis of the
assessment of the relationship between industrial viability and innovative ability that
follows. It concludes with a review o f the theoretical and analytical frameworks used by
geographers to investigate current issues o f technological change-induced spatial
restructuring. These frameworks are extensively utilized in this study because of the
insights and analytical frameworks they provide for any study of the relationship between
innovation and place.
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This chapter describes the methods that will be used to investigate the relationship
between innovative ability and industrial locational viability. As discussed earlier, the
measurement of technological change and its linkage with the performance of individual
centers within an industrial system present researchers with serious problems. As a result,
this study employs a rather complex methodology to establish and locate technological
changes in iron shipbuilding and to relate those change's to a center's industrial viability.
The data used for the study were obtained from the Lloyd's Register o f British and
Foreign Shipping. The Register, which began annual publication in 1834 and continues to
the present, is an efficient source o f information for the British iron and steam shipbuilding
industry and provides an excellent opportunity to explore the importance of technology to
the industrial viability of individual production centers. However, the data are not without
their problems. These problems will be discussed in more detail in later sections o f this
chapter.
The chapter begins by establishing the conceptual model of technological change
and its impact on individual production centers that guide this research. Next, it provides
definitions for key terms and concepts. It then presents the methods used to develop
required variables and specifies the test that will be used to assess the association between
industrial viability and innovative ability.

47
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1. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK
This chapter begins by identifying guiding concepts and defining key terms. The
analytical framework, including key concepts, is introduced first. Next, it provides a
working definition o f the industrial center and its role and importance within larger
industrial structures. This is followed by a discussion of the rationale for technological
change and its implications on innovative ability and locational viability.
1.1. Analytical Framework
This research combines the disequilibria concept of change with the traditional
neo-classical concern with place. Although these two theories are often presented as
antithetical, spatial restructuring over time and space is the culmination of changes
initiated at and imposed upon each and every location within an industrial system. The
large scale-factors o f time—the technological cycle—and space—the individual components
of the industrial system—form the framework within which the locationally-specific
variables o f industrial viability and innovative ability can be examined. This framework
allows for analysis of the technological performance of any center within the industrial
system at any time during the technological cycle.
An industrial center is defined as a single firm or collection o f firms producing a
similar product or related products and operating in the same location. Firms locate at
specific locations for access to markets, factor inputs, or both, and compete with other
firms. These centers collectively form progressively larger portions o f the industrial
system at regional, national, and international scales.
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Innovation is initiated or adopted by individual firms in an attempt to improve
profitability. Early adopters enjoy excess profits by improving their profitability relative to
firms using old technology, while late adopters imitate early adopters so as to maintain
their competitiveness. As the rate of technological change increases, locational instability
and disruption occur as the new technologies alter the relative importance o f factor inputs.
Since factor prices vary in space, new firms can locate at new least cost locations which
can then become viable production centers. Established firms can either move to new
least cost locations, or maintain their locational viability by generating innovations or
adopting the most current, but rapidly changing, "best practice" techniques (Salter, 1960).
Innovative shipbuilding centers enjoy locational advantages over less innovative
centers. This is because dining periods o f rapid technological change locational viability
depends upon the ability to generate, adopt, and incorporate "best practice" techniques.
Competitive advantages due to innovative ability can then mitigate against locational
disadvantages in factor inputs.
1.2. Definitions
Innovative ability and locational viability are considered to be locationally specific
attributes that allow for the assessment o f the relationship between innovative ability and
industrial locational viability. Innovative ability is a production center's ability to generate
or to assimilate technological changes. Industrial viability is a center's growth, stability, or
decline, in terms o f gross output, within the industry's spatial system and is indicated by its
market share.
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Ships incorporated in this research are limited to ocean-going ships that were made
of iron, propelled by marine steam engines and screw propulsion systems, and carried
cargo. These ships were the direct predecessors o f the modem trans-oceanic cargo
carrier. Although the production of fishing vessels, dredgers, tugs, and similar vessels was
an important component o f many production centers' output, these vessels are excluded
from this study because their functions, and hence their technological requirements, were
different from cargo carriers. Paddle-steamers are also excluded because, although they
were highly innovative ships for a time and their production was important at many
centers, these vessels were obsolete as cargo carriers and for use on ocean-going trade
routes by 1865.
The analysis o f technological change is restricted to the most significant
component technologies which characterized the iron steamship. The study does not
establish steamship productivity or efficiency increases to justify technological change.
Rather, it assumes that these increases were the original reasons for innovation and
adoption, and their superiority over other techniques is sufficiently established by their
continued use, after further modification, in the modem merchant ship. Nor does the
study inquire into why the individual firm adopted iron and steam construction. The
shipbuilder's decision to adopt these technologies is considered to a be rational and correct
assessment o f his particular economic situation.
The iron steamship represents the combination o f two complex technologies—
marine steam propulsion and iron construction. A succession o f innovations in propulsion
and construction technologies were introduced during the study period. It is assumed that
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these innovations were adopted to improve efficiency or productivity, either for
shipowners or shipbuilders, and that innovative centers enjoyed competitive advantages
over their rivals.
2. METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK
This section presents the methods used to develop the variables that measure
innovative ability and industrial viability. It begins with a discussion of the data source,
the Lloyd's Register, and its limitations. Next, it introduces the periodization scheme that
is used to sub-divide the 1840-1880 period. Finally, it presents the methods that will be
used to develop the required variables and the procedure for testing the relationship
between industrial viability and innovative ability.
2.1. Data
Data for this study are obtained from the Lloyds Register of British and Foreign
Shipping. The Register collected and reported technical descriptors o f individual ships.
This information was then used by marine insurance underwriters to determine a ship's
insurance risk. Although it was not intended as such, the Register also provides
information needed to test for the relationship between a British iron and steam
shipbuilding center's industrial viability and innovative ability.
The Lloyds Register, not to be confused with the insurance market Lloyds of
London, was the largest and most prestigious o f several ship classification societies.
These societies, under the authority of both the British government and the insurance and
shipping industries, were responsible for certifying a ship's seaworthiness by inspecting the
ship during construction and at regular intervals thereafter. All ships surveyed by Lloyds,
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either new ships or older ships whose owners desired a Lloyds classification, were listed in
the annually published Register. The amount of information increased over the course of
the 1840-1880 study period. By 1872, information in the listing consisted o f the ship's
name, the name and location of the builder, the year o f construction, registered tonnage,
and various technical measurements including dimensions and engine specifications such
as engine type, cylinder size, rated boiler pressure, and horsepower. As such, the Register
offers an efficient source o f locational and technological data.
These data were collected dining the summer o f 1993 from published Registers
held by the Social Science Department of the Mitchell Library in Glasgow, Scotland.
Using each Register published in 1840, 1845, 1850, 1855, 1860, 1865, 1870, 1875, and
1880, all iron steamships built between 1840 and 1880 were identified. All new ships and
ships inspected after launching but not modified in some manner were entered into a
standard spreadsheet. Data for each ship includes the following information: construction
material - iron or steel; tonnage - net, gross, and underdeck; dimensions - length, width,
and depth; number of bulkheads; number o f decks; double bottom or partial double
bottom ballast tanks; name and location o f shipbuilder; type of ship-paddle, screw, or
twin screw; engine type—lever, diagonal, oscillating, compound, and inverted; engine
configuration (angle at which cylinders are mounted on a stationary engine bed); engine
cylinder volume (number o f cylinders x diameter x stroke); boiler pressure; horsepower;
name and location of engine builder; and the year in which the ship was built. The
database for this research consists o f over 2,200 ships from 100 shipbuilding locations in
Britain, Europe, Asia, North America, and New Zealand.
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The dataset was later "culled" to remove all vessels that did not carry cargo, such
as tugs, dredgers, fishing boats, paddle-steamers, and other iron steam vessels, or that
were obviously too small for ocean-going trade. The final dataset consists of 1544 ships.
The data for individual ships are not always complete, especially for ships built early in the
study period and for ships built at remote ports. The first reason for incomplete data is
that the data quality and quantity improves over time as Lloyds reporting improved, the
second reason is that Lloyds seems to have neglected small, isolated British outports and
foreign ports. Neither of these has much effect on the research findings.
Despite the very large number of observations and variables, these data have
several problems that restrict the methods that can be used for this study. Four problems
can be identified. The first is that few variables are available for the entire study period;
more variables were reported in the Register as the study period progressed. Second,
many variables in the dataset could not be included in this analysis. This is especially true
for structural features such as decks, bulkheads, and water ballast tanks because it is not
always clear if the Register's compilers simply failed to record this information or if the
ship was not equipped with these features. Third, the Register does not include all ships
produced dining the study period so that a full time series is lacking. Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, there is a high degree of multicollinearity between many variables,
especially for register tonnage, dimensions, and horsepower.
2.2. Innovation Cycles
The final issue which must be discussed before presenting the methodology
concerns the sub-division o f the 1840-1880 period into shorter sub-periods. As the
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extended discussion in Chapter IV will more clearly demonstrate, the study period consists
of four distinct shipbuilding cycles, each characterized by growth and then decline of
British total shipbuilding output. These cycles also correspond to fluctuations in the rate
o f technological change.
As a result, the study period is divided into four separate and distinct shipbuilding
cycles and are:
Cycle 1:
Cycle 2:
Cycle 3:
Cycle 4:

184018561866 1873-

1855
1865
1872
1880

This periodization scheme is necessary for two reasons. The first reason is that the use o f
these shipbuilding cycles allows for the inclusion of more technical measurements from the
Register as they become available. The second reason is that both the rate o f technological
change and the contribution of the component technologies varied from cycle to cycle.
2.3. Methods
This section presents the methods that will be used to calculate the key sitespecific variables. As stated at the beginning of this chapter, the study's spatial and
temporal considerations as well as the constraints imposed by the data source, require a
somewhat complex analytical methodology. The section begins by presenting the
industrial viability variable used to establish the individual shipbuilding center's viability
within the larger shipbuilding industrial system. This is followed by a discussion o f the
development of the innovative ability variable that will assess the center’s ability to
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introduce or assimilate technical innovations. Finally, the section outlines the test used to
assess the relationship between these two variables.
2.3.1. Industrial Viability
The index o f industrial viability establishes the individual British shipbuilding
center’s relative competitiveness within its larger spatial industrial system. The first step in
the computation o f this variable is to calculate each center’s annual percent share of total
annual British shipbuilding output recorded in the Register. Since the majority of ships
were built on consignment, this variable represents the shipbuilding center's market share
relative to all other centers. Each center's annual percent share is then ranked into one o f
three categories to produce an index of annual market share. This index is then used in
the final stage o f this analysis.
2.3.1.1. Market Share
The index o f annual market share is calculated using the gross tonnage
measurements provided in the Register. Although net tonnage is provided by official
annual shipbuilding statements, gross tonnage is the measurement of shipbuilding output
used by shipbuilding analysts and historians because it represents the total volume o f the
ship as opposed to net tonnage which only measures cargo carrying capacity (Todd,
1985). The annual output share variable is calculated in the following manner. First, and
for any given year during the study period, the gross tonnage o f all British-built ships is
summed to give total annual national output. Next, the gross tonnage o f all ships built at
each shipbuilding center during a given year is summed to give the center's total annual
output. Finally, each center's total output is divided by national annual output to provide
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each center’s share o f the total national shipbuilding market. The procedure is expressed
in the following formula:
Output Share = T„ / Tr
Where:
T = total gross tonnage built at shipbuilding center c during yeary
Tv= total national gross tonnage built during yeary
2.3.2. Market Share Rank
With each center's annual market share calculated, h is necessary to transform this
variable to make it more amenable to further analysis. Transformation is required because
a large number of centers produced an extremely small annual output while a small
number of centers produced an extremely large amount, resulting in a distribution skewed
to the left. To counter this problem, each center is assigned to one o f three annual output
categories: high, medium, or low. This ranking system was chosen based on the visual
inspection of scatter plots of market share and innovative values. This inspection revealed
that three market share categories, as well as two innovative ability categories, adequately
capture the joint occurrences o f the two variables.
2.4. Innovative Ability
Innovative ability measures a center's capacity for generating or adopting
technological change. This is the most problematic variable in this analysis because
measuring technological change, not to mention innovative ability, presents scholars with
serious methodological problems (Le., how do you measure new knowledge and its
contribution to technological progress). As a consequence, most studies of technological
change use one o f three approaches that rely on proxy measurements: input-output
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analysis; the market share of new products relative to old products; and investment in
research and development (Acs and Andretsch, 1991; Rosegger, 1980).
This study utilizes a more direct measure o f technological change based on Hughes
and Reiter's (1958) "transport capacity measure." These authors estimated the annual
amount o f cargo-carrying capacity o f the British merchant steam fleet to argue that
technological changes associated with increased ship size and speed directly contributed to
the British shipping industry's productivity growth before 1860. Their estimates were
developed from net tonnage and horsepower measurements for individual ships obtained
from a published list of pre-1860 British steamships as well as estimates o f ship speed.
Hughes and Reiter's approach provides the basic framework for identifying each
shipbuilding center's annual innovative ability using the technical and locational data
available in the Register. First, a series o f multiple regression models, one for each
shipbuilding cycle, are specified to identify innovations that made a significant contribution
to explaining the increasing ship size (economies o f scale)~the most important
technological change that occurred during the study period. Variables for the models and
their construction are discussed later in this section. Next, the independent variables are
used to develop innovative indices that score the level o f technological sophistication of
individual ships. Finally, each center is assigned an annual ranking, in terms of either a
high or low innovative center, based on the position o f each center relative to the mean
score o f the calculated innovation index for all ships built at each center during a given
year relative to the mean score for all ships built during the cycle. The use o f a
dichotomous ranking scheme allows for the identification of technological leaders and
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laggards which allows for a more straightforward assessment o f the results of the test for
association. The following sections discuss these three steps in more detail.
2.4.1. Modeling Technological Change
The first task in identifying technologically leading and lagging shipbuilding centers
is to establish a criteria o f technological change in iron steamships against which ships
from individual centers can be compared. This is accomplished by specifying a series of
OLS multiple regression models, one model for each of the four shipbuilding cycles, that
incorporate the technical measurements that best characterize steamship technological
change. These characteristics are based on component ship technologies and their change
through time. The models serve two purposes: first, they describe the relative
contribution o f key innovations to iron steamship change; second, they identify significant
innovations used later to rate the technological performance o f individual shipbuilding
centers.
Multiple regression tests measure a hypothesized relationship between several
independent variables and a single dependent variable. They are used in this study to
identify significant innovations which contributed to the world dominance of the British
shipbuilding industry. This is accomplished by testing the hypothesis that increasing ship
size, the most important change in iron steamships throughout the study period, was a
function o f innovations that improved the efficiency o f several key component
technological systems. The models are specified as:
Ship Size (Registered Tonnage) = technology, + technology 2 + technology „
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Four models are specified using two-stage multiple regression analysis for each
individual shipbuilding cycle. The reason for developing models for each cycle rather than
the entire study period is that one model does not provide an adequate explanation of
overall 1840-1880 iron steamship technological change because of the emergence of new
technologies (and new variables). The two-stage approach is used because it allows for
the testing of hypotheses regarding the contribution o f important technical changes
identified in previous research by leading shipbuilding historians.
The two-stage approach begins with a theoretical model for each cycle that
describes important innovations. The model is assessed based on the explanatory power
o f the model as indicated by the F statistic and its significance; the significance and
expected sign of the individual regression coefficients; and the sequential contribution of
individual variables to Adjusted R2. If these conditions are not satisfied, then the model is
respecified by adjusting the dependent and independent variables as appropriate.
2.4.2. Variables
The data used to specify the technological change models consist of the year in
which the ship was built, two register tonnage measurements, and five variables that
represent important technical changes in iron construction and steam propulsion. These
variables are obtained from the Register and entered, either as raw or derived variables,
into the model The use o f derived variables minimizes collinearity and so maximizes the
explanatory power o f each independent variable. The following section discusses these
variables, with a summary provided in Table HI-1.
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Register tonnage, both gross and net, measures the enclosed volume o f the ship.
One ton equals 100 cubic feet. Gross tonnage is the total permanently enclosed volume o f
the ship less deductions for water ballast tanks, wheel house, galley and lavatories. Net
tonnage is the ship's cargo-carrying capacity, or total earning space. It is legally defined as
gross tonnage less all non-earning spaces, such as accommodations, and allowance for
engine, fuel bunker, and machinery space. Gross tonnage is reported for the entire study
period, while net tonnage was not reported on a consistent basis until 1852. Average
gross and net tonnage increased throughout the study period.
The NetrGross Ratio is a derived variable that establishes the percent difference
between a ship's cargo-carrying capacity and its total volume. The ratio is calculated by
dividing net tonnage by gross tonnage (Riegel, 1921). The variable is used to monitor
changes in ship design that maximized ship cargo-carrying capacity but which were not
reflected in net tonnage calculations.
The Length-to-Bearn ratio also monitors changes in ship design. This variable is
derived by dividing a ship's length by its width. Longer, but not necessarily wider, ships
reduced water friction against the hull, which increased cargo-carrying capacity (and
speed) without a corresponding increase in engine power. Pollard and Robertson (1979)
identify increasing length-to-beam ratios as a key change in ship design.
Two derived variables are used to estimate ship motive power using the two
register tonnage values and horsepower. These variables unitize horsepower to tonnage
(Le., one (1) unit o f horsepower equals n tons) to provide a measure o f either the number
of gross or net tons propelled by one unit of horsepower. The variables are constructed
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by dividing the respective tonnage measure by horsepower. Both measures of ship power
increased throughout the study period. (Two horsepower measurements were commonly
used during the study period: "nominal horsepower," an arbitrary measure developed by
Watt; or "indicated horsepower" which is calculated using engine specifications. The
results of an independent calculation o f indicated horsepower using a formula obtained
from The Century Dictionary and Cyclopedia (1913) suggest that the Register recorded
indicated horsepower.)
The rated pressure o f the ship's boilers is also used. This variable also comes
directly from the Register and is used to monitor increasing boiler pressure due to
improved boiler designs.
The final variable is engine cylinder volume (in3) per unit of net or gross tonnage.
The variable provides a measure of engine size relative to the ship's cargo-carrying
capacity or its total enclosed volume. Since cylinder volume is unitized to the tonnage
variable, it allows for the monitoring o f engine size efficiencies. The variable is
constructed using the following formula:
n

I

(1/2 D„2rt) H„

n=l
T
where:
V = cylinder volume
D = cylinder diameter
H = length o f stroke
n = cylinder 1 through n
T = net or gross tonnage
All variables used in this calculation are obtained from the Register.
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2.43. Innovative Ability Scale
The innovative ability scale is a synthetic measure of each center's innovative
ability for each year it was in production. It is developed using the variables identified in
the regression models. Since the independent variables have minimal multicollinearity,
each independent variable's contribution is independent o f the other variables in the model.
Innovative ability is expressed as each center's annual rank as either a technologically
leading or lagging shipbuilding center. A separate ranking is constructed for each o f the
four ship building cycles. The variable is constructed in the following manner.
For any given shipbuilding cycle model, the values for each independent variable
are sub-divided into quintiles. The lowest score (1) represents the lowest possible level of
technological sophistication for that variable, while the highest score (5) indicates the
highest level Every ship is then assigned to a class from one to five that corresponds to
its position within the total range of the variable. This process is repeated for all variables
in the model and the scores are summed to create a single value which reflects the
innovations incorporated in each ship vis-a-vis all other ships for the time period.

The

number of variables used in creating the scale increase from one cycle to the next because
new technologies were introduced over the course o f the study period and because the
Register increased the number o f technical measures reported. Each ship's final score,

therefore, depends on the number of independent variables in the model For example, the
model for the first shipbuilding cycle has only one independent variable. Therefore, the
lowest possible ship score is one (1), while the highest possible score is five (5). For the
last cycle, which uses five independent variables to calculate the innovation index, scores
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may range from five (5) to twenty five (25). Again, the final score indicates the ship's
level of technological sophistication relative to all other ships built during that particular
cycle.
After each ship is scored in terms of its technological performance, the
technological rank for each shipbuilding center for each year can be calculated. Each
center’s rank is computed as the mean score for all ships built at the center during a given
year. For example, if Glasgow produced 15 ships in 1876, then the average innovative
ability index is computed using those 15 ships. Once the mean innovation index is
calculated by center and year, each center is assigned to one o f two classes: if the
innovative index value is above the mean score for all centers, the center is designated as a
technological leader; while a center with an index value below the mean is designated as a
technological laggard. This process aggregates the individual ship innovation scores into
measures o f the innovative ability of individual centers for each year, thus repeating the
shift in scale which is required for the locational analysis. These data, combined with the
industrial viability ranking, allow for a final test for the association between a specific
center's industrial viability and its innovative ability.
2..S. The Relationship Between Innovation and Market Share
The final stage of the statistical analysis tests for association, in a statistical sense,
between the center's market share (the measure o f industrial viability) and its innovative
ability. The question is whether or not shipbuilding centers were rewarded economically,
as indicated by their market share, for their innovative ability. The test assumes that a
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shipbuilding center's ability to compete successfully with other centers in its industrial
system was directly related to its ability to generate or assimilate shipbuilding innovations.
The test is carried out using a chi-square contingency table test. Chi-square, a
non-parametric statistical procedure, tests for an association between a set o f observed
categorical frequencies and a set o f hypothesized frequencies. In order to carry out the
test, the market share rankings are combined with the innovative ability rankings for each
center and each year it was in production. As previously mentioned, the index scores for
each center and for each year are assigned to three classes: high, medium, and low.
Similarly, the innovative ability variable is divided into two classes: above the mean and
below the mean for each cycle. The result is a two-by-three contingency table. A chisquare test statistic is calculated to test for the association between innovation and place
for each o f the four cycles. Additional analyses measure the strength and direction o f the
association using Kendall's Tau-c statistic, and assess the contribution of individual
categories (cells) within the two-by-three contingency table to the total chi-square
statistic. Given the sub-division o f the study period into four cycles, there are four
contingency tables and four sets o f tests for association. The number o f shipbuilding
center and year observations available for each o f the four tests o f association vary
because different locations enter and leave the Register during each year and each cycle.
3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Despite the implicit assumption o f interdependence between technological change
and the industrial viability of the individual production center, economic geographers have
not examined the relationship between innovation and place. This chapter has presented
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an analytical framework for assessing this relationship. However, the complexities of the
research problem combined with the nature of the data require a somewhat involved
research design.
This research design provides a methodology for directly examining the
relationship between industrial viability and innovative ability. It incorporates time—the
technological change cycle—and space—the individual components of the spatial industrial
system. This analytical approach allows for the examination technological change at a
variety o f spatial scales, from the national to the level o f individual production centers, and
provides economic geography with a methodological framework with which to assess the
interaction between innovation and place.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER IV
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND THE 1840-1880 BRITISH IRON SCREW
SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY

The 1840-1880 British iron and steam shipbuilding industry presents an excellent
opportunity to examine the relationship between technological change and industrial
restructuring. Innovations during this period dramatically increased ship size, power, and
cargo-carrying capacity. The period also witnessed the establishment of modem ship
construction techniques, propulsion systems, and designs (Abell, 1981; Brock and
Greenhill, 1973; Jones, 1957; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Parkinson, 1960; Rowland,
1971; Waine, 1976). More importantly from a geographic perspective, the new ship
transformed the scale of the individual shipbuilding firm and reconfigured the industry's
spatial structure as new centers emerged and older centers declined in importance.
This chapter provides a broad overview of the important changes in the iron
steamship between 1840 and 1880. It begins with an introduction to, and brief outline of
British experiments in iron construction and steam propulsion before 1840. It then
discusses key innovations in iron ship construction techniques and marine steam
propulsion systems. Next, it examines the transition of the British shipbuilding and
shipping industries from the traditional wooden sailing ship to the iron steamship. Based
on this analysis, four distinct shipbuilding and innovation cycles within the study period are
identified. The final section demonstrates that these changes resulted in continuous
increases in ship size, power, and efficiency.
67
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1. IRON STEAMSHIP TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
Although shipbuilding is one o f that country's oldest and most important industries,
Britain's perfection o f new ship technologies allowed her to dominate world shipbuilding
output from 1872 to 1918. The British shipbuilding industry's dominance was due to its
development o f and specialization in iron and steam shipbuilding. At the beginning o f the
nineteenth century, when shipbuilding was synonymous with wood and sail, British
shipbuilders began experiments with iron construction and steam propulsion. By 1840,
the new ship had established its economic viability for select trade routes, and a second
innovation cycle began that perfected the new technologies. Changes during this period
led to dramatic increases in ship size, power, and cargo-carrying efficiency (Musson,
1978; Pollard and Robertson, 1979) and by 1880 modem ship construction techniques,
propulsion systems, and designs had been established (Abell, 1980; Waine, 1976).
1.1. Introduction of and Early Experiments in Iron and Steam Shipbuilding
Britain was able to experiment with and then perfect the new ship because o f its
head start in the Industrial Revolution. James Watt's improvements to the Newcomen
engine (1763) provided a relatively efficient engine, while Cort's puddling process (1782)
provided a cost-effective method for producing malleable iron bar and plate (Walker,
1984; Jones, 1957). Britain's pioneering efforts in the iron-working and engineering
industries conferred initial and comparative advantages on that country which were most
instrumental in the development o f the new ship. This is evidenced by the fact that
original experiments and financial support came from the mechanical engineering, civil
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engineering, and iron-working industries rather than shipbuilders and shipowners (Jones,
1957; Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
The first British experiments in iron construction and steam propulsion occurred at
the end o f the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries. The first iron vessel
was the TriaL built by John Wilkerson at Sunderland on the North East Coast. Iron
shipbuilding was then confined to river and canal boats for the next twenty years
(Cunningham, 1903; Dougan, 1968; Jones, 1957; Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
Although steamboats were built earlier in the United States, the first practical British
steamboat was the canal towboat Charlotte Dundas. built by Robert Symmington in 1801
near Glasgow. Further work on the Clyde culminated in the first commercially successful
British passenger steamer, Henry Bell's Comet, built in 1812 (Jones, 1957; Rowland,
1970; Walker, 1984).
The first iron hulled steamship was the Aaron Manbv. built in 1821 for the short
ocean Liverpool to Ireland packet service. The advantages of installing steam engines in
iron hulls were that iron is fireproof and, since stronger and lighter than wood, iron was
better able to the support the heavy engine without sacrificing the ship's earning potential.
Following the success o f the Aaron Manbv, iron steamships were built in increasing
numbers for service on rivers, protected open water, and the English Channel and Irish
Sea (Cunningham, 1903; Gilfillan, 1935; Jones, 1957; Rowland, 1970).
The iron steamship still required an efficient propulsion system before h could
become a suitable ocean-going cargo carrier, however. The original steamers were
propelled by the paddle-wheel, a propulsion system that made for very fast vessels and
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which was well-suited for the low piston speeds obtained by the early steam engines.
Unfortunately, the paddle-wheel was very inefficient, since only the immersed paddles do
useful work. Further, it was unsuitable for ocean-going trade routes because the paddles
were easily damaged and came out of the water in heavy seas. The preferred system was
the screw propeller because it eliminated the problems noted above: all blades are
immersed and perform useful work; is less subject to damage because it is sturdier and
below the waterline; and remains operable in all sea conditions. The introduction o f an
efficient screw did not occur until fairly late, however, because o f the high costs
associated with casting alternative screw designs. As a result, the first screw propeller
was not introduced until 1826 and the first prototype o f the modem screw propeller,
installed on the Archimedes by Francis Smith, did not appear until 1839 (Graham, 1958;
Gilfillan, 1935; Rowland, 1970; Walker, 1984).
By 1840 improvements in iron construction techniques and steam propulsion
systems made the iron screw steamship superior to the paddle steamer and competitive
with the traditional wooden sailer on select ocean-going passenger and cargo routes. The
ship’s acceptance by the shipping community was signaled by the entry o f the Sirius in the
Lloyds Register of British and Foreign Shipping in 1837. The feasibility o f the new ships
as long distance ocean carriers was demonstrated by the first trans-Atlantic crossing under
continuous steam power made by this same ship in 1838. These two accomplishments
signaled the end o f the iron steamship's technological gestation period and initiated the
1840-1880 technological change cycle. By the end of this cycle the iron steamship was
the dominate ocean-going cargo carrier on all but the longest trade routes.
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1.2. 1840-1880 Iron Steamship Technological Change
Iron ship construction and steam propulsion systems perfected between 1840 and
1880 revolutionized ocean transport. In 1840 the new ship occupied a small niche within

a British merchant fleet dominated by the traditional wooden sailing ship. By 1880, afler
progressive and unprecedented increases in ship size and power, the steamship was the
dominate ship technology. Sailing ships were relegated to trade routes either too long for
the steamer's coal requirements or with profit margins too low to justify the iron
steamship's greater initial and operating costs. In addition, the period saw the
establishment of shipbuilding techniques, ship designs, and propulsion systems that are the
basis o f the modem shipbuilding industry.
Iron steamship technological change was the response to both supply and demand
factors. During the pre-1840 period and until the introduction o f the John Bowes, which
established the iron and screw steamship's advantages as a bulk cargo carrier, interest in
iron ship construction was led by shipbuilders attempting to substitute increasingly scarce,
and so more expensive, ships timber. In this respect, technological change can be
considered to have been "supply pushed.” At the same time, however, packet services
became increasingly interested in the application of the steam engine to navigation,
originally as towboats for canals and later for packet services on rivers and short ocean
routes. In this sense, then, technological change can be considered to have been "demand
pulled.” Afler the acceptance of the iron steamship, however, innovations in iron
construction and steam propulsion were driven by shipowner demand for more cargo- and
fuel-efficient ships.
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1.2.1. Iron
The main advantages o f iron as a shipbuilding material are its reduced weight
combined with greater strength. Wooden ship structural components embody a large
amount of lost and dead weight. Twenty to fifty percent o f ffaming-timber weight is lost
immediately in planing and shaping, while dead weight cargo-carrying capacity is reduced
because a full half of wooden hull weight is needed to simply hold the ship together. Iron,
because of its greater weight and strength efficiencies, reduced hull thickness and so
increased dead weight cargo capacity by 30 percent and hold capacity from 20 to 50
percent in proportion to exterior dimensions. Iron's greater longitudinal strength also
allowed it to take greater structural stresses so that the length of iron hulls could exceed
the 300 feet limit imposed by wood (Jones, 1957; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Walker,
1984).
In addition to its weight and strength efficiencies, iron had several other
advantages. Iron could take the localized stresses caused by the screw propeller, allowing
for the full utilization o f this propulsion system. The ends o f iron plate could be
overlapped and riveted to make for a stronger, water-tight vessel over its entire length,
while water-tight bulkheads made for greater transverse strength. Finally, and not least,
iron construction was much faster than wooden construction (Jones, 1957; Pollard and
Robertson, 1979; Walker, 1984).
Despite its advantages, iron also had a number of drawbacks that had to be
overcome before it could displace wood as the material o f choice for trans-oceanic
carriers. First, iron required anti-corrosion processes and the development o f compasses
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that were not affected by the hull's magnetic field, both accomplished by 1839 (Gilfillan.
1935; Walker, 1984). Second, the cost o f iron plates and frames had to be reduced and
their quality improved. Both problems were addressed by the iron industry between 1840
and 1850 through technical improvements in iron rolling techniques as demand increased
from the shipbuilding industry (Jones, 1957; MacGregor, 1980; Pollard and Robertson,
1979). Third, shipbuilders had to develop new construction techniques, machinery, labor
practices, and shipyard layouts to fashion, assemble, and fasten individual structural pieces
and systems (Jones, 1957; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Walker, 1984). Finally,
shipbuilders, shipowners, merchants, and ship surveyors had to be convinced that iron
ships would withstand the stresses associated with trans-oceanic service (Jones, 1957;
MacGregor, 1984;Waine, 1976).
I.2.I.I. Iron Construction
Basic ship construction techniques were essentially the same as those for wooden
ships. The difference was that, rather than being a handicraft industry as was the case with
wooden shipbuilding, iron shipbuilding became an industrial enterprise that altered 1)
shipyard practices used to fashion, assemble, and fasten individual structural pieces and
systems; and 2) shipyard layouts that maximized throughput. As such, it adopted many of
the same techniques, machinery, and labor practices already developed in foundries and
engine and boiler works. Although they were continually modified throughout the study
period, the construction techniques and yard layouts were essentially in place by 1834 with
the establishment of the first exclusively iron shipyard, located on the River Clyde (Abell,
1981; Jones, 1957; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Walker; 1984).
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Except for a few isolated experiments with the longitudinal framing system, used
for steel ships after 1880, iron ships were built using the transverse framing system. This
was the same system used to build the Vulcan, the first iron steamer built on the Clyde in
1818, and was a direct adaptation of the framing system used for wooden ships. The
primary structural components and their order o f assembly were as follows. The keel, an
iron plate miming the length of the ship, was assembled. Floor plates were then attached
at right angles to the keel to form the bottom o f the hull. The ribs, bent to the contour of
the hull before erection, were attached to the ends of the floor plates. Bars that ran the
length o f the ship were used to tie in the ribs and floor plates for longitudinal support,
while iron bulkheads and deck beams running the width of the ship provided transverse
support. The last step in the assembly process was to attach the metal plates, shaped to
the form of the outer hull or skin, which were overlapped and riveted to the floor plates
and ribs and made watertight (Abell, 1981; Bremner, 1868; Walker, 1984).
Changes in ship construction were directed towards maximizing dead weight
cargo-carrying capacity and increasing ship length without an attendant loss in strength
(Abell, 1981; Pollard and Robertson, 1979). Most of these changes were accomplished
through leaming-by-doing and leaming-by-using. First, methods emerged for
strengthening longitudinal framing pieces. Second, fastening systems for joining structural
pieces were modified to strengthen joints and eliminate redundant framing pieces for
weight and construction cost savings. Since these changes were embedded in the
production process and are not discussed by shipbuilding historians, they are difficult, if
not impossible, to date. Two significant changes which increased longitudinal strength
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(and so ship length) and which can be dated were the introduction o f hollow floor framing
systems for water ballast, introduced in 1842, followed by the double-bottom water ballast
system introduced in 1860 (Abell, l981;Dougan, l968;Waine, 1976; Walker, 1984).
1.2.1.2. Hull Forms and Ship Design
Modem hull forms and ship design were also introduced during the 1840 to 1880
period. Based on available information, efficient hull forms were not introduced until the
1870s while changes in ship design began in the mid- 1840s and culminated in the ship
superstructures and additional decks and spaces typical o f modem ships. The following
discussion is composed o f two parts. The first examines changes in hull form represented
by changes in the length-to-beam ratio. The second examines changes in ship design that
increased the ship's cargo-carrying efficiency.
1.2.1.3. Hull Form
The steam engine's greatest handicap, especially before 1852, was the amount of
potential money earning space occupied by the engine and fuel supply. One of the most
effective methods for maximizing engine efficiency relative to cargo-carrying capacity
was to utilize iron's greater longitudinal strength to make the hull longer relative to its
width. This relationship is referred to as the length-to-beam ratio and is expressed by the
ratio Length : Width (Muckle and Taylor, 1975). Higher ratios allowed for increases in
hull volume without a corresponding increase in engine power because the water
resistance against the ship was not materially increased (Rowland, 1970).
The first significant change to the length-to-beam ratio was introduced by I.K.
Brunei Brunei built the Great Britain, the most celebrated of the early iron steamships, in
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1843. Brunei utilized a length-to-beam ratio o f 5.8:1 for this ship, radical for the period,
and justified it by formulating the principle that the carrying capacity of a ship's hull
increased as a cube of the ship's dimensions, while the power required to overcome water
resistance increased only as a square (Rowland, 1970). By 1854, length-to-beam ratios
for ocean steamers were between 5.5:1 and 6 : 1, as compared to the 3.5:1 common
at the end of the eighteenth century. By 1860 the ratio had increased to between 8:1 and
9:1 (Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Rowland, 1970). According to testimony before the
1873 Royal Commission on Loss of Life at Sea, by the late 1860s ships already in service
were being sent back to the yard for lengthening to increase both cargo-carrying capacity
(allowed for by improved ship framing techniques) and length-to-beam ratios.
Lengthening consisted of separating the ship at its midsection and inserting a new hull
section. The fact it was a common practice by the early-1870s indicates that the greater
advantages o f the new construction and propulsion systems were clearly recognized
within both the shipbuilding and shipping industries. While ships with ratios of 10:1 to
11:1 were built in the 1870s, such extreme ratios over-extended framing systems and were
suspected of causing ship failure (Parliamentary Papers. Vol XXV, 1969). By the end of
the study period the ratio stabilized at around 8:1 (Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Waine,
1976).
Changes in iron construction and steam propulsion dictated changes to hull forms,
which were constantly modified throughout the study period. The earliest steamship hull
forms, copied directly from those used for wooden sailers, were modified as the handling
qualities of steamships and the capabilities o f iron and steam became better known. These
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changes were based on the preferences o f shipbuilders and shipowners as they gained
more experience with the new ship technologies, but scientific methods for designing hull
forms were introduced in the 1860s and 1870s.
The earliest hull form modifications extended bull length and made the bows
finer, or sharper. Hull lengthening came about because iron hulls, due their greater
longitudinal strength, were less subject to the stresses o f hogging and sagging
(longitudinal bending) caused by being driven through heavy swells (Rowland, 1970).
Driving also resulted in bows being further sharpened to allow the ship to cut through
heavy seas rather than sail over them. This was a common feature in iron steamships in
the 1860s. Bows then became blunter in the 1870s as problems with hogging and sagging
in the longer ships forced a return to the practice of riding over seas (Waine, 1976). The
final change to hull forms, based on the experiments o f William Froude and other naval
architects, also came about in the 1870s with the squaring o f hulls at the keel to reduce
turbulence and resulting drag at the propeller (Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Waine,
1976).
I.2.I.4. Ship Design
Between 1840 and 1880 the iron steamship was transformed from being little more
than a modified copy o f traditional wooden sailers to prototypes of modem passenger and
cargo ships with multiple decks, raised decks at the bow and stem, and superstructures.
Although either neglected or given cursory attention by most shipbuilding historians,
Waine (1976) provides important insights into these changes. The following discussion is
based on Waine's discussion and ship drawings.
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In 1840, deck layout and rigging systems were copied from wooden ships
employed on the same trade routes. Changes began sometime around 1848, as indicated
by plans for a ship built in that year, with the erection of a rudimentary bridge to allow
for a better view forward. Sometime between 1848 and 1865, the exact date not given,
the forecastle deck made a tentative appearance (Waine, 1976). The first specialized bulk
cargo-carrier, the collier John Bowes, was built in 1852. Although it was designed like
the wooden sailing ships employed in the trade, the ship featured water ballast tanks to
adjust the depth and angle at which the ship rode in the water. Bulkheads were also added
to separate hold compartments, which improved ship stability and cargo handling
capability while reducing the threat of flooding in the event the ship's skin was punctured.
Water ballast tanks and bulkheads are common to modem cargo ships (Dougan, 1968;
Waine, 1976).
Although (somewhat surprisingly) no sources corroborate this, the Merchant
Shipping, or Moorsom, Act o f 1854 would appear to have had a profound impact on the
development of modem ship designs. This act established new definitions for calculating
register tonnage (one ton being equal to 100 cubic feet) used to assess harbor duties and
other charges. The Act defined gross tonnage as the ship's total permanently enclosed
volume less certain exempted spaces such as water ballast tanks, wheel house, galley, and
lavatories. Net tonnage was defined as gross tonnage less non-earning spaces such as
crew accommodations, as well as allowances for engine and machinery space.
Since harbor duties and fees were based on the ship's net tonnage, shipowners
expected net tonnage to be kept as low as possible without jeopardizing cargo-carrying
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capacity. Shipbuilders responded by adding non-permanently enclosed decks and spaces
above the tonnage deck (first permanently enclosed deck) that could still be used to carry
cargo. These decks and spaces were used to calculate gross tonnage but met the
exemption requirements for calculating net tonnage (Waine, 1976). The practice was
common by 1872 and was suspected of making ships unstable, leading to the
implementation of the Plimsoll Line (1894), a legally required mark on the hull used to
indicate when a ship was overloaded and to set its trim (Parliamentary Papers. 1969).
The profile of the modem ship began to take form in the 1860s with the
appearance of the hurricane deck, a deck fitted at the bow to keep water from sweeping
over the decks. Since the space under the deck was not necessarily permanently enclosed,
it created more gross tonnage but not net tonnage (Waine, 1976). The blunt bow and
square hull was common by the 1870s, the first so that ships could ride over seas, rather
than through them, while the second reduced water turbulence and resulting drag at the
propeller. For smaller vessels, the raised quarterdeck (at the stem) was extended and the
hatches were placed in the well deck (between quarter and hurricane decks) on small
ships. For larger vessels, the raised quarterdeck was extended all the way to the bridge
which was placed approximately in the middle o f ship. Finally, the superstructure became
permanent when the bridge was completely enclosed (Waine, 1976).
1.3. Steam Propulsion
The mam advantages o f the early steamships were their greater speed and
dependability. Unlike sailing ships that are subject to winds and tides, steamers could
keep pre-arranged schedules and were faster than sailing ships, important qualities for the
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Irish and Continental packet services which depended upon regular service and rapid turn
around time. These qualities allowed shipowners to charge premium fares for both
passengers and low bulk, high value express freight, essential if owners were to recapture
the steamship's higher initial and operating costs (Cunningham, 1903; Rowland, 1970).
Still, the early steamers were not suitable as trans-oceanic cargo-carriers because
of their gross inefficiency in terms o f converting heat into propulsive energy. Early
engines required one half ton o f machinery and 4.7 pounds of coal to generate one unit of
indicated horsepower. Improvements in the engine plant before 1850 were directed
toward reducing engine weight and size and improving fuel efficiency. Improvements in
weight and size were gained through the development of and refinements to a succession
of engines that attempted to either improve engine power or reduce size and weight,
while fuel efficiencies were gained through improved boilers and steam condensers. Other
improvements in engine and boiler performance were gained by improved metal working
techniques, such as boring and screw making machines and close tolerance metal working
techniques introduced in the 1840s; the development of petroleum based lubricants
beginning in the late 1840s and lasting throughout the study period; and the perfection of
the screw propeller (Elkins, 1884; Gilfillan, 1935; Jones, 1957;RiegeL, 1924; Rowland,
1970; Walker, 1984).
1.3.1. Engines
The two engines in common use at the beginning o f the study period were the
side-lever and oscillating engines. These engines were simple to operate and suitable for
the low boiler pressures used in the early British steamships. However, because o f their
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low boiler pressures, they consumed excessive amounts of coal. By the early 1850s screw
propellers were becoming more common, but the side-Iever and oscillating engines were
unsatisfactory for the screw because crankshaft revolutions were too low and had to be
stepped up three to six times. Transmission systems were introduced as early as 1843, but
they remained unsatisfactory throughout the study period (Elkins, 1884; Riegel, 1924;
Rowland, 1970; Walker, 1984).
Rather than develop new transmission systems, a new engine was introduced. This
was the compound engine, originally introduced in 1804 but not patented for marine
use until 1852. The benefits of this engine were that it took better advantage of steam
pressure, was coupled directly to the drive shaft, and developed high enough crankshaft
revolutions to drive the screw propeller.
With the compounding system, steam entered a large diameter (low pressure)
cylinder where it expanded to drive the large cylinder. The steam was then exhausted into
a second, small diameter (high pressure) cylinder where it expanded again to drive the
second cylinder before being condensed and returned to the boiler. Since more work was
done by the same steam, the compound engine saved thirty to forty percent in fuel costs
over a single expansion engine o f the same horsepower, while increasing the ship's sailing
radius as fuel stores went farther (Elkins, 1884; Riegel, 1924). The first engine was
installed on the Brandon in 1853, the same year that the Crimean War started, and the new
engine was used extensively for the resulting build-up of the merchant fleet (Gilfillan,
1835; Jones, 1957; McNeil, 1990; Moyse-Bartlett, 1968; Rowland, 1970).
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In addition to savings in operating costs, the engine increased the regularity of the
turning moment, yielding higher propeller efficiency, while also decreasing stresses and
strains on the ship and engine frames, shaftings, and bearings. The engine was also much
simpler in construction than previous engines, which reduced materials and further
reduced costs (Riegel, 1924; Rowland, 1970; Pollard and Robinson, 1979). Toward the
end o f the study period the engine had been enlarged to the triple expansion engine (three
pairs of cylinders) and then to the quadruple expansion (four pairs of cylinders), the latter
engine remaining the standard for cargo ships until the introduction of the diesel engine
(Jones, 1957; Walker, 1984).
1.3.2. Boilers and Condensers
Better engine performance and fuel consumption were also achieved through
improvements to boilers and steam condensers. The first significant change to the boiler
occurred in 1844 with the introduction of the marine fire tube boiler. Rather than
circulating water through tubes placed immediately above the fire, as was done in the early
steamers, flat horizontal tubes connected the combustion chamber to the funnel uptake.
The tubes were surrounded by water and steam was generated as the hot gasses passed
through the tubes and on to the funnel (GilfiUan, 1935; Jones, 1957; Reigel; 1924;
Rowland, 1970). The Scotch boiler, introduced in 1862, operated on the same principle
as the fire tube but was cylindrical in shape rather than box-like. This boiler became
popular after 1870 because it was sturdy, reliable, and suitable for pressures up to 600
pounds per square inch (Ib/in2), and so ideal for long haul cargo ships (Rowland, 1970).
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A year after the Scotch boiler was introduced, the surface condenser made a
second appearance. The condenser allows the engine cylinder to perform useful work on
the piston's downstroke by exhausting all unexpanded steam in the cylinder to create a
vacuum. This is Watt's major improvement to the original Newcomen engine (Usher.
1954). The most commonly used condenser before the introduction o f the surface
condenser was the jet condenser. This condenser, which sprayed water into the cylinder,
did not differ greatly from that invented by Watt. It was replaced beginning in 1863 with
an improved surface condenser, first introduced in 1834 but never gaining wide popularity
because of its complexity and maintenance requirements. The new surface condenser used
a pump to draw unexhausted steam out of the cylinder and then pass it through tubes of
cool, fresh water. Its most important improvements were that it improved the cylinder
vacuum by using a pump to draw the unexhausted steam out o f the cylinder, and reduced
maintenance by using distilled water and employing filters to draw off lubricant residues
(Rowland, 1970).
1.4. Screw Propeller
Although screw propellers were in use by 1840, this system required further
improvements before it became a dependable propulsion system. First, wooden hulls
could not tolerate the vibrations inherent with screws, so that its full implementation had
to wait until iron hulls became the industry standard between 1840 and 1850. Second, the
crankshaft had to be made to turn fast enough to make the screw work efficiently. Several
transmission systems were patented beginning in 1844, but the problem was not solved
until the compound engine was introduced. Finally, the rapid wear and tear o f the stem
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shaft and propeller bearings had to be overcome and non-leaking, dependable stem
bearings developed to allow the propeller shaft to pass through the hulL These tasks were
accomplished between 1839, with the patenting of Babbitmetal, a soft alloy used for
bearings, bushings, and seals; and lignum vitae stem bearings introduced in 1855 (Graham,
1958; Rowland, 1970, Taggart, 1969).
2. THE TRANSITION FROM WOOD AND SAIL TO IRON AND STEAM
Previous sections have established the origins of technical changes in 1840-1880
iron screw steamships. Before proceeding with a examination o f the impacts of these
changes on the iron steamship, the transition o f the British shipbuilding and shipping
industries over to the new ship will be discussed. In addition, four individual shipbuilding
cycles are identified. These cycles coincide with the introduction o f important innovations
which changed the technological composition o f the iron steamship. The following
discussion is based largely on Figure IV-1, which graphs British sail and steam
shipbuilding tonnage output for the 1840-1880 period. The graph extends to 1883 in
order to include the entire fourth shipbuilding cycle. Data are obtained from B. R_
Mitchell's British Historical Statistics (1988).
Three observations are in order. The first is that 1840-1880 shipbuilding, like the
modem industry, was a very volatile industry subject to periods o f boom and bust (Todd,
1985; Ville, 1990). The cyclical nature o f shipbuilding output reflected in the graphs
correspond to British trade cycles (Saul, 1985; Thomas, 1954) which, like business cycles
in the United States, are characterized by rising output followed by market saturation and
glut. These cycles are directly linked to the larger economy as demonstrated by their
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correspondence to fluctuations in British interest rates (Mitchell, 1991). The second
observation is that the prolonged growth of iron steamship output between 1860 and 1866
clearly demonstrates the new ship's acceptance by the shipowning community, while the
collapse in sail output coupled with growth in steam output demonstrates the change-over
o f the merchant fleet to steam Finally, the opposite trend lines for the two ship
technologies represents the existence o f two distinct ship markets by 1869 and possibly as
early as 1860.
2.1. Output
The traditional sailing ship dominated British shipbuilding output from 1840 to
approximately 1870. With the exception of the 1840 to 1845 period, when iron steamship
production remained stable during a decline in sailing ship output, steamship output
tracked that for the larger industry. This trend continued until approximately 1865 and
1866, when output for the two ship types began to diverge. In 1865, sailing ship output
began a decline, with a similar decline for the steamship beginning the following year. By
1867, sailing ship output experienced a brief revival until 1869, after which output
declined to its lowest level for the entire study period. Steamship production, conversely,
declined until approximately 1869 and then began a revival and growth period lasting until
1873. This divergence in output for the two ship types, with peaks for one type
corresponding to troughs for the other, demonstrates that the iron steamship became the
industry standard either in 1869 (from the graph), or in 1870 (Pollard and Robertson,
1979).
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The reasons for this divergence are that the steamship became economically viable
on most routes while the sailing ship remained an attractive alternative for shipowners
during depressions in overseas trade. Steamships became viable because of the
introduction of the multiple expansion engine in 1852 and the opening o f the Suez Canal
in 1868. The introduction of the multiple expansion engine made the marine steam engine
an efficient, cost effective propulsion system. The engine was specifically developed for
screw propulsion and, when combined with the more efficient boilers that were coming
into general use at this time, allowed for fuel savings o f between 30 to 40 (Rowland,
1970) or 40 to 50 percent (Jones, 1957). The opening of the Suez Canal in 1868
considerably shortened voyages and reduced the distance between coaling stations, so that
the steamship was now an economically viable ocean-going cargo carrier on most major
routes (Fletcher, 1958; MacGregor, 1984; Moyse-Bartlett, 1968).
Shipowners continued to order sailing ships because they remained viable for the
wool trade from Australia and the nitrate trade from the South American west coast until
the opening o f the Panama Canal (Cunnison and GilfiHan, 1958; Moyse-Bartlett, 1968).
In addition, sailing ships remained attractive during depressions because they were cheap
and therefore price competitive during periods of reduced shipping and trade. When trade
increased, however, demand for the more expensive, but much more efficient steamships
also increased, causing depression in the wooden shipbuilding industry (Cunnison and
(lilfillatij 1958).
2.2. Cycles
Figure IV-1 also shows four distinct iron and steam shipbuilding cycles. Although
two distinct cycles occurred at the beginning of the period, 1840-1847 and 1848-1855,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

88

iron and steam shipbuilding output remained fairly stable until the 1850-1855 upswing. As
a result, the two early cycles are combined for this and all subsequent analysis. The four
cycles are dated using Mitchell's tabular shipbuilding output, rather than the moving
averages in Figure IV-1 which have been "smoothed." Each cycle runs from the year with
the highest output and to the year immediately preceding the next peak in output. The
exception are the first cycle, which began before the start of the study period, and the last
cycle which ended in 1883. The cycles are:
Cycle 1:
Cycle 2:
Cycle 3:
Cycle 4:

1840-1855
1856-1865
1866-1872
1873-1880

Cycles for iron and steam shipbuilding correspond to those for the larger industry
up until 1867. During the first cycle, 1840-1855, shipbuilding output is dominated by sail.
Steamship output is relatively stable from 1840 to 1843, unlike the larger industry,
suggesting that the market for steamships was somewhat distinct from that of the overall
ship market. Steamship output comes into synch with the larger industry in 1842, after
which its cycles are indistinguishable (except that peaks and troughs for steam occur from
one to two years before those for sail) for those o f the larger industry until 1865. The
bust cycle ending in 1843 can be associated with the world wide trade depression
beginning in 1839 (Temin, 1969), while the crashes in 1855 and 1865 are due to the gluts
o f shipping capacity following the Crimean and American Civil Wars, respectively (Pollard
and Robertson, 1979; Todd, 1985; Walker, 1984). By the beginning o f the third
shipbuilding cycle, steam and sail output begin to diverge. In 1868 the two cycles take
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opposite tracks, with steam output entering a growth period in 1869 while that for sail is
delayed until 1873 and never again reaches its 1865 peak. (The crash in 1873 can be
associated with the world-wide financial crisis that began as early as 1866 (Kendleberger.
1990; Pollard, 1989; Saul, 1985).) This divergence demonstrates that the iron steamship
became the dominate shipbuilding technology and that two distinct industries, sail and
steam, had emerged by 1868.
3. IRON STEAMSHIP CHANGE
The technological changes discussed earlier resulted in increases in average ship
size, power, and efficiency over the course o f the study period. The following discussion
is based on Table IV-1, which shows increasing engine plant efficiencies in terms o f
horsepower and coal consumption. These data are collected from various sources.
Figures IV-2 through IV-4 graph annual changes in average ship size (gross tons per
ship), engine horsepower, and ship power (gross tons divided by horsepower) based on
technical measurements in the Lloyd's Register available for the entire study. At the same
time, these changes are placed within the context o f the shipbuilding cycles discussed
above to show that technological changes introduced either in preceding cycles or
immediately at the beginning o f a cycle resulted in distinct phases in the development of
the common practice steamship.
3.1. Engine Efficiency Gains
Efficiency gains to the entire propulsion system created by improvements in
engines, boilers, condensers, and screw propulsion are shown in Table IV -1. The data are
obtained from discussions of improved steam engine performance located in Elkins (1884)
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and Reigel (1921). Although incomplete, the data indicate steady steam engine efficiency
gains throughout the study period. Boiler pressure, using the original box-boiler, was only
5 pounds per square inch (Ib/in2) in 1834. The use o f the fire-tube boiler, introduced
during the first shipbuilding cycle, and following improvements raised boiler pressures to
between 25 and 40 lb/in2 in 1862. Finally, at the end of the third cycle in 1872 and with
the common use o f the Scotch boiler, pressures had risen to between 45 and 60 Ib/in2.

TABLE IV-1: 1840-1880 Changes in Boiler Pressure and Coal
Consumption

Expansion

Boiler
Pressure'

Coal
Consumption2

1834

single

5 lb/in2

***

1840 (Cycle I)

single

***

4.7 Ibs/hp

1852 (Cycle 1)

single

***

3.75 Ibs/hp

1862 (Cycle 2)

compound

25-40 lb/in2

***

1872 (Cycle 3)

compound

45-60 lb/in2

***

1873 (Cycle 4)

compound

***

2.5 Ibs/hp

1892

triple

***

1.5 lbs/hp

Year

*** no data
Source:1 Elkins, 1886;2 Riegel, 1921

Reductions in coal consumption were even more dramatic. The amount of coal
consumed to generate one unit of indicated horsepower (Ib/hp) declined during the first
cycle, from 4.7 Ib/hp in 1840 to 3.75 Ibs/hp in 1852. By the beginning o f the last cycle, in
1873, and after the full implementation o f the changes discussed above, coal consumption
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had fallen to 2.5 Ibs/hp Coal consumption continued to fall with the introduction of the
triple and quadruple expansion engines to a low o f 1.5 Ibs/hp in 1892.
3.2. Increases in Ship Size and Power
The following graphs conclusively demonstrate that the technological changes of
the 1840-1880 period dramatically increased the size and power o f the ship. However,
these increases were not continuous but rather were accomplished through net gains from
one cycle to the next. Note that dramatic increases in ship size and power occur either
immediately before, during, or after the transitions between shipbuilding cycles. This
suggests that the benefits o f technological innovations introduced during one economic
cycle are not fully realized until following cycles. This finding supports arguments made
by authors ranging from Kuznets (1930) to Hyde (1977) to Mensch (1978). The declines
in the later phase of the cycle are most likely due to the retrenchment within the shipping
industry in response to declining trade.
The first graph in the series (Figure IV-2) reports average annual iron steamship
size in terms of gross tons, a measure of permanently enclosed ship volume. The years
1843 and 1844 contain single observations which distort the trend and the following
graphs at the beginning of the study period. The graph demonstrates that average ship
size increased for the entire study period. Average gross tonnage rose from approximately
183 gross tons in 1845 to 1400 tons by 1880. The only exceptions to this record of steady
growth in average ship size are three periods o f decline: from 1857 to 1860; 1865 to 1868;
and 1874 to 1877. Despite these periods o f decline, however, average size never fell
below the peak of the previous cycle. The periods o f declining ship size correspond to
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periods of declining iron steamship output and most likely reflect demand within the
shipping industry for smaller ships during periods o f economic contraction. This
observation is suggested by the fact that the first two periods correspond to ship market
gluts following the Crimean War and American Civil War. respectively (Hughes and
Reiter, 1958; Lester, 1975; and Spencer, 1983).
The trend for engine horsepower (Figure IV -3) is less clear than that for average
ship size. The graph shows that, except for brief periods o f fluctuation from 1852 to 1854
and 1856 to 1858, average engine horsepower increased steadily until 1863. This year is
significant because it coincides with the introduction o f the Scotch boiler (1862) and
surface condenser (1863). After 1863, the trend for average horsepower is characterized
by both large fluctuations and overall decline. Interestingly, periods o f increasing average
horsepower, either before or after 1863, correspond to periods of declining average ship
size. The reason for this correspondence is unclear, but could possibly be due to the need
for more powerful engines for smaller ships with larger length-to-beam ratios.
The reasons behind the decline in average horsepower clarify when we consider
annual changes in average ship power (Figure IV-4). This variable is calculated by
dividing the ship's gross tonnage by engine horsepower to measure the amount o f gross
tonnage propelled by one unit o f engine horsepower. The performance o f ship power is
unlike that o f average horsepower in that the period before 1869 was highly cyclical but

characterized by a slight overall increase in power. The exception is the period o f rapid
growth beginning in 1861 and then the just as rapid decline until 1869. Periods of
increasing and declining ship power correspond with those for average ship size and
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horsepower, suggesting only modest increases in ship power before 1869. After 1869.
however, and around the same time the use of the Scotch boiler and surface condenser
(introduced in 1862 and 1863, respectively) were widespread, ship power rises
dramatically until 1873. After this year, the cyclical trend characteristic of the pre-1869
period resumes.
These graphs demonstrate that, despite the high fluctuations in horsepower and
ship power, the amount o f power installed on individual ships rose steadily during the
period, indicating that shipbuilders were using engines commensurate with the power
requirements of the individual ship. This observation suggests increasing ship power
efficiency and, since this is not indicated by average horsepower alone, supports the
argument made earlier that greater pow er efficiencies were the result o f complex inter
relationships between the iron steamship's two component technologies, iron construction
and steam propulsion, and their sub-systems.
4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
British experiments in iron construction and steam propulsion began at the
beginning of the nineteenth century. By the late 1830s, the innovation process had
advanced to the point that the iron screw steamship was accepted by the shipping industry
for trans-oceanic trade routes. This acceptance initiated a forty year innovation cycle that
transformed the iron screw steamship from a ship type suitable for only a few select trade
routes to the dominate trans-oceanic cargo carrier.
This revolution in ship technology was the result of successive improvements in
two basic ship technological systems over the course o f the 1840-1880 period. Iron
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construction techniques and ship designs led to cargo carriers that were much more
efficient than traditional wooden ships, while a succession o f improvements to the
propulsion system, including engines, condensing systems, and boilers resulted in dramatic
efficiency gains. Although the 1840-1880 innovation cycle concluded with the change
over to steel construction and the multiple expansion engine, modem iron construction
techniques, ship designs, and propulsion systems were in place.
Significantly, however, the innovation process was not continuous. The 18401880 period can be broken into four genuinely distinct cycles caused by periods of
economic expansion and depression within the shipbuilding and shipping industries. These
cycles are important to any understanding of technological change within the shipbuilding
industry for two reasons. First, changes in key technological indicators, such as average
ship length or horsepower, track shipbuilding output fluctuations. Second, these changes
were not continuous but rather occurred in jumps from one cycle to the next. This
strongly indicates that innovations introduced in one cycle were not fully exploited in
commercial terms until the following cycle.

This chapter has established the important changes that occurred in the two iron
steamship component technological systems: iron construction and steam propulsion.
These findings will be used in Chapter VI to direct the specification o f four multiple
regression models that identify the most significant technological changes that
characterized the 1840-1880 iron steamship. These four sets o f significant variables are
then used to construct the innovation index that will be used to test for association
between innovation and place.
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CHAPTER V
THE 1840-1880 BRITISH IRON AND STEAM SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY

The adoption of the iron screw steamship had a profound impact on the British
shipbuilding industry. The new technologies required an expansion in shipyard scale and
complexity, altered factor inputs, and created new industrial linkages These changes
relaxed the industry's traditional locational requirements and allowed for its spatial
reconfiguration at a variety o f scales.
This chapter examines the 1840-1880 British shipbuilding industry. It begins with
a discussion o f changes in shipyard operations and factor inputs that were brought about
by the new shipbuilding technologies. It demonstrates that these changes altered the
industry's locational requirements, primarily reflected in the industry's shift from southern
centers to formerly peripheral northern centers. The industry's spatial relocation, at both
the national and intra-regional levels, is then discussed. The chapter concludes with a
survey of 1840-1880 British iron and steam shipbuilding regions, identifying component
shipbuilding centers, their advantages and disadvantages, and their performance between
1840 and 1880.
1. INDUSTRIAL CHANGE
This section begins with an examination of changes within the shipbuilding
industry. It examines changes in shipyard operations that altered the locational
requirements for any particular shipyard. This is followed by a discussion o f changes in
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factor inputs that weakened the position of established shipbuilding centers and allowed
for the industry's spatial reconfiguration at a variety o f scales.
1.1. Shipyard Operations and Site Requirements
In 1840, the shipbuilding industry was dominated by wooden sailing ships. A
suitable site for wooden ship construction required frontage on a river channel which was
wide and deep enough to launch and swing the ship; space to stock timber and erect the
ship; and proximity to raw materials, skilled labor, and ship markets. Equipment was
negligible and primitive. Little capital was required, so the industry was made up o f a
large number o f highly competitive but generally small scale producers who could enter
and leave production as economic conditions warranted (Jones, 1957).
Although basic ship construction steps are the same for both types of ship, iron
and steam shipbuilding required massive increases in the scale and complexity of shipyard
operations. New construction techniques required new and much more powerful methods
for manipulating and transporting individual structural pieces, as well as more efficient
layouts that maximized iron through-put from unloading to final erection. In addition to
building berths and storage areas, the new shipyard was laid out differently to
accommodate furnaces for heating the iron; steam-powered machines to cut, roll, and
punch holes into frames and plate; and workshops for bending structural pieces. If carried
out at the same location, workshops for engine- and boilerworks required even more
space and capital (Abell, 1980; Hume, 1976; Walker, 1984). These changes transformed
the shipyard from a small, handicraft type shop to a large industrial operation with a highly
organized labor force using complex power tools (Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
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As ships became larger, the construction process became more complex. As the
construction process became more complicated, the shipyard required more area and more
capital intensive equipment (Jones, 1957). By the late 1860s and early 1870s, when ships
were becoming much larger and construction processes more complicated, shipyard
productivity was increased through more efficient yard layouts, including the replacement
o f block and tackle with sheerless booms for lifting frames and plates, and the
development of more powerful machine power tools (Pollard and Robertson, 1979;
Walker, 1984).
There were also iron shipyards that operated at a much smaller scale than those
described above, reflecting a more traditional approach in terms o f both ship construction
techniques and business strategy. Although their operations were similar in regards to
machinery and yard layout, the smaller scale yards were much less capital intensive and by
and large still relied on the same locational and business strategies used by the wooden
shipyards. These yards were located in the smaller ports and were usually operated in
conjunction with ship repair facilities. The small yards specialized in the production of
small coastal steamers for the local market and could either close down or concentrate on
ship repair operations during shipbuilding slumps (Waine, 1976).
1.2. Factor Inputs
Changes in shipyard operations changed the nature and relative importance of raw
materials, land, labor, and capital. These changes relaxed the shipbuilding industry's
traditional locational requirements and allowed for its spatial reconfiguration. While not
deterministic, differences in factor prices favored new and/or formerly peripheral
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shipbuilding regions and disadvantaged traditional shipbuilding regions once the new
shipbuilding practices became established.
1.2.1. Raw Materials
Iron, both for ship construction and ship machinery, was the industry's single most
important raw material. As a result, shipbuilding activity was attracted to areas with
established iron and mechanical engineering industries. The most favored locations were
those near the innovative iron producing regions in Scotland and the North East Coast
(Hyde, 1977). These centers were also able to attract large scale mechanical engineering
industries (Hyde, 1977; Pollard and Robertson, 1979). Although regional variations in
iron prices and transport costs tended to equalize over the course o f the study period,
northern shipbuilding centers enjoyed initial advantages because they were able to form
closer business relationships with local iron producers (Jones, 1957; Pollard and
Robertson, 1979; Warren, 1990).
1.2.2. Land
The early iron and steam shipbuilders were located in urban areas because o f the
locational advantages of access to subsidiary industries and ship and capital markets.
Urban advantages eroded as the iron and steam industry became established in that
congested shipping lanes and high urban land costs soon worked to create localized
diseconomies o f scale. These disadvantages were avoided in the newer regions by either
hiving o ff operations or relocating entirely to low-cost satellite communities further down
the urban hierarchy. This was made possible by infrastructural improvements, primarily in
the form o f straightening and deepening river channels and developing new industrial sites
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along their banks (Dougan, 1968; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Walker; 1984).
Relocation was not an option for the traditional regions, however, either because potential
river improvements which might permit the development o f new sites down the urban
hierarchy had already been exploited or because of conflicts with the shipping industry.
Firms located in these traditional regions were clearly at a serious disadvantage relative to
those in the newer regions. As a result, many traditionally successful firms were forced to
either relocate out of the region or left the industry altogether (Pollard, 1950; Pollard and
Robertson, 1979).
1.2.3. Labor
Iron and steam transformed shipbuilding into an assembly trade with a more highly
organized but less skilled labor force. Changes in labor force requirements began almost
immediately with the introduction of iron and steam as shipbuilders adopted many of the
labor practices used in engine- and boilerworks. Since most machine operations and new
ship assembly techniques could be carried out by relatively unskilled workers, immigrants
were employed in these tasks (shipwrights and apprentices, more highly skilled and higher
paid, were retained because o f the power of their trade organization). Since immigrants
were attracted to low skilled jobs in urban areas, urban shipyards enjoyed initial
advantages in labor recruitment and training. These savings in labor costs did not last,
however, primarily because o f the early establishment o f trade unions and the development
of inter-regional labor markets in the industry. At this point the advantage often swung in
favor o f those centers located down the urban hierarchy where housing and other
amenities could be provided (Pollard, 1950; Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
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1.2.4. Capital
The large fixed plant required for an iron shipyard was much more capital intensive
than that for a wooden shipyard. Initially, shipbuilders received financial backing from the
mechanical engineering industry and the owners of steam packet lines. Again, these
sources were located in large ports. By the 1850s, which saw the expansion of the new
ship into bulk cargo routes, funds became available from regional mining and iron interests
that employed specialized iron steamers. Most shipyards were owned by single
proprietorships or by family groups and, since the vast majority of ships were built on
order from shipowners, with regular payments made during the course o f the ship's
construction, operating funds and capital for expansion was often raised within the firm.
Capital markets formalized after the mid-1850s with shipbuilders obtaining funds from
both local and regional financial institutions. Although several joint stock companies were
formed between 1856 and 1865 (the second shipbuilding cycle identified in the previous
chapter), survival rates were not high and this method for capital accumulation was not
heavily utilized during the study period (Dougan, 1968; Pollard and Robertson, 1979;
Slaven, 1992; Walker, 1984).
2. SPATIAL CHANGE
Accepting that changes in site location and factor inputs were required as the
industry responded to new forces o f agglomeration and economies o f scale, this section
examines the spatial changes within the 1840-1880 British shipbuilding industry. The
discussion begins by establishing the spatial industrial system at the beginning o f the study
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period, and then documents the changes in the system brought about by changing site
requirements and factor inputs.
2.1. Circa-1840
The shipbuilding industry in 1840 was widely scattered simply because no single
region had sufficient river frontage to handle all the yards needed to satisfy the country’s
annual demand for new shipping. The major centers dominated by wood and sail were
located on the rivers Thames and Mersey, the ports of Bristol and Dublin, and smaller
ports in East Anglia and on the North East Coast (Dougan, 1968; Jones, 1957; Pollard
and Robertson, 1979). Of these centers, London and Liverpool, on the Thames and
Mersey, respectively, built the highest rated ships and enjoyed the highest product
identification (Pollard and Robertson, 1979). Although firms with several ports had
experimented with iron shipbuilding, for example Bristol where the Great Western was
built, iron and steam shipbuilding was still heavily concentrated in London, Liverpool,
Birkenhead ( also on the Mersey), and on the River Clyde in Scotland (Pollard and
Robertson, 1979; Walker, 1984).
Shipbuilders in large urban ports enjoyed locational advantages over builders in the
smaller ports. Ships built in these locations were rated higher than those built in smaller
ports and enjoyed high product recognition. The turban location also gave access to a
large ship market, and shipbuilding output was directly proportional to the trade o f the
port. Further, pools of skilled workers from the local building trades were readily
available for both ship construction and finishing work, allowing builders in urban ports to
better handle rush orders (Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
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2.2. Post-1840
Iron and steam shipbuilding transformed the industry's locational requirements and
allowed for the British industry's spatial restructuring at both national and regional scales.
At the national level, the industry shifted out o f the traditional shipbuilding regions and
centers in the south to formerly peripheral regions and centers in the north. At the
regional level, the industry expanded out of the original urban centers to satellite
communities once the shipbuilding process became standardized and the center's
agglomeration advantages began to erode.
Once iron and steam shipbuilding was established in the 1840s, the industry's
primary locational concerns included convenient access to iron and mechanical engineering
industries, cheap labor, ship and capital markets, and repair facilities. These concerns
favored urban centers located on northern rivers. Firms at these new locations saved on
raw material transport costs and realized business advantages through backward linkages
to iron and machinery makers and forward linkages to shipowners. Secondary factors in
the location decision were the port's volume o f trade, capital markets, and engineering
ability (Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
By the early 1850s, iron shipbuilding was increasingly concentrated in centers on
the Clyde and North East Coast that offered cheap factor inputs; large ship markets; and
subsidiary industries such as machinery, engine- and boilerworks, and repair services.
Like the established wooden shipbuilding centers, the new iron concentrations enjoyed
high product recognition and tended to attract shipbuilding migrants. These advantages
improved the individual firm's costs and profitability, providing competitive advantages
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over the declining older southern regions. Other regions that successfully converted to the
new ship technology were the Scottish East Coast and the River Humber (Jones, 1957;
Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
The 1850s and 1860s also saw a high degree of concentration in small towns
within the regional industrial system. The growth o f these centers was due to intraregional shifts as firms migrated out of congested urban shipyards and into small towns
and new industrial sites. These shifts were made possible by river improvement projects
that straightened and deepened river channels. The new locations allowed firms to
maintain business relationships established in the original center while avoiding much
higher urban land prices and congestion (Dougan, 1968; Walker, 1984). Another
advantage was the firm's ability to better control workers and dominate the small towns
socially, politically, and economically (Pollard and Robertson, 1979).
Intra-regional shifts occurred for both the Clyde and North East Coast regions.
Shifts on the Clyde, accomplished before the beginning of the study period, were
characterized by movement beyond Glasgow's corporate limits to immediately adjacent
communities or further down the river. Similar shifts on the North East Coast began in
the 1850s and were confined to the rivers Tyne (Newcastle) and Tees (Stockton)
(Dougan, 1968; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Walker, 1984).
3. BRITISH SHIPBUILDING REGIONS
This section presents 1840-1880 British iron and steam shipbuilding regions and
their component centers (figures V-1 through V-6). Each center is assigned to one o f ten
shipbuilding regions. These regions, following standard regionalization schemes used by
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Pollard and Robertson (1979), Todd (1985) and others, are named for either the river or
sea coast on which they are located. Six of the regions are complete functional systems.
Three regions include isolated ports that were not functionally a part of the region to
which they are assigned (Mersey) or by combining several individual regions into one
greater region (Ireland and Severn). The final region (Irish Sea) consists of isolated ports
between the Mersey and Clyde regions. These centers were not functionally linked but
each depended local iron supplies and industrial relationships with the Clyde.
3.1. Clyde
The Clyde was the largest and most famous shipbuilding region in the world. It
was not one of Britain's traditional shipbuilding regions, however, and its success was due
to its early specialization in iron and steam. The Clyde was considered to be Britain's
most innovative shipbuilding region, and its list of innovative firsts include: technically and
commercially successful steamboats; an exclusively iron and steam shipyard; specialized
machinery, and the compound expansion engine (Hume, 1976; Jones, 1957; Walker,
1984).
Factors influencing the region's growth included the local availability of iron and
coal, large pools o f both skilled and unskilled labor, an established mechanical engineering
industry, and local capital and ship markets. Iron for structural pieces and machinery
came from the large local iron and mechanical engineering industries. Skilled labor was
obtained from local mechanical engineering establishments and foundries, while unskilled
labor was imported from Ireland. The river’s large merchant fleet provided a ready ship
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market, while capital was obtained from shipowners, formal financial institutions, and
shipbuilders (Hyde, 1977; Robb, 1958;Slaven, 1992;Tumock, 1982).
The distribution o f Clyde shipbuilding centers is presented in Figure V -1. The
region's most important center, Glasgow, was located at the Clyde's head o f navigation.
Next in importance were Greenock, Port Glasgow, and Dumbarton, located at the mouth
o f the river, and Paisley and Renfrew nearer Glasgow. Average ship size data from the
Register suggests that only Greenock and Paisley specialized in particular types o f ships,
with the former producing large ships and the latter small coastal traders. The location of
the minor centers o f Bowling, Maryhill, and Whiteinch suggest relocation out o f the
larger, nearby centers. Campbelhown, located on the Kintyre peninsula in the Forth of
Clyde, did not begin production until the very end of the study period.
3.2. Scottish East Coast
The Scottish East Coast (Figure V -1) was the Register's fourth largest producing
region. Shipbuilding was a prominent industry during the eighteenth and early nineteenth
centuries. The region made an early entrance into iron and steam shipbuilding, with its
first wood and iron steamships being built in 1823 and 1838, respectively. However, the
region is considered to have been in decline during the 1840-1880 period because of the
relocation o f many Aberdeen shipbuilders to both the Clyde and North East Coast and the
decline o f trade at the region's principal port, Leith (Bremner, 1869; Lenman, 1981;
Tumock, 1982). The region's success came from its specialization in specialty ships such
as coastal steamers and fishing vessels (a strategy still followed today) (Pollard and
Robertson, 1979; Todd, 1985; Waine, 1976).
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Six centers were in production at one time or another during the study period.
The two most important centers were Dundee and Aberdeen. Kinghom and
Inverkeithing, located on the Forth of Firth, were in production for a limited amount of
time, Kinghom appearing to specialize in large ships while Inverkeithing produced coastal
steamers or smaller specialty craft. Leith, located at Edinburgh, and Montrose were very
small centers (Tumock, 1982).
3.3. North East Coast
Three sub-regions, the Wear, Tyne, and Tees (Figure V-2), are combined to form
a single North East Coast shipbuilding region. This regionalization scheme follows that of
most shipbuilding historians, examples being Dougan (1968), Pollard and Robertson
(1979), and Todd (1985). The classification is based on their dependence on the North
East Coast iron and steel and coal mining industrial system (Hyde, 1977; Warren, 1990).
While output for each individual region was less than fifty percent of the Clyde's, the
combined output of all North East Coast centers was 31.5 percent greater than that for the
Clyde.
Although the region built Britain's first iron vessels, in actuality the North East
Coast did not vigorously enter into iron and steam shipbuilding until relatively late.
Although authors disagree on the exact location and year, the region's first iron steamer
was built on the Tyne in approximately 1840, while the first ship on the Tees was built in
1854 on and the Wear in 1858 (Dougan, 1968; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Smith and
Holden, 1953). Despite the region's late start and the small scale o f its shipyards even as
late as 1850, it was the first region to switch exclusively to iron and steam shipbuilding,
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accomplished in 1863 (Dougan, 1968). Somewhat surprisingly, the North East Coast did
not enjoy a reputation for its innovative ability at the time, though major innovations
originating in the region included water ballast tanks (1840), the first bulk cargo-carrier
(1852), and the double bottom water ballast tank (1860) (Dougan, 1968; Pollard and
Robertson, 1979).
The region's primary locational advantages lay in access to cheap iron and
machinery as well as close proximity to ship and capital markets. The region's iron
industry was established soon after the introduction o f Cort's puddling process (Jones,
1957), while engine works were established at Newcastle as early as 1820 (Dougan,
1968). The locational advantages in raw materials and components attracted shipbuilders
from the Scottish East Coast, especially from Aberdeen, who established the region's first
iron and steam shipbuilding yards on the Tyne. Demand for shipping and capital for
investment in the new shipbuilding industry was provided by local iron and mining
interests, who required efficient bulk cargo carriers. These ships transported coal to
English (primarily London) and Continental coal markets, while iron ore was carried to the
region's iron furnaces from local iron ore mines and later from mines located in Spain.
The John Bowes, built in 1852, was the first iron and steam collier and revolutionized the
bulk transport o f both o f these commodities. The region did not have an advantage in
labor costs, with wages generally higher than those on the Clyde, but this disadvantage
was overcome by longer working hours and the institution of piece work and sub
contracting (Dougan, 1968; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Waine, 1976).
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The Tees was the largest producer of the three sub-regions. The sub-region was
centered on Stockton, which built the first iron steamer and also built the largest amount
o f tonnage on the North East Coast. New sites closer to the coast were developed
following river improvements begun in 1852. New centers were the Hartlepools and
Middlesborough, the latter the second largest center on the river (Dougan, 1968; Pollard
and Robertson, 1979). Sunderland was the only center in the second largest producing
sub-region, the Wear. This center was a veiy old shipbuilding port, specializing in
wooden colliers, but it had the poorest reputation, in terms o f ship quality and ship
innovations, of any shipbuilding region in the study (Smith and Holden, 1953; Ville.
1990).
The final region was centered on the Tyne, specifically Newcastle and its suburbs
Walker and Jarrow. Newcastle was the home of the Hawthorne Engine Works, which
specialized in marine steam engines, and the Palmer Shipbuilding Company, builder of the
John Bowes, (the Palmers Shipbuilding Company also operated a yard in Jarrow). River
improvements begun in 1850 led to the development of the Shields; South Shields, the
region's second largest producer; and, after a significant drop-off in output, North Shields.
3.4. Humber
The Humber was one of the few traditional wooden shipbuilding regions that
successfully made the transition to iron and steam. Hull (Figure V-2), the region's
principal center, was Britain's third largest port, trading mainly with the Baltic ports
(Encyclopaedia Britannica. 1882). The center specialized in coastal steamers and bulk
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cargo carriers for local shipowners (Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Waine, 1976). No
information is available for the minor centers of Grimsby and Gainesborough.
3.5. Thames
The Thames, centered on London, was Britain's oldest and most famous
shipbuilding region (Figure V-3). Although best known for its wooden sailing ships, the
Thames was one o f the three pioneering iron and steam shipbuilding regions, with engine
works established as early as 1810 and iron shipbuilding by 1825 (Rowland, 1970).
Considered by many authors to be Britain's most innovative iron and steam shipbuilding
region, the Thames claimed the country's most scientific shipbuilders and naval architects
and was a leading center in the development of close tolerance metal working techniques
(Banbury, 1971; Pollard and Robertson, 1979; Parkinson, 1960; Rowland, 1970).
Although London's advantages lay in its large ship and capital markets, as the
industry matured it was fatally disadvantaged by high costs for raw materials, land, and
labor. Transport costs kept material costs much higher than those on the Clyde and North
East Coast. Congestion along the city's river front drove up land prices and major river
improvement and she development schemes had all been completed before 1840. The
region's greatest drawback, according to Pollard (1950), was the ability o f the strong local
trade unions to enforce high wage rates.
Despite its reputation for innovative ability, the Thames region declined with the
increased adoption o f the new ship. In 1863 the river produced 117 thousand register
tons o f shipping, or one quarter of all British shipbuilding output, but the industry
collapsed after 1865 in the face of rapidly increasing costs (Banbury, 1971; Pollard, 1950;
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Pollard and Robertson, 1979). The few shipyards that remained in the region after this
time specialized in ships that were relatively insensitive to high production costs, such as
high cost warships and passenger liners.
3.6. Solent
The Solent shipbuilding region consisted of Southampton, Southwick, and
Portsmouth (Figure V-3). The Solent was an important wood and sail shipbuilding region
but did not produce iron and steam ships until fairly late. This lag continued despite the
fact that the Admiralty's principle dockyard was located at Portsmouth and that
Southampton was one of the major ports, especially for Atlantic packet liners, on the
southern coast (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1888). Little information from the literature is
available for the region's iron and steam shipbuilding industry, although Waine (1976)
identifies three builders o f coastal steamers. Since the Register does not include any ships
until late in the study period, it would appear that the industry did not become established
until after shipbuilding techniques became standardized in other regions.
3.7. Severn
The Severn shipbuilding region consists o f the English port o f Bristol and the
Welsh ports o f Llanelly, Neath, and Swansea (Figure V-4). The port o f Northam, at the
entrance to the Mouth of Severn, is also included in this region. The region's most
significant port was Bristol, an established wooden shipbuilding center and an early iron
and steam center (the Great Britain was built here in 1843). Bristol was Britain's fourth
largest port (circa 1882), while the Welsh centers were important local ports and market
towns (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1882). No information is available for Northam.
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The region's locational advantages were based on local supplies of iron and
machinery and demand from local shipowners operating out of the region's many ports.
The Welsh ports were manufacturing centers based on coal mining, raw material
processing, and iron and steeL Swansea and Neath produced iron and steel, with the latter
also producing engines and machinery. Based on average ship size, these centers probably
specialized in small coastal steamers and other specialty craft. This assumption is
corroborated by Waine (1976), who identifies Bristol and Barnstable (Northam) as coastal
steamer production centers.
3.8. Mersey
The Mersey was Britain's second largest wooden shipbuilding region after the
Thames. It was one of the pioneering iron and steam shipbuilding regions, along with the
Clyde and Thames. The Mersey region proper (Figure V-5) includes the centers of
Liverpool, Birkenhead, Chester, and Winsford. Aberdovey, a minor Welsh port at the
mouth of the River Dovey, is included although it was not related to the concentration to
the north and east.
Liverpool and Birkenhead had strong reputations for innovative steamships.
Liverpool dominated the region's output, with Birkenhead the second largest center.
Birkenhead's one shipyard specialized in warships, explaining the sharp drop-ofif in output
between this center and Liverpool Chester, a minor port whose harbor was silting in
(Encyclopaedia Rrrtannica 1875), is identified as specializing in coastal traders (Waine,

1976). Little information is available for the final two centers, Winsford and Aberdovey.
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Liverpool and Birkenhead enjoyed many of the locational advantages of the Clyde
and North East Coast. Both centers had access to cheap raw materials, but labor costs
were higher than the Clyde and North East Coast (but still less than the Thames). These
centers, like London on the Thames, also were in proximity to large ship and capital
markets (Liverpool was Britain's second largest port, serving as the Manchester's
entrepot). Despite these advantages, these centers were already in decline by the
beginning o f the study period. According to Pollard and Robertson (1979) and

corroborated by the Encyclopaedia Britannica (1875), the decline was caused by the
Liverpool Corporation's refusal to provide additional river frontage for the shipbuilding
industry.
3.9. Irish Sea
The four shipbuilding centers o f Barrow, Preston, Whitehaven, and Isle o f Man are
combined to form a single Irish Sea shipbuilding region (Figure V-5). These ports do not
appear to have been functionally related, other than the fact that they probably obtained
raw materials from the region's revived iron and steel industry. These port's locational
advantages were their access to locally produced raw materials and the proximity to the
Clyde, which provided a ship market and business linkages with established yards. Labor
was cheap and obtained from the Clyde and Ireland.
Barrow was the most important center in terms o f subsequent growth. Developed
in the early 1870s by local iron interests, it did not become a major shipbuilding center
until the yard's acquisition by the Vickers armaments company in the 1890s
{Encyclopaedia Britannica. 1875 and 1882; Pollard and Robertson, 1979). Preston was a
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trading port and mechanical engineering center (Encyclopaedia Britannica 1882). O f the
other two centers, Whitehaven was a traditional wooden shipbuilding center with linkages
to Clyde shipowners (Turaock, 1982) and its fairly late development, combined with its
production o f large ships, suggest a functional relationship with the Clyde industry. No
information is available for the Isle o f Man.
3.10. Ireland
The Register's four Irish centers have been combined into one large Ireland region
(Figure V-6). Each o f the four was a prominent wooden shipbuilding region, but only
Belfast made the successful transition to iron and steam. The Belfast industry was
dominated by the Harland and W oolf company, which began, operations in 1857 following
the construction o f a ship channel and building site. The company specialized in large
ships, especially packet liners (its most famous ship was the Titanic! Belfast was
disadvantaged by high raw material costs, as iron and coal had to be imported. Still, the
city remained competitive because o f strong national demand for its ships, an abundant
supply of cheap unskilled labor, and site and harbor improvements subsidized by the city
(Pollard and Robertson, 1979). Both Cork and Waterford were wooden shipbuilding
centers (Todd, 1985) and were active iron and steam centers until the 1865 depression
which ended the second shipbuilding cycle. (The Encyclopaedia Britannica o f 1875
reports that Waterford had one operating shipyard.) Although Dublin contributed only
two ships to the Register. Todd (1985) states that the harbor board subsidized a ship
repair facility and Waine ( 1976) notes that this yard produced coastal steamers for local
shipowners.
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The introduction of iron and steam shipbuilding had a profound impact on the
British shipbuilding industry and its spatial structure. The new construction techniques
radically increased the scale and complexity of the individual shipyard and transformed it
into a large industrial operation. The new technologies also changed the relative
importance and prices of factor inputs so that, in addition to iron and machinery, the new
industry required more land to accommodate increased shipyard scale; cheap, unskilled
labor; and access to ship and capital markets. These locational considerations favored iron
and machinery producing regions on northern rivers and, at the beginning o f the study
period, urban areas that offered agglomeration advantages. These advantages tended to
erode as the study period progressed, as witnessed by the movement out o f urban
concentrations and down the urban hierarchy as rivers were dredged and straightened and
new industrial sites developed. The growth, expansion, and concentration o f shipbuilding
activity on the Clyde and North East Coast created massive industrial complexes in these
two regions.
At the same time, formerly important shipbuilding centers, notably London on the
Thames and Liverpool on the Mersey, declined during the study period. Despite the fact
that these centers enjoyed reputations as innovative iron and steam shipbuilding centers,
their disadvantages in terms o f access to factor inputs was too great to overcome. Over
the course o f the study period, their competitive positions declined relative to the northern
regions, and they were relegated to insignificance by the end of the study period.
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However, shipbuilding activity continued and even expanded at minor centers in
the smaller traditional shipbuilding regions. Although centers such as Belfast in Ireland
and Barrow on the Irish Sea were the exception, these small scale shipyards represented a
continuity with the traditional industry. These centers, operating at a disadvantage in
terms o f access to raw materials and urban concentrations, maintained many o f the
organizational and business strategies of the wooden shipyard and remained viable due to
their access to local ship markets.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER VI
SPATIAL INDUSTRIAL CHANGE

The previous chapter examined industrial and spatial changes in the British
shipbuilding industry over the course of the 1840 to 1880 study period. In particular, it
examined increases in the scale and complexity o f shipyard operations, changes in the
industry’s locational requirements, and the industry's south-to-north reorientation. It also
established the country’s ten shipbuilding regions and their component centers.
This chapter investigates changes in the industry's spatial structure in greater detail.
The first section examines the relative importance of all shipbuilding centers that produced
at least one ship during the study period which was listed in the Lloyds Register. The
discussion is based on a series o f tables that rank each center in terms of output for each
of the four shipbuilding cycles identified in Chapter IV. Each center's relative importance
during each cycle is established, as well as changes in its position from one cycle to the
next.
The chapter's second section presents the annual market share rankings which,
when combined with the industrial viability rank to be established in the next chapter, will
be used to test for the association between industrial viability and innovative ability. The
market share rankings are presented in a series o f tables and maps, one for each
shipbuilding cycle. The tables present the annual rankings on a regional basis, while the
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aps locate and present the ranking of individual centers in production during each cycle's
last year.
1. SPATIAL INDUSTRIAL FLUX
This section establishes the changing spatial structure of the 1840-1880 British
iron and steam shipbuilding industry. The discussion is based on four tables, one for each
shipbuilding cycle. Each center is ranked by its total output (in terms o f gross tonnage)
during a given cycle. Information provided for each center includes: the number of ships
built; total tonnage; average ship size; percent change in output from the previous cycle;
rank; the absolute amount and the direction of change in rank from the previous cycle; and
the number of shipbuilding firms in operation. Data for the tables was synthesized from
the Lloyd's Register and as such does not represent total national output.
Please note that there is a great deal of variability in average ship size.
There are several reasons for this variability. First, shipbuilding centers, and regions,
specialized in the type o f ships they produced. Examples o f specialized shipbuilding
centers are Paisley and Renfrew on the Clyde which were recognized for their small
coastal steamers and harbor craft. Examples o f specialized regions are Hull and the
Scottish East Coast, the former producing small to medium-sized cargo carriers for
continental trade routes, while the latter was recognized for its coastal steamers and
fishing and other specialized vessels. The second reason for the variability in average ship
size deals with the fact that many shipbuilding centers produced few ships that were
inspected by the Register. The reasons for this are probably due to the Lloyds neglect of
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remote shipbuilding locations and the fact that some shipowners and shipbuilders did not
choose to have their ships inspected by Lloyds.
The discussion uses Vernon's Product Life Cycle (1966) as a conceptual
framework. The model provides a spatial expression of Kuznet's (1930) argument that
industries pass through a regular and predictable development cycle consisting o f three
periods: innovation; growth; and standardization. Each period of the Life Cycle has
strong implications for the individual firm's location decision: the innovation period
requiring close proximity to markets, linked industries, and capital markets; the growth
stage allowing firms to expand out of their original locations to those closer to markets,
and the standardization stage requiring firms to seek out the least cost location as profits
diminish- As such, the Product Life Cycle provides a framework for examining the

diffusion o f shipbuilding activity.
1.1. Cycle 1: 1840-1855
The first cycle can be considered to be the innovation phase for the British iron and
steam shipbuilding industry. The largest producing centers (Table VI-1) are located on
the Clyde, Thames, and North East Coast. These regions enjoyed access to large ship and
mechanical engineering industrial concentrations. These linkages are important during the
Product Life Cycle's innovation period.
Glasgow and the other centers on the Clyde clearly dominated output during this
cycle, followed by the Thames. North East centers appear to have occupied a second tier,
with a drop-off in output occurring between South Shields (North East Coast), and
Waterford (Ireland) (Aberdeen's relatively high rank is due to its production o f a single
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Table VI-1 : Spatial Industrial Change
Output, Rank, and Firms fo r Individual Centers, 1840-1855

Port

Region

Glasgow
Dumbarton
Greenock
London
Port Glasgow
Newcastle
Shields
Hull
Cork
Stockton
Birkenhead
Liverpool
Aberdeen
Chester
Paisley
South Shields
Waterford
Bristol
Jarrow
Walker
Neath
Preston
Swansea
Inverkeithing
Renfrew
Dundee
Total

Clyde
Clyde
Clyde
Thames
Clyde
N.E. Coast
N.E. Coast
Humber
Ireland
N.E. Coast
Mersey
Mersey
S.E. Coast
Mersey
Clyde
N.E. Coast
Ireland
Severn
N.E. Coast
N.E. Coast
Severn
Irish Sea
Severn
S.E. Coast
Clyde
S.E. Coast

Total
Average Ship
Size
Output
(gross tons) (gross tons)
43
30345
706
23
8979
390
15
8586
572
15
6669
445
9
4247
472
8
3813
477
8
3282
410
8
2696
337
5
2662
532
5
2272
454
2
2258
1129
4
1821
455
1
1754
1754
1488
496
5
1335
267
5
1193
239
2
699
350
3
609
203
1
332
332
2
315
158
2
240
120
1
180
180
2
124
62
1
109
109
1
95
95
84
1
84
175
86187
492

Number
Built

Percent
Share
35.21
10.42
9.96
7.74
4.93
4.42
3.81
3.13
3.09
2.64
2.62
2.11
2.04
1.73
1.55
1.38
0.81
0.71
0.39
0.37
0.28
0.21
0.14
0.13
0.11
0.10

Number
Firms

Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

4
nd
1
nd
nd
nd
1
nd
nd
nd
1
1
nd
1
1
nd
nd
1
1
I
nd
nd
1
nd
nd
nd
14

nd - no
Source: L loyd's R o a ste r. 1 8 4 0 .1 8 4 5 .1 8 5 0 .1 8 5 5 . I8 6 0 . 1865. 1 8 7 0 .1 8 7 5 . 1880.

large ship). With the exception o f Jarrow, Walker, and Renfrew, the small were located
well away from major markets and industrial centers.
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A review of Table VI-1 indicates the small number of firms. This is probably due
to the fact that, first, Lloyd's did not make an effort to record builder’s names and, second,
there were few builders in the period that had established strong reputations. The few
centers that did record builders names are concentrated in the large centers on the Clyde
and North East Coast, as well as the Mersey, leaving the impression that these centers and
their builders enjoyed more established reputations in iron and steam shipbuilding which
undoubtedly resulted in greater sales opportunities.
1.2. Cycle 2: 1856-1865
Output more than doubled between the first (1840-1855) and second cycles (18561865) (Table VI-2). This growth is also reflected in the increase in the number of
shipbuilding centers and firms within centers. Among all regions, the Clyde still
dominated national shipbuilding output, recording four centers among the seven largest.
Despite a 15 percent decline, Glasgow was still the leading center, while Greenock
remained the third largest after increasing output by over one hundred percent. Newcastle
was the second largest producer, increasing its output by over four hundred percent and
rising from its rank of sixth in the previous cycle. Belfast, the fourth largest producer, did
not even appear in the previous cycle as the Harland and Woolf Company did not begin
operations until the mid 1850s. Despite experiencing absolute output gains, both
Dumbarton and London experienced relative declines (dropping 4 and 3 places,
respectively). Dundee and Renfrew made dramatic gains to lead the second tier of centers
(output from 1890 to 7654 tons).
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Table VI-2: Spatial Industrial Change
Output, Rank, and Firms for Individual Centers, 1856-1865
Total
Average
Number Output
Ship Size Percent Percent
Rank Number
Port___________ Region_____Built (gross tons) (gross tons) Share Change Rank Change Firms
57
Clyde
25702
451
14.08
-15
nc
5
Glasgow
1
37
20074
543
11.00
427
+4
6
N.E. Coast
2
Newcastle
Clyde
26
20056
771
10.99
134
4
nc
Greenock
19727
1517
Ireland
13
10.81
nd
4
nd
Belfast
1
389
Port Glasgow
Clyde
35
13619
7.46
221
5
nc
5
Clyde
14
11191
799
6.13
-4
25
6
1
Dumbarton
507
Thames
22
11143
6.10
67
7
9
London
-3
14
7654
547
4.19
Dundee
S.E. Coast
9012
8
+ 18
1
2
Clyde
16
6794
9
Renfrew
425
3.72
7052
+ 16
8
6755
844
3.70
nd
10
nd
1
West Hartlepool N.E. Coast
Hull
11
5225
475
Z86
94
11
-3
3
Humber
2
4479
Sunderland
N.E. Coast
5
896
2.45
nd
12
nd
2
Ireland
3887
1944
171
Waterford
2.13
13
+4
1
3700
Mersey
4
925
2.03
103
14
3
Liverpool
-2
Ireland
3
3294
1.80
1098
24
15
-6
1
Cork
1.71
N.E. Coast
8
3121
390
37
16
-6
Stockton
1
2427
Clyde
11
221
1.33
17
Paisley
82
-2
1
4
2391
598
1.31
Bristol
Severn
293
18
nc
1
4
2041
Shields
N.E. Coast
510
1.12
-61
19
-12
3
4
2039
510
nd
20
nd
Hartlepool
N.E. Coast
1.12
1
1890
1.04
S.E. Coast
3
630
nd
21
nd
1
Kinghom
2
930
2
465
0.51
nd
22
nd
Middlesborough N.E. Coast
899
899
Jarrow
1
0.49
171
23
-4
N.E. Coast
1
4
781
195
0.43
617
24
nc
Inverkeithing
S.E. Coast
1
736
0.40
Ireland
1
736
nd
25
nd
1
Dublin
561
0.31
nd
North Shields
1
561
nd
26
1
N.E. Coast
0.27
27
nd
Irish Sea
492
246
nd
1
Isle of Man
nd
Clyde
1
324
324
0.18
nd
28
1
Whiteinch
220
220
nd
29
nd
Llanelly
Severn
1
0.12
1
125
125
0.07
30
nd
1
nd
1
Grimsby
Humber
nd
Mersey
103
103
0.06
nd
31
nd
I
Winsford
101
0.06
nd
nd
Mersey
1
101
32
1
Aberdovey
85
0.05
nd
nd
85
33
1
1
Gainesborough Humber
574
182566
75
318
Total
n d - n o data
n c - n o d ia n g e
Source: L lo y d 'sR eg iaer 1855. I8 6 0 . 1865. 1870. 187 5 .1 8 8 0
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The table indicates that the shipbuilding industry’s national spatial system was in a
state of flux with some centers dropping from the list, other centers experiencing relative
declines, and still others entering for the very first time. Eight centers from the previous
cycle do not even appear in the next cycle. While this does not necessarily mean these
centers did not build any ships (ships could have been listed with other registers), still, it
does suggest a significant drop-off in output. The most significant o f the centers not
appearing in the second cycle are Birkenhead, probably due to the Laird's shipyard
concentrating on warships, and Aberdeen which was (and still is) an important
shipbuilding center. Despite absolute increases in output (only Shields experienced an
absolute decline) only three firms increased their position within the industrial system. At
the same time, fifteen centers make their first appearance. Prominent among these are the
second tier centers o f West Hartlepool, Sunderland, Hartlepool, Middlesborough, and
North Shields, all located on the North East Coast. The last 9 centers, beginning with
Dublin, were small scale producers and may represent repair yards building a limited
number of coastal traders for the local market
The increase in the number of shipbuilding centers and the instability in their rank
order within the system relative to positions in the previous cycle indicates that the
industry was in the Product Life Cycle's growth phase. Of the new centers on the North
East Coast, only Sunderland was an established shipbuilding center, indicating movement
out o f the urban centers o f Newcastle and Stockton facilitated both by river improvements
and the weakening o f the close ties to urban markets and support industries characteristic
o f the innovation phase. Although the record is incomplete, the fact that 75 firms were in
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operation, with multiple firms operating in the larger centers, suggests rapid expansion,
another indication that the industry had entered the Product Life Cycle's growth phase.
1.3. Cycle 3: 1866-1872
Production continued to be concentrated in the north during the third cycle (Table
VI-3). The centers can be sub-divided into four groups based on output: four centers
producing over 26 thousand tons; four centers producing between eighteen and fourteen
thousand tons; twelve centers producing between nine and one thousand tons; and twelve
centers (not counting the generic "Clyde") producing less than one thousand tons. In the
last group, only Belfast, Llanelly, and South Shields produced more than one ship.
O f the eight centers in the first two groups, only London was not located on either
the Clyde, still the leading region, or North East Coast. The increase in total output was
largely accounted for by increased output in these two regions. Greenock and Newcastle
dominated national output (with more than four thousand tons apiece). Glasgow, the
third largest producer, made only a marginal increase in absolute terms and still, perhaps
more surprisingly, did not equal its output during the first cycle.
O f the thirteen largest centers, only Glasgow did not experience growth or at least
no change in output. London was among the centers experiencing no growth. Centers
experiencing the greatest gams were on the North East Coast, especially Middlesborough
and HartlepooL From Dumbarton (the fourteenth ranked center) down, however,
declining centers outnumbered growth centers by 7 to 4. Eight centers from the previous
cycle are no longer present, while nine new centers appear, the most prominent being
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Table VI-3: Spatial Industrial Change
Output, Rank, and Firms for Individual Centers, 1866-1872

Port
Greenock
Newcastle
Glasgow
Renfrew
Port Glasgow
Sunderland
London
West Hartlepool
Middlesborough
Liverpool
Stockton
Kinghom
Hartlepool
Dumbarton
Dundee
Hull
Aberdeen
Paisley
Inverkeithing
Southwick
Belfast
South Shields
Llanelly
North Fleet
Dublin
Northam
Grimsby
North Shields
Preston
Southampton
Maryhill
Winsford
Clvde
Total

Region
Clyde
N.E. Coast
Clyde
Clyde
Clyde
N.E. Coast
Thames
N.E. Coast
N.E. Coast
Mersey
N.E. Coast
S.E. Coast
N.E. Coast
Clyde
S.E. Coast
Humber
S.E. Coast
Clyde
S.E. Coast
Solent
Ireland
N.E. Coast
Severn
Thames
Ireland
Severn
Humber
N.E. Coast
Irish Sea
Solent
Clyde
Mersey
Clvde

Total
Average
Rank Number
Number Output
Ship Size Percent Percent
Built (gross tons) (gross tons) Share Change Rank Change Firms
131.8
46495
2214
17.71
1
+2
4
21
7
843
16.37
114.2
2
nc
51
42981
-2
5.4
27083
903
10.32
3
12
30
2
927
282
4
+f
25951
9.88
28
5
514
6.86
32.2
nc
7
35
18001
1327
6
+6
7
17250
6.57 285.1
13
7
15297
1093
37.3
nc
5
14
5.38
2
+2
1019
111.1
8
14
14263
5.43
870
9
601
3.44
+ i:
1
15
9021
+4
52.5
10
6
8
5641
705
2.15
2
689
2.10
76.6
11
+f
8
5511
+9
184.6
12
4
5378
1345
2.05
1
2
145.6
+7
835
1.91
13
6
5008
-56.7
-8
4845
969
1.85
14
1
5
-40
-1
7
4593
656
1.75
15
1
-5
906
-13.3
16
I
5
4528
1.72
nd
nd
17
3
3576
715
1.36
5
18
-1
1445
181
0.55
-40.5
1
8
+5
596
52.5
19
1
2
1191
0.45
nd
1055
0.40
nd
20
1
1
1055
-17
397
-76.7
21
793
0.30
1
2
2
nd
nd
595
149
0.23
22
4
+6
219
0.17
99.1
23
1
438
2
nd
nd
24
345
345
0.13
1
1
nc
234
0.09
-68.2
25
1
1
234
nd
nd
26
193
193
0.07
1
1
+3
27
190
190
0.07
52
1
1
_2
-77
28
129
0.05
1
129
1
29
nd
118
0.04
nd
1
118
1
nd
nd
30
1
108
108
0.04
1
nd
nd
31
101
0.04
1
1
101
-1
100
0.04
-2.9
32
nd
100
1
33
nd
76
0.03
nd
1
76
1
80
262533
881
298

n c - n o change
n d - n o data
Source: Llovds Register. 18 6 5 .1 8 7 0 .1 8 7 5 .1 8 8 0 .
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Aberdeen. Other new centers included Southwick and Southampton in the Solent, North
Fleet on the Thames, and Maryhill adjacent to Glasgow on the Clyde.
Although there were only five more firms operating than in the previous cycle,
there was a higher number o f firms per center, especially for those producing over
fourteen thousand tons. Since these centers, with the exception o f London, were located
on the Clyde and North East Coast, this finding indicates that these massive shipbuilding
concentrations formed during the 1865-1872 cycle. The decline in the number of firms
operating in Glasgow combined with an increase in the number o f firms operating in other
Clyde centers could indicate movement out o f the city to centers down the urban
hierarchy. This is also suggested by the number o f firm names that are common to more
than one center.
The industry was clearly in the Product Life Cycle's growth phase throughout this
period. This observation is based on the combination of large absolute growth rates and
system instability as indicated by the dramatic rank order changes within the spatial
industrial system. At the same time, the relatively small increases in the pioneering centers
of Glasgow and London suggest that these centers had reached a mature stage in their
development. That the industry was becoming increasingly standardized is suggested by
the continued expansion down the urban hierarchy. This is further supported by an
increase in the number o f branch plants as indicated by the number of firms in the Register
operating in more than center, as well as the industry's expansion into entirely new
regions, notably Southampton on the Solent.
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1.4. Cycle 4: 1873-1880
The fourth cycle was a period of phenomenal growth in the shipbuilding industry
with continued concentration in the North. The phenomenal growth o f the North East
Coast is most likely due to the growth the region's massive iron and steel industry. Six
centers experienced absolute growth of over a staggering one thousand percent, the most
notable being Sunderland and Stockton (Table VT-4). Five groups o f centers, based on
output, can be identified. The first group is composed of Sunderland and Newcastle, the
first producing 205 thousand and the second 119 thousand tons. The second group,
producing from 81 to 39 thousand tons consists of two North East Coast centers and five
from the Clyde, while the third group (20 to 11 thousand tons) includes North East Coast
centers as well as Barrow (Irish Sea), Belfast (Ireland), and Hull (Humber), indicating
rapid gains in centers not located within the shipbuilding core regions. Also note the
increase in average ship size allowed for by technological changes in construction
techniques and steam propulsion systems.
Industrial growth is also demonstrated by increases in the number of centers that
experienced absolute production increases, the number o f ships produced per center,
and the number o f firms per center. Although changes in rank importance suggest system
instability, only five centers experienced absolute declines in output, the most important
being Renfrew (-89 percent) and London (-62 percent). In addition, both the total number
o f firms and number o f firms per center again increased from the previous cycle, although
the largest gains are in the large, established centers on the North East Coast and Clyde.
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Table VI-4: Spatial Industrial Change
Output, Rank, and Finns for Individual Centers, 1873-1880

Port
Sunderland
Newcastle
Stockton
Middlesborough
Glasgow
Port Glasgow
Greenock
Dumbarton
Belfast
South Shields
Hull
Barrow
West Hartlepool
Hartlepool
Aberdeen
Liverpool
Dundee
London
Whitby
Southampton
Whitehaven
Renfrew
North Shields
Paisley
Birkenhead
Blyth
Leith
Campbelltown
Montrose
Preston
Bristol
Bowling
Northam
Portsmouth
Total

Region
N.E. Coast
N.E. Coast
N.E. Coast
N.E. Coast
Clyde
Clyde
Clyde
Clyde
Ireland
N.E. Coast
Humber
Irish Sea
N.E. Coast
N.E. Coast
S.E. Coast
Mersey
S.E. Coast
Thames
N.E. Coast
Solent
Irish Sea
Clyde
N.E. Coast
Clyde
Mersey
N.E. Coast
S.E. Coast
Clyde
S.E. Coast
Irish Sea
Severn
Clyde
Severn
Solent

Total
Average
Number Output
Ship Size Percent Percent
Rank Number
Built (gross tons) (gross tons) Share Change Rank Change Firms
138
204563
1482
24.21
1086
I
+5
19
86
118657
1380
14.04
176
2
nc
13
54
2
81835
1515
9.68
1385
J
+8
63
1214
76500
9.05
748
4
+5
4
43
-2
1683
8.57
72376
167
5
11
63
795
50076
5.93
178
6
-1
10
23
1955
44968
5.32
-3
7
-6
5
25
38585
1543
4.57
696
8
+6
7
12
20071
1673
2.38
2431
9
+ 12
J
22
20070
912
138
3273
10
+ 12
3
2
7
15966
2281
1.89
253
11
+5
8
15593
1949
1.85
nd
12
nd
i
11
13845
1259
1.64
-j
13
-5
3
8
10787
1348
1.28
115
14
-1
1
13
9844
757
1.16
175
15
+2
3
7
8858
12265
1.05
57
16
-6
5
12
7897
658
0.93
72
17
-2
3
9
5869
652
0.69
18
-62
-11
6
5
5723
1145
0.68
nd
19
nd
1
4
5457
1364
0.65
4953
20
+ 10
1
3
3601
1200
0.43
nd
21
nd
1
2
3
2894
965
0.34
-89
22
-18
3
2
2553
851
0.30
1879
23
+5
2
5
1839
368
0.22
27
24
-6
2
1795
898
0.21
nd
25
nd
2
1
1017
1017
0.12
nd
26
nd
1
1
897
897
0.11
nd
27
nd
1
2
784
392
0.09
nd
28
nd
1
3
678
226
0.08
nd
29
nd
1
2
0.07
561
281
375
30
-1
1
2
489
245
0.06
nd
31
nd
1
143
143
0.02
nd
32
nd
1
1
121
121
0.01
-37
33
-7
1
1
71
71
0.01
nd
34
nd
1
1314
643
844983
122

n c-a o c fa a a g e
n d - n o data
Source: Llovds Renister. 1 8 7 5 .1 8 8 0 .
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The industry appears to have entered the standardization phase o f the Product Life
Cycle by the fourth innovation cycle. During this phase, competition among firms is
intense as profit margins decline, while production process are so established that multiple
production units can be operated to take advantage of least cost production locations or
access to markets. That this was occurring is evidenced by the industry's rapid growth at
Barrow and Whitehaven near the revitalized iron producing regions on the Irish Sea, and
at the major shipping port of Southampton on the Solent. Further, the continued spatial
expansion of the North East Coast into Biyth and Whitby reflects this trend. The Irish Sea
is an example o f expansion into new least cost areas, expansion on the North East Coast
probably represents further attempts to escape congestion and high land costs as the
spatial system infills, while growth on the Solent was an attempt to exploit larger markets.
No matter what the reason, these expansions were all made possible by the standardization
of the production process and subsequent relocation efforts aimed at the reduction o f
costs in the face o f rising competition.
2. INDUSTRIAL VIABILITY
The last portion o f this chapter presents the measure of industrial viability that will
be used to assess the association between innovation and place. The innovative ability
measure ranks each shipbuilding center's share o f all ships buflt and registered with Lloyds
during a given year. Ranking is necessary because a large number o f centers accounted
for only a small amount of output during any given year. To avoid this problem, each
year's range o f market share values is sub-divided into three equal parts, high, medium,
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and low, and each center is assigned to one o f the three categories that corresponds to its
annual

market share for each cycle.
The following section presents the market share ranks for each shipbuilding center

and the year in which it produced at least one ship for each o f the four shipbuilding cycles.
Despite it awkwardness, the term center / year combination will be used in this and
subsequent discussions because it best expresses the fact that each single observation
consists of both the individual center and the year it was in production. The discussion is
based on a series of tables and maps. The tables present the total frequencies by region for
each o f the four shipbuilding cycles. For example, there were a total of 82 center / year
combinations during the first shipbuilding cycle (Table VI-5), and two o f the Clyde's
center / year combinations were in the low market share category. The maps, conversely,
identify the market share ranking for all centers in production during the last year of each
cycle. The last year in the cycle was selected for these and following maps because it
maintains analytical consistency from one series of maps to the next and because, since the
last year in the cycle was a peak production year, it use assures that a large number of
centers are available for the maps.
2.1. Cycle 1: 1840-1855
Nine shipbuilding regions were in production during the first cycle, the Solent
being the only British shipbuilding region not represented (Table VI- 5). The Clyde and
North East Coast shipbuilding regions had the largest number of combinations with the
Clyde having almost twice as many as the later region. These findings should come as no
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surprise given the discussion in the previous section. Following these regions were the
Thames, Mersey, and Ireland, with seven center / year combinations each.

Table VI-5: Market Share Rank, 1840-1855
Rank
Region

Low

Medium

High

Total

Clyde

2

11

17

30

North East Coast

8

5

4

17

Thames

1

3

3

7

Mersey

3

4

0

7

Ireland

2

4

1

7

Humber

2

2

1

5

Severn

4

1

0

5

Scottish East Coast

I

1

1

3

Irish Sea

I

0

0

1

24

31

27

82

Total

The table also demonstrates the considerable degree to which the Clyde dominated
the iron and steam shipbuilding market during this cycle. Its thirty center / year
combinations dominated both the high and medium market share categories, accounting
for almost three quarters o f the high and one third o f the medium share combinations. The
seventeen center / year combinations on the North East Coast, conversely, consisted of
low to medium share centers, with eight low and only four high share centers. The
Thames was a medium to high share region, while the Mersey and Ireland were made up
o f low to medium share combinations. O f the remaining regions, there was no difference
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in ranking among the Scottish East Coast's three centers, while the Humber. Severn, and
Irish Sea regions were low to medium share combinations.
Figure V I-1 reflects a fairly even spatial distribution of shipbuilding centers and
clearly illustrates the concentration o f high market share centers on the Clyde. Each one
of this region's four centers that were in production during the year 1855 were in the
highest market share category. Two of the North East Coast's four centers were medium
share centers, while Shields and South Shields were high and low share centers,
respectively. London, on the Thames, and Cork in Ireland were low and medium share
centers, respectively, while two o f the Mersey's three centers were medium share and
Chester was a low share center.
2.2. Cycle 2: 1856-1865
The only regions not represented during the second cycle was again the Solent
(Table VI-6). The nine regions that were in production fall into four groups based on the
number o f center / year combinations. The first group is again made up o f the Clyde (45

center / year combinations) and the North East Coast (27). The Scottish East Coast (13)
and Ireland (12) constitute the second group. Next are the Thames and Humber, with
eight and seven center / year combinations, respectively. The smallest group is made up o f
the Mersey, Severn, and Irish Sea regions.
The spatial shifts which characterized this cycle are quickly apparent. Unlike the
previous cycle, no single region dominated the high market share category. Share
ranking s were evenly distributed on the Clyde, with the largest number o f high (19) and

low (14) share combinations, and both categories were larger than the medium share
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Market Share Rankings for
1855 British Shipbuilding Centers
L tgtnd:
Market share c la s s e s based on parcantaga share of output
H • High
M > Medium
L = Low

Dundee
Dumbarton
Port Glasgow
i

t-

v / VI

<7 Greenocl
North Shields
S Shields

Stockton
Hull

Liverpool

Cork
London

Bristol

o
Source: Uoyds Register. 1855.1860.1865,1870.1875.1880.

Figure VI-1: Market Share Rankings: 1855
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Table VI-6: Market Share R ank, 1856-1865
Rank
Region

Low

Medium

High

Total

Clyde

14

12

19

45

North East Coast

5

13

9

27

Scottish East Coast

5

8

0

13

Ireland

2

3

7

12

Thames

2

4

2

8

Humber

3

0

1

7

Mersey

3

0

1

4

Severn

1

0

2

3

Irish Sea

2

0

0

2

Total

37

43

41

121

combinations. The North East Coast was characterized by the relatively large number of
medium share combinations relative to the other two categories. In the second group, the
Scottish East Coast can be characterized as a medium to low share region while Ireland
was a high share region. The Thames and Humber, in the third group, were medium and
low share regions, respectively, and the last group consisted of low share centers with the
exception o f the Severn, which was a high market share region.
Figure VI-2 corroborates the market characterizations identified from the tables.
The Clyde's four centers were dominated by high share production centers, with only one
center, Port Glasgow, in the medium share category. On the North East Coast, Newcastle
was a high share center, Middlesborough a low share center, and the remaining two
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Market Share Rankings for
1865 British Shipbuilding Centers
Legend:
Market share c la s s e s based on percentage share of output
H = High
M —Medium
L » Low

Dundee
Dumbarton | |
Port G lasgow
t-

/

U

N ew castle

M ,
M

Stockton H
Middiesbo rough
H ullaa

Liverpool

Source: Uoyds Register, 1865,1870,1875,1880

Figure VI-2: Market Share Rankings: 1865
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centers were in the medium share rank. Three centers on Scottish East Coast and Ireland
were in production in 1865, and all o f these centers were ranked in the low share category,
while London on the Thames and Hull on the Humber were medium share centers. The
Mersey was the only one o f the remaining regions represented, with Liverpool and
Winsford high and low market share centers, respectively.
2.3. Cycle 3: 1865-1872
The Irish Sea was the only region not represented during the 1866-1872
shipbuilding cycle. Although the Clyde was still the largest shipbuilding region, the North
East Coast began to challenge the former region during this cycle, as demonstrated by the
number of center / year combinations shown in Table VI-7. The North East Coast
accounted for thirty-four o f the cycle's center / year combinations compared to the Clyde's
thirty-six Repeating the pattern established in the previous cycles, the Scottish East
Coast alone occupied a second tier, being represented by fourteen center / year
combinations. There was a significant drop-off from the latter region to the remaining
regions, with the number o f combinations in these regions ranging from the Thames' six to
the Solent's two.
Continuing the trend established in the previous cycles, the Clyde continued to
dominate the high market share category. However, it is important to note that the
categories were not evenly distributed in the region, with twenty center / year
combinations in the highest rank, eleven in the lowest, but only five in the medium share
category. The North East Coast was still characterized by fairly equal distribution of
medium and high market share combinations, and the distribution of combinations among
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Table VI-7: Market Share Rank, 1866-1872
Rank
Region

Low

Medium

High

Total

Clyde

11

5

20

36

North East Coast

7

15

12

34

Scottish East Coast

4

9

1

14

Thames

2

3

1

6

Mersey

2

3

0

5

Severn

3

1

0

4

Humber

1

1

1

3

Ireland

2

1

0

J

Solent

2

0

0

2

Total

34

38

35

107

the three categories was little changed from the previous cycle. The Scottish East Coast
was a medium share region, as were the Thames and Mersey. O f the remaining regions,
however, all were characterized by their low market share rankings.
The northern shipbuilding regions dominated the British shipbuilding industrial
system by the end o f the third cycle. The concentration o f activity in these two regions
can be clearly seen in Figure VI-3: aside from these two shipbuilding concentrations, only
four centers were in production south o f the North East Coast. While the two Scottish
East Coast centers fell into the low share category, the Clyde's five centers all placed in
either the high (3) or medium (2) categories. Eight centers were concentrated in the
North East Coast, which was dominated by four high share centers. O f the centers south
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Market Share Rankings for
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Figure VI-3 : Market Share Rankings: 1872
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of the North East Coast, London and Liverpool were medium share centers, while
North am and Southwick were low share centers.
2.4. Cycle 4: 1873-1880
By the fourth cycle the North East Coast surpassed the Clyde as Britain's dominant
shipbuilding region, accounting for fifty-one o f the cycle's center / year combinations
(Table VI-8). The Clyde accounted for thirty-four of these combinations, down from
thirty-six in the previous cycle. The Scottish East Coast was again the third largest region
and was followed by the remaining seven regions that were clustered in a range of
combinations from a high o f eight (Irish Sea) to a low of two (Humber and Severn
regions).

Table VI-8: Market Share Rank, 1873-1880
Rank
Low

Medium

High

Total

North East Coast

6

18

27

51

Clyde

7

13

14

34

Scottish East Coast

10

4

0

14

Irish Sea

4

3

1

8

Mersey

2

4

0

6

Thames

3

1

0

4

Ireland

0

2

1

3

Solent

2

1

0

3

Humber

2

0

0

2

Severn

2

0

0

2

Total

38

46

43

127

Region
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Not only was the North East Coast the dominant region, but it also had the largest
number o f centers, twenty-seven, in the high market share category. Of the region's other
center / year combinations, eighteen were ranked in the medium category and only six in
the low category. In addition to its decline in center / year combinations, the Clyde also
experienced a shift out o f the high and into the medium share categories. The Scottish
East Coast was dominated by low share centers. Ireland was characterized by its medium
to high share centers, the Irish Sea by medium centers, and the Mersey by medium to low
share centers. All other regions were characterized by their rankings in the low market
share category.
The south to north spatial shift in shipbuilding output, as well as the industry's
increasing concentration ou the North East Coast and Clyde can be seen in Figure VI-4.
Liverpool is the only center south o f the North East Coast that contributed a ship to the
Lloyds Register in 1880. Six centers were in production on both the North East Coast
and Clyde in 1880 and the three market share categories are fairly evenly distributed. The
only difference between the regions is that the North East Coast has one more and one
less center in the high and low share categories, respectively, than does the Clyde. The
two centers on the Scottish East Coast were again ranked in the low share category, while
the two remaining centers, Liverpool and Belfast, were both ranked in the medium market
share category.
3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has examined the changing spatial structure of the 1840-1880 British
iron and steam shipbuilding industry. It has documented the industry's spatial relocation,
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ranging from the national to intra-regional levels. Using a conceptual framework provided
by the Product Life Cycle, this chapter has examined the spatial restructuring process for
each o f the four shipbuilding cycles. During the first cycle, the Product Life Cycle's
innovation phase, iron and steam shipbuilding was already concentrated in the northern
iron and machinery producing regions of the Clyde and North East Coast. In addition,
favored locations tended to be urban centers that offered access to labor, capital, and ship
markets. The industry’s continued concentration in the north, as well as its expansion out
o f the urban centers favored in the first cycle, was apparent during the Product Life
Cycle's growth phase that corresponded to the second and third shipbuilding cycles (18561872). By the fourth shipbuilding cycle, 1873-1880, the industry had entered the final
standardization phase of the Product Life Cycle. This period was characterized by the
massive shipbuilding concentrations in the north and the development o f medium to large
scale shipbuilding enterprises in formerly peripheral regions on the Irish Sea (Barrow) and
in Ireland (Belfast).
The concentration o f market share in northern shipbuilding regions, first on the
Clyde and later on the North East Coast, was phenomenal The Clyde dominated both the
absolute number of shipbuilding center / year combinations developed for the industrial
viability variable, as well as the number of these combinations in the high and medium
market share categories. The Clyde's dominance extended into the second cycle, but
declined and then stabilized for the rest of the study period.
Although the North East Coast was the second largest region in terms o f the
absolute number of combinations, it can not be characterized as a high share region until
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the third and fourth cycles. During the last two cycles, this region overtook the Clyde to
become Britain's largest shipbuilding region in both the absolute number o f combinations
and in its dominance o f the high market share category.
Still, despite this dominance, it is important to note that smaller regions and
centers remained competitive and experienced growth. By the end o f the period. large
scale production centers were established in formerly minor regions. However, traditional
shipbuilding regions, especially the Thames and Mersey, experienced relative declines
throughout the study period. The performance o f all the small regions in the market share
categories was characterized by the small absolute number of combinations and their
concentration in the low and medium share categories.
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CHAPTER VH
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE AND BRITISH SHIPBUILDING CENTERS

The last measure required to assess the relationship between innovation and place
is a measure of the innovative ability o f individual shipbuilding centers. This index is
developed in two stages. The first stage specifies a series of multiple regression models to
identify technological innovations that made a significant contribution to increasing ship
size, the single most important change in iron steamships that occurred throughout the
study period. The first section o f this chapter introduces these models and identifies
significant variables which can be used to construct the index.
The second stage in developing the innovative ability index uses these significant
variables to rank each shipbuilding center for every year in which it produced at least one
ship registered with Lloyds. Since the regression models' independent variables have
minimal multicollinearity (based on correlation coefficients), each variable included in the

index represents a unique technological component o f the iron steamship. As a result,
each ship's scores on these variables can be summed to develop a measure o f that ship's
level o f technological sophistication vis-a-vis all other centers in each sub-period. A mean
score for all ships built at a center during a given year, therefore, provides a measure of
that center's level o f technological sophistication. This mean score can then be used to
develop a ranking system that identifies technologically leading and lagging shipbuilding
centers and which, when combined with the industrial viability measure presented in the
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previous chapter, allows for the statistical testing o f the association between innovation
and place. These rankings are presented and discussed in this chapter's second section.
1. MODELING TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE
This section specifies technological change models for each shipbuilding cycle. It
begins with a model for the entire study period using available data to demonstrate that,
though such a model provides a good description o f 1840-1880 technological change, this
single model is really not appropriate for the entire study period. A series of models are
then specified that better capture the changes that occurred during the individual cycles by
incorporating more variables as the Lloyds Register's record keeping improves and more
data become available.
1.1. The 1840-1880 Model
The nineteenth century witnessed unprecedented changes to the ship. Experiments
during the century's first four decades established the iron steamship as a viable alternative
to the traditional wooden sailing ship. Changes introduced between 1840 and 1880
resulted in continuous increases in ship size and power. By 1880, these changes had laid
the foundation for the modem ship and rendered the traditional wooden sailing ship
virtually obsolete.
This success was the result o f improvements in the two component technological
systems, iron construction and steam propulsion, as well as interrelationships between the
two technologies whereby a change in one led to improved performance and innovation in
the other. Improvements in iron construction techniques resulted in increased ship size
and cargo-carrying capacity and allowed for modem ship designs. Improvements in
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marine steam engine plants, including boilers and condensers, created ever more powerful
and more efficient engines which remained the industry standard until the diesel engine's
introduction.
1.1.1. Model
With these changes in mind, the analysis begins by specifying a model for the
1840-1880 period. Since shipbuilding historians agree that the greatest changes to ships
during the study period were increased ship size and power, a model is specified to test the
hypothesis that ship size, measured by gross tonnage, is a function of the year the ship was
built and its motive power. As such, the model describes the technological innovations
that made a significant contribution to increasing ship size. This hypothesis is articulated
in the following regression model:
Gross Tons = a + bl*Year + b2 * Ship Power
Again, and as discussed earlier, the dependent variable is gross tonnage, a measure
of the ship's total permanently enclosed volume or absolute size. This is the only tonnage
measurement available for the entire period. Since both net and gross tonnage are
common measurements used to describe merchant ships, these variables are key
descriptors of the ship and both are appropriate measures for the dependent variable. A
more complete discussion o f all variables used this and subsequent models was introduced
earlier in Chapter HI.
The independent variables are the year in which the ship was built and gross
tonnage per unit o f horsepower. The variable Year incorporates change over time so the
variable is expected to have a positive coefficient which reflects the increasing demand for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

155

larger ships over time. The second independent variable is gross tonnage per unit of
horsepower, or ship power. This variable is derived by dividing gross tonnage by the
engine's indicated horsepower. This derived variable is a measure of the number o f tons
propelled by one unit of horsepower or, simply put, the ship's motive power. Although
gross tonnage is used to derive the dependent variable ship power, the two variables are
only moderately correlated (r = .528 at p = .0001), reflecting significant differences in
power generation technology among ships and, hence, this variable's suitability for
inclusion in the model. Since ship power increased throughout the study period, its
coefficient is expected to be also positive.
The final specifications o f the model and their associated test statistics are given in
Table VII-1. The overall fit o f the model is adequate given the complexities o f this
problem, with an adjusted R2 o f .29 and a highly significant F-statistic (306.17 at p =
.00001). While the adjusted R2 explains less than one third of the total variance, the
model is theoretically sound and highly significant, as indicated by the fact that the signs of
the coefficients are as predicted and the associated high level of significance for each
independent variable.
While the model provides a good fit to the data, it has two serious drawbacks.
First, it is very simplistic in that it contains only two independent variables. While these
are the most important variables identified in the literature, a more complete description of
iron steamship change can be specified as more technical descriptors become available
over the course of the study period. The second drawback is that the model does not
describe changes for the entire study period well, as indicated by the distribution o f the
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Table VII-1: 1840-1880 Model Results and Statistics
Dependent Variable: Gross Tons

Intercept

Coefficient

Beta

Significance

-696.71

0.00001

0.00001

12.73

0.1498

0.00001

118.67

0.4314

0.00001

Year
Ship Power (Gross Tons)
n = 1487
Adjusted R Square

0.291
306.17

F- Ratio

0.00001

residuals within the individual shipbuilding cycles. If the model represents the entire
study period, then the mean residual for each sub-period should sum to zero indicating no
difference in the explanatory power of the independent variables across the cycles. When
the mean residuals for each cycle are summed and averaged, however (Table VII-2), it is
clear that this is not the case: the model underpredicted ship size for the first and fourth
cycles while it overpredicted ship size for cycles 2 and 3.

Table VII-2: Mean and Summed Residuals by Shipbuilding Cycle
Cycle 1:
1843-1855

Cycle 2:
1856-1865

Cycle 3:
1866-1872

Cycle 4:
1873-1880

Mean

58.05

-5.11

-44.84

8.53

Sum

9694

-1630.58

13946

5882.59

167

319

311

690

Statistic

n
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Based on the temporal pattern found dining the residual analysis, it is clear that
iron steamship change differed from cycle to cycle. This is not surprising when we
consider the cyclical nature o f changes in ship size, engine horsepower, and ship power
established in Chapter IV. Therefore, to adequately understand the technical components
of the steamship and their change through time requires the specification o f a model for
each individual shipbuilding cycle to improve our understanding of how these variables
interact.
1.2. Cycle 1: 1840-1855
The first shipbuilding cycle, from 1840 to 1855, was a period o f growth and
experimentation within the shipbuilding industry. Output increased, especially after 1850
when the iron steamship made significant inroads in the European cargo routes (Hughes
and Reiter, 1958). New keel framing systems associated with double bottom water
ballasting increased longitudinal strength and allowed for greater ship length and tonnage
(Dougan, 1968; Waine, 1976). Specialized bulk cargo-carriers were also introduced
during the cycle (Dougan, 1868; Waine, 1976), along with the addition o f deck structures
(the bridge) and additional decks and partial decks (Waine, 1976). Experimentation also
continued to make existing engines more suitable for the screw propeller, finally
culminating in the introduction o f the double expansion engine near the end o f the cycle
(Jones, 1958).
1.2.1. Model
A model predicting iron steamship technological change for the first cycle, 18401855, is now specified. Since the data are limited to the same variables as those available
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for use during the entire 1840-1880 period, the model remains unchanged:
Gross Tonnage = a + b 1*Year + b2 * Ship Power
Again, ship size, in terms o f gross tonnage, depends on the year the ship was built and its
motive power. Likewise, both independent variables are again expected to have positive
coefficients. Regression statistics are reported in Table VII-3.
Once again, the model provides a reasonably good fit to the data. The regression
coefficients are o f the expected signs and are significant, while the significance level
associated with the F-statistic is quite good. Although the model explains only. 13
percent o f the total variance, down from an R2 o f .29 for the entire period, this is not
surprising given the fact that only one technological measurement, ship power, is used to
describe what is still, in practical terms, a highly experimental ship.

Table VII-3: 1840-1855 Model Results and Statistics
Dependent Variable: Gross Tons
Coefficient
Intercept

Beta

Significance

-1815.78

0.0016

Year

39.99

0.275

0.0008

Ship Power (Gross Tons)

59.65

0.168

0.0381

n = 167
Adjusted R Square

0.134

F-Ratio

13.86

0.00001

The 1840-1855 steamship described by the model had a registered gross tonnage
o f494 tons and its engine plant propelled 3.99 gross tons for each unit o f engine
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horsepower. Gross tonnage increased rapidly during this cycle, at an average of 40 tons
per year. Every unit increase in ship power resulted in an average increase o f 60 gross
tons.
13. Cycle 2: 1856 - 1865
The second shipbuilding cycle was an important period in the development o f the
iron steamship. The year 1855 witnessed three critical developments that directly impacted
iron ship construction. First, the shipping community accepted iron as a shipbuilding
material because of its technical and economic advantages over wood. Second, the
Register established its first iron ship construction guidelines for ships classified with the
society. Finally, Parliament passed the Moorsom Act which redefined the methods for
calculating gross and net tonnage.
Perhaps the most important event o f the entire study period occurred immediately
before the start of this cycle with the re-introduction o f the compound engine. This
engine, designed to power the screw propeller, was followed three years later by an
improved stem bearing that eliminated leakage where the propeller shaft exited the hull.
These changes, introduced during the first cycle, coincided with the outbreak of the
Crimean War, and the resulting shipbuilding boom accelerated their adoption during the
second cycle.
The improved engine plant, when combined with the benefits of higher length-tobeam ratios, allowed for larger ships without corresponding increases in engine power.
Changes in ship design included greater use o f multiple decks, partial decks, and
superstructures as shipbuilders sought to minimize net tonnage but not carrying capacity.
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These changes took advantage o f net and gross tonnage exemptions allowed by the
Moorsom Act and later amendments.
1.3.1. Variables
In addition to the variables that were available for the first cycle's model, the
Register began to consistently record net tonnage in 1853. Net tonnage is the ship's gross
tonnage less the amount of ship volume used to cany cargo, and is a measure of the ship's
cargo-carrying capacity. This improvement in record keeping makes possible a more
detailed m odel Using net and gross tonnage, an additional variable is constructed that
measures cargo-carrying efficiency, expressed a percent of the ship's total permanently
enclosed volume. This variable, the Net: Gross Ratio, is constructed by dividing net tons
by gross tons.
A theoretical model is specified that states that a ship's gross tonnage depended on
the year it was built, the ship's power, and the new variable: the Net:Gross Ratio. As in the
previous model, the regression coefficients for these variables are expected to be positive
to reflect increased average ship size and engine power. It is also expected that a negative
coefficient will result for the Net:Gross Ratio under the assumption that experimental ship
designs resulted in gross tonnage increasing at a faster rate than net tonnage. This
assumption is based on Waine's (1976) argument that 1) shipowners demanded ships with
minimal net tonnage relative to gross tonnage to minimize tax and cargo-handling costs,

and that 2) this demand was satisfied by incorporating spaces that could hold cargo but
were not permanently enclosed and so could be excluded from net tonnage calculations.
This model is specified as:
Gross Tons = Year + Ship Power + Net:Gross Ratio
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As can be seen in Table VII-4, the model does not provide a good fit to the data
but, still, it is significant. R: is only. 16, but the F-statistic is significant. The regression
coefficients for Year and Ship Power are both significant and of the expected sign, but the
Net:Gross Ratio is neither significant nor of the expected sign. The model suggests that
ship design changes did not contribute to changes in ship tonnage.

Table VH-4: 1856-1865 Theoretical Model Results and Statistics
Dependent Variable: Gross Tons
Coefficient

Beta

Significance

-1456.94

0.137

0.0114

Year

23.68

0.137

0.0106

Net Gross

93.29

0.011

0.8343

123.60

0.371

0.00001

Intercept

Ship Power (Gross Tons)
n = 315
Adjusted R Square

0.158

F- Ratio

20.32

0.00001

Since this result is contrary to Waine's argument, the model is respecified by
substituting net tonnage for gross tonnage for both the dependent and ship power
variables under the assumption that shipowners were more concerned with a ship's cargocarrying capacity than they possibly were with its absolute volume. Qualitatively, this
argument seems sound and precedent for this specification is found in the literature. Net
tonnage is used to calculate the ship power variable in order to keep it consistent with the
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dependent variable. Therefore, net tonnage is a more appropriate descriptor of the ship.
The new model then becomes:
Net Tons = Year + Ship Power + Net: Gross Ratio
The new model reflects an improvement over the first (Table VTI-5). Both R2 and
the F-statistic improve slightly (to . 18 and 23.7, respectively). All regression coefficients,
including that for the Net:Gross Ratio, are now significant, although the Net:Gross Ratio
is still not of the expected sign. The improved performance of the model indicates that
cargo-carrying capacity is a more precise, and so more appropriate, descriptor of 18561865 iron -steamship technological change.

Table VII-5: 1856-1865 Model Results and Statistics
Dependent Variable: New Tons
Coefficient
Intercept

Beta

Significance

-1416.324

0.0007

Year

15.31

0.122

0.0212

N et Gross

755.2

0.127

0.0189

Ship Power (Gross Tons)

85.18

0.350

0.0001

n = 315
Adjusted R Square

0.183

F- Ratio

23.74

0.0001

The mean 1856-1865 steamship was registered at 434.14 net tons. Net tonnage
increased by 7.55 tons with every .01 unit increase in the Net:Gross Ratio. This is
contrary to expectations that ship size would decline as the ratio increased. The
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NetrGross Ratio makes an important contribution to the steamship, but not through the
addition of more exempted spaces. Had additional exempted spaces suitable for carrying
cargo been added, then the ratio's value would have declined reflecting the fact that net
tonnage declined or stayed the same relative to gross tonnage and, hence, the negative
coefficient. The increase in gross tonnage relative to net tonnage indicates an increase in
register cargo space, suggesting that the compound engine's fuel consumption and engine
size efficiencies were reducing the amount of space being exempted for coal bunkers and
machinery and so providing more ship volume for cargo.
1.4. Cycle 3: 1866-1872
The 1866-1872 cycle can be considered to have been a consolidation period in ship
construction. Although shipbuilders continued to build larger ships, no significant changes
in construction techniques are recorded for this period. Instead, shipbuilders began to
experiment with new ship designs and adjusted length-to-beam ratios, with the latter
reaching highs of between 10:1 and 11:1 during the cycle. That shipbuilding techniques
had become standardized is suggested by the fact that shipbuilders were sending their
ships back to the shipyard for lengthening (Parliamentary Papers. 1961) rather than selling
them off to foreign buyers and purchasing newer and improved ships (Jones, 1938; Pollard
and Robertson, 1979). Lengthening was accomplished by disassembling the ship at its
midsection and inserting new hull sections.
The most important innovations in the marine steam engine plant during the 18661872 cycle were the adoption o f the Scotch boiler and surface condenser. Following the
pattern set by the compound engine, these innovations were introduced at the end o f the

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

164
previous cycle (1862 for the Scotch boiler and 1863 for the surface condenser) but not
fully adopted until the 1866-1872 cycle. Unlike the compound engine, whose introduction

coincided with a war-dme merchant fleet build-up, the adoption o f these innovations was
much slower and they did not come into common use until after 1870.
1.4.1. Variables
The Register consistently recorded ship dimensions beginning in 1861. As a result,
an additional aggregate variable, the Length-to-Beam ratio, can now be included in the
analysis. This ratio, computed by dividing ship length by width, measures changes in hull
form resulting from the application o f the principle that increasing ship length relative to
its width reduces water friction against the hull This allows for larger ships but not a
corresponding increase in engine power. According to Pollard and Robertson (1979),
increasing the length-to-beam ratio was heavily utilized to improve engine and cargocarrying efficiency.
1.4.2. Model
The theoretical model differs from the previous model only in that it includes the
Length-to-Bearn ratio. All other variables remain the same. The model is specified as:
New Tons = Year + Ship Power + NetrGross + Length-to-Beam
Again, the coefficient for the variable Year is expected to be positive because ship size

continued to increase. The Length-to-B earn coefficient is also hypothesized to be positive
as shipbuilders sought to maximize ship power efficiencies by increasing the ratio,
especially for larger ships. Conversely, the coefficients for ship power and the Net:Gross
ratio is expected to have either very small positive or negative values, indicating that
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engine plants and ship designs were becoming so efficient that increases in ship size did
not require corresponding increases in ship power or engine size. Finally, the NetrGross
coefficient is hypothesized to be negative because of an increasing divergence between net
and gross tons as shipbuilders included more decks, partial decks, and other unenclosed
spaces not included in net tonnage calculations.
The resulting model is the best so far. It explains over 50 percent of the variance
among the variables (adjusted R2 = .52) with a highly significant F-statistic o f 85.6 (Table
VH-6). However, and somewhat surprisingly, the regression coefficients for Year and
NetrGross are not significant, indicating that these variables were not significant for
predicting ship tonnage.

Table VII-6: 1866-1872 Theoretical Model Results and Statistics
Dependent Variable: New Tons
Coefficient
Intercept
Year
NetrGross
Ship Power (Gross)
Length-to-B earn

Beta

Significance

-4301.17

0.0005

30.41

0.080

0.0727

-551.26

-0.057

0.2084

48.88

0.155

0.002

435.24

0.653

0.00001

n = 310
Adjusted R Square

0.523

F- Ratio

85.61

0.00001

The model is now respecified to achieve the best fit while retaining as many
explanatory variables as possible. After running all possible combinations o f variables, the
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model that best fit the two conditions is:
Gross Tons = NetrGross + Length-to-Beam + Ship Power (Net Tons)
Regression statistics are reported in Table VII-7.

Table VII-7: 1866-1872 Model Results and Statistics
Dependent Variable: Gross Tons
Coefficient
Intercept
Ship Power (Net)
Net Gross
Length-to-Beam

Beta

Significance

0.00001

-1876.33
92.56

0.225

0.00001

-1220.11

-0.125

0.009

441.41

0.663

0.00001

n = 3I0
Adjusted R Square
F-Ratio

0.522
113.58

0.00001

After the respecification, the results remain consistent. The R2 is unchanged and
the F-statistic remains highly significant. The differences between the two models are that,
first, Gross Tons replaces Net Tons as the dependent variable; second, the variable Ship
Power is computed using net rather than gross tons; and third, the variable Year has been
dropped from the model altogether. The fact that the variable Year was not significant is
surprising. That the year in which the ship was buih is not important strongly suggests
that the pace o f technological change slackened during this period and underscores the
fact that iron and steam shipbuilding techniques had become standardized at this time.
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The three variables that explain ship size, in terms of gross tons, are Ship Power,
the NetrGross ratio, and the Length-to-B earn ratio. Per unit increases in both Ship Power
and the Length-to-Beam Ratio resulted in increases of 92.56 and 441.41 gross tons,
respectively. As expected, but unlike its performance in the previous cycle, a negative
relationship existed between the NetrGross ratio and ship size: an increase of .01 units in
this ratio resulted in a decrease in ship size of 12.2 tons.
The performance of the Length-to-Beam and NetrGross ratio variables substantiate
the arguments made by Pollard and Robertson and Waine concerning changes in hull form
and ship designs. The Length-to-B earn ratio made the largest contribution o f the three
variables in explaining ship size. The negative relationship between the NetrGross ratio
and ship size demonstrates that the percent o f net tonnage as a percent of gross tonnage
declined, demonstrating that shipbuilders were increasing absolute ship size but not
registered cargo-carrying capacity. Although the divergence between net and gross
tonnage could be due to increases in machinery and engine plant size that were exempt
from net tonnage calculations, this is highly unlikely given the emphasis placed on making
the engine plant more space efficient. A more likely explanation is that shipbuilders were
making use of deductions that allowed for non-permanently enclosed spaces through the
addition of decks and partial decks as provided for in the Moorsom Act o f 1854. Nonpermanently enclosed spaces could be used to carry cargo but were not included in the
calculation of taxes, cargo-handling fees, and other expenses.
1.5. Cycle 4:1873-1880
A review of the historical literature identifies few changes in either ship
construction or engine plants during the final cycle incorporating the years from 1873 to
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1880. This suggests that the period was one of stabilization and standardization and that
further improvements came through the fine-tuning o f existing techniques. Changes in
ship construction centered around a trend toward the stabilization o f the Length-to-Beam
ratio at around 8:1 (Pollard and Robertson, 1979) and the increasing use of additional and
partial decks (Waine, 1976). Improvements in the engine centered around raising boiler
pressures, made possible by improvements to the Scotch boiler adopted during the
preceding cycle (Rowland, 1970).
1.5.1. Variables
The Register began recording engine specifications by 1870, allowing for the
addition of two new variables to the analysis. These variables are boiler pressure and
engine size. The estimate of boiler pressure reported in the Register is the boiler's rated
operating pressure rather than the amount of pressure operating on the cylinder head
(based on experiments attempting to calculate horsepower using the Register's engine
specifications). The engine size variable is a ratio that unitizes register tonnage, either
gross or net, to engine cylinder volume (in3) computed from the Register's cylinder
diameter and piston stroke length specifications.
1.5.2. Model
The theoretical model includes the variables used in the final model for the 18661872 cycle but also incorporates these two new variables, Boiler Pressure and Cylinder
Volume: Gross Tons. Gross tons is used as the unitizing value for the cylinder volume
ratio because this is also the dependent variable. The model is specified as:
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Gross Tons = Ship Power (Net) + NetrGross + Length-to-Beam +
Boiler Pressure + Cylinder VolumerGross Tons
Positive coefficients are expected for the variables Ship Power and Boiler Pressure
reflecting continued improvements in engine plant efficiencies. A positive coefficient is
also expected for the Length-to-Beam ratio. Conversely, the coefficients for both
NetrGross and Cylinder VolumerGross Tons should be negativer the first because of
additional exempted spaces within the ship; the second because o f scale efficiencies in the
engine plant, coupled with the effects of the Length-to-Beam ratio, allowed for more
cargo to be carried without a corresponding increase in engine plant size.
Model statistics, reported in Table VII-8, show that the model provides a very
good fit to the data. Adjusted R2 is .63 and the F-statistic is highly significant. However,
the regression coefficient for the NetrGross ratio is not significant, while that for the
Cylinder VolumerGross Tons ratio, while significant, surprisingly is not of the expected
sign.
The model is respecified in order to include the NetrGross ratio and see if this
would change the sign for the Cylinder VolumerGross Tons ratio. As in the previous
model, the condition for selecting the best model is to retain as many explanatory variables
as possible without jeopardizing explanatory power. After running all possible
combinations of variables, the best model in respect to explanatory power is as followsr
Net Tons = Year + NetrGross + Ship Power (Net) + Length-to-Beam +
Cylinder VolumerGross Tons + Boiler Pressure
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Table VH-8: 1873-1880 Theoretical Model Results and Statistics
Dependent Variable: Gross Tons
Coefficient
Intercept

Beta

Significance

-4512.39

0.00001

Ship Power (Net)

125.23

0.284

0.00001

N et Gross

110.20

0.008

0.7593

Length-to-Beam

540.07

0.638

0.00001

10.97

0.152688

0.00001

0.16

0.111

0.0001

Boiler Pressure
Cylinder VolumerGross
n = 608
Adjusted R Square
F- Ratio

0.631
249.02

0.00001

These changes slightly improve Adjusted R2 from the .63 of the theoretical model
to .66 due to the additional variables (Table VII-9). The F-statistic remains highly
significant. The new model also results in two important changes. The first change is the
renewed emphasis on cargo-carrying capacity in explaining the steamship, as demonstrated
by the substitution of Gross Tons (absolute ship size) for Net Tons as the dependent
variable. This change suggests that shipbuilders were more concerned with m aximizing
the ship's cargo-carrying capacity, and so its earning potential, rather than absolute size.
The second change is the re-emergence of the variable Year which demonstrates that,
unlike the 1866-1872 cycle, technological change over time was an important component
o f the 1873-1880 iron steamship.
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Table VII-9: 1873-1880 Model Results and Statistics for Dependent Variable
Net Tons
Coefficient
Intercept
Year

Beta

Significance

-5420.88

0.00001

12.96

0.058

0.0442

2151.5

0.225

0.00001

Ship Power (Net)

72.98

0.225

0.00001

Length-to-Beam

358.89

0.627

0.00001

Cylinder Volume: Net

0.08

0.195

0.00001

Boiler Pressure

8.55

0.133

0.00001

Net Gross

n = 608
Adjusted R Square
F- Ratio

0.663
199.64

0.00001

Both average ship size and power increased between the third and fourth cycles.
The average ship was registered at 1285.63 gross tons and 839.61 net tons, while ship
volume propelled by one unit o f horsepower increased by 8.41 (gross) and 5.46 (net).
These changes represent rates o f increase o f approximately 27.7 and 20.75 percent,
respectively, with the slower rate o f increase for ship power indicating that engines were
becoming more efficient in terms o f power. This is because increases in ship size did not
require corresponding increases in ship power. In addition, the average values for the
NetrGross and Length-to-B earn ratios did not change from the third to fourth cycle.
The average 1873-1880 steamship was registered at 840 net tons. Net tonnage
increased 12 tons each year. Every unit increase in ship power, in terms o f volume o f
cargo propelled by engine plant, resulted in 73 additional net tons. While the average
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NetrGross ratio remained stable between the third and fourth cycles, net tonnage increased
21.51 tons for every .01 unit change in the ratio. This is counter to expectations o f a
negative relationship between the variables, and suggests that a limit had been reached to
the amount o f additional space that could be exempted from the net tonnage calculations.
Based on the size o f its beta coefficient, the Length-to-B earn ratio was again the single
largest contributor with respect to explaining ship cargo-carrying capacity, with a unit
increase in the ratio resulting in a corresponding increase in cargo-carrying capacity of 359
tons. Contrary to expectations of a negative relationship between the Cylinder
Vohime:Net Tons ratio and cargo-carrying capacity (expected if engine size efficiencies
were being realized), a one unit increase in the ratio resulted in an increase o f only .08 net
tons. This a very small value since the average ratio was 1984.4:1, but the coefficient is
highly significant. The final variable, Boiler Pressure, did perform as expected, with one
unit change leading to an additional 8.55 tons o f cargo-carrying capacity.
This discussion of the final model for the fourth shipbuilding cycle concludes the
technological change modeling process. Using data available from the Register, these
models have identified those innovations that made a significant contribution, in a
statistical sense, to increasing ship size. With the significance of their importance proven,
the variables from these models can now be used to construct the innovative ability
variable that identifies technologically leading and lagging shipbuilding centers.
2. INNOVATIVE ABILITY INDEX
The independent variables for each o f the four models are now used to develop a
synthetic measure o f each shipbuilding center's innovative ability during each year it was in
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production. This variable is developed by scoring each ship built during a given cycle by
its level of technological sophistication relative to all other ships. This is accomplished by
assigning each independent variable, which measures an important technological

innovation, from each cycle a score ranging from one (1) to five (5) based on quintiles
which reflect the position of each ship on that variable's range of values for all ships. A
score o f 1 indicates that the ship incorporated the lowest possible level of technological
sophistication for that particular innovation (the lowest quintile), while a score of 5
indicates that it incorporated the highest level (the highest quintile). The variable scores
are then summed to produce an "innovative index" for each ship. Since the majority of
ships were built on order from the shipowner, it should be recognized that the index score
can be influenced by design considerations such as trade route and owner preferences.
The mean innovative index score for all ships built at any center during any given
year is then calculated to serve as a benchmark for all ships. The final step is to rank each
center and year into one o f two categories based on whether or not the center and year
combination's mean innovative index score was above or below the mean score for all
ships built during the cycle. A high rank indicates that the center was, in practical terms,
a technological leader relative to the cycle's mean ship, while a low rank indicates that it
was a technological laggard.
The use o f such composite indices in studies of technological innovation with
multiple forms has precedent in economics research. An example is the study by Akridge
(1989) that assesses the effectiveness o f a sample o f multiproduct agribusiness firms in
minimizing costs. The study estimates the frontier multiproduct cost function and then
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develops an index to use as a benchmark against which the performance o f individual firm*;
is compared. A second example is the study by Baltagi, et aL (1995) who estimate a
general index o f technical change within the US airline industry to identify cost changes
due to technological change and cost changes due to deregulation.
The following section presents these innovative rankings for each of the four
cycles. Again, each observation is a combination o f an individual center and the year in
which h produced at least one ship listed in the Register. The discussion is based on a
series of tables and maps. The tables present the total number o f center / year
combinations by region for each cycle, while the maps provide the rank for each center
producing a ship during the last year of each cycle.
2.1. Cycle 1: 1840-1855
Technologically leading shipbuilding center / year combinations outnumbered
lagging combinations during the first cycle (Table VII-10). Leaders accounted for 57
percent o f the eighty-two total frequencies. The Humber was the most innovative region
with all its centers being technological leaders. Contrary to the assessment of nineteenth
century observers and shipbuilding historians (Parliamentary Papers. 1969; Pollard and
Robertson, 1979), the North East Coast was a technologically leading region while the
Clyde was evenly divided among technologically leading and lagging center / year
combinations. The Mersey and Thames, both considered innovative centers (Banbury,
1971; Pollard and Robertson, 1979), can be so characterized: both having five of their
seven total combinations ranked as technological leaders. This confirms the assessment of
previous research discussed in Chapter V. While the innovative performance of the
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Severn and Scottish East Coast was mixed, the remaining regions, especially Ireland, can
not be considered to have been innovative.

Table VH-10: Innovative Ability Rank, 1840-1855
Rank
Region

Low

High

Total

Clyde

15

15

30

North East Coast

5

12

17

Thames

2

5

7

Mersey

2

5

7

Ireland

6

I

7

Humber

0

5

5

Severn

3

2

5

Scottish East Coast

1

2

3

Irish Sea

1

0

1

35

47

82

Total

The map o f 1855 centers, Figure VII-1, is dominated by technological leaders. O f
the eighteen centers, only one center (Preston, the single observation on the Irish Sea) was
not a technologically leading center. The map, when compared to the regional
performances in Table VII-10, suggests that innovations associated with the single
independent variable ship power had been assimilated by the industry.
2.2. Cycle 2: 1856-1865
Technologically lagging center / year combinations outnumbered leaders during the
second cycle, with seventy-one o f the total combinations being non-innovative (Table
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Innovative Ability Rankings for
1855 British Shipbuilding Centers
Legend:
H * Higher than Mean Performance on Innovation Scale
L - Lower than Mean Performance on Innovation Scale
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Source: Calculated by author.

Figure W - l : Innovative Ability Rankings: 1855
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V II-11). The North East Coast was again the most innovative region. The only other
region that can be characterized as being innovative was Ireland, where five of its seven
combinations were in the high innovative ability category. This region's performance is
due to Belfast's Harland and Woolf Company, a firm which enjoyed a strong reputation as
an innovative shipbuilding firm. The Clyde, Thames, and Mersey regions can all be
considered non-innovative, although the Clyde to a lesser extent that the other two.

Table VH-11: Innovative Ability Rank, 1856-1865
Rank
Region

Low

High

Total

Clyde

29

16

45

North East Coast

10

17

27

Scottish East Coast

8

5

13

Ireland

5

7

12

Thames

6

2

8

Humber

6

I

7

Mersey

3

1

4

Severn

2

1

3

Irish Sea

2

0

2

Total

71

50

121

O f the fifteen centers in production during 1865 (Figure VTI-2), ten were
technological leaders. AH four o f the centers on the North East Coast were innovative.
The only innovative center on the Clyde was Dumbarton, where the multiple expansion
engine was introduced. Unexpectedly, Glasgow is included among this region's non-
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Innovative Ability Rankings for
1865 British Shipbuilding Centers
U g in d :
H » Higher than Maan Performance on Innovation S cale
L > Lower than Mean Performance on Innovation S cale
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Figure VII-2: Innovative Ability Rankings: 1865
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innovative centers. The only other non-innovative centers were Liverpool on the
Merseyand Dundee on the Scottish East Coast. London is included among the innovative
centers.
2.3. Cycle 3: 1866-1872
Repeating the pattern in the previous cycle, technologically lagging center / year
combinations were in the majority (Table V II-12). The best performing region during this
cycle was the Scottish East Coast were there were as many leaders as laggards (although
the same can be said for the Solent, this region had only two combinations). In all the
other regions, including the North East Coast and Clyde, technological laggards
outnumbered leaders. The Severn was the worst performing region with no technological
leaders among its four center / year combinations.

Table VII-12: Innovative Ability Rank, 1866-1872
Rank
Region

Low

High

Total

Clyde

21

15

36

North East Coast

20

14

34

Scottish East Coast

7

7

14

Thames

4

2

6

Mersey

3

2

5

Severn

4

0

4

Humber

2

1

3

Ireland

2

1

3

Solent

1

1

2

Total

64

43

107
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The nineteen shipbuilding centers shown in Figure VII-3 suggest that the
technologies represented by the independent variables in the third cycle's model had been
widely assimilated by the British shipbuilding industry. Only five centers were noninnovative centers. The Clyde and North East Coast each accounted for two o f these
centers (Renfrew and Port Glasgow on the Clyde, the two Shields on the North Each
Coast), while the final non-innovative center was the isolated Northam. Both Liverpool,
on the Mersey, and London on the Thames were innovative centers.
2.4. Cycle 4: 1873-1880
Unlike the previous two cycle, the fourth cycle had more innovative center / year
combinations than non-innovative combinations. Both the North East Coast and the
Clyde can be characterized as technological leading regions with 66 and 56 percent of
their shipbuilding combinations being in the technologically leading category. All
combinations in the Ireland and Humber regions were innovative, and 63 percent (5 of 8)
o f the combinations on the Irish Sea were innovative. The regions that performed poorly
were the Scottish East Coast, Severn, and Thames, while the Mersey had as many leading
as lagging combinations.
O f the fifteen centers shown in Figure VTI-4, only two were non-innovative.
These centers were Greenock and Paisley on the Clyde. Again, the high proportion of
innovative to non-innovative centers suggests that the significant technological changes
identified by the cycle's model had been widely diffused within the industry by end of the
fourth, and last, shipbuilding cycle.
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Innovative Ability Rankings for
1872 British Shipbuilding Centers
Legend:
H * Higher than Maan Performance on Innovation Scalo
L = Lower than Moan Performance on Innovation Scale
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Figure VII-3: Innovative Ability Rankings: 1872
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Table VH-13: Innovative Ability Rank, 1873-1880
Rank
Low

High

Total

North East Coast

17

34

51

Clyde

15

19

34

Scottish East Coast

11

3

14

Irish Sea

3

5

S

Mersey

3

3

6

Thames

3

I

4

Ireland

0

3

3

Solent

2

I

3

Humber

0

2

2

Severn

2

0

2

Total

56

71

127

Region

3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter has developed a measure o f the innovative ability of each individual
shipbuilding center and year in which that center produced at least one ship certified and
registered with Lloyds. This has been accomplished by estimating a series o f regression
models that describe iron steamships and their technological change over time for each of
four shipbuilding cycles. It then uses the independent variables from these models to
construct an innovation index that aggregates all ships built at an individual center during
each year it was in production and assigning the center / year combination a ranking of
high, indicating a technologically leading center, or low to indicate a technologically
lagging center.
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Innovative Ability Rankings for
1880 British Shipbuilding Centers
Legend:
H » Higher then Menn Performance on Innovation S ca le
L * Lower than Mean Performance on Innovation S ca le
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Figure VH-4: Innovative Ability Rankings: 1880
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Four regression models, one for each of the four shipbuilding cycles identified in
Chapter IV, were estimated using variables as they became available over the course of the
study period. Although initial R2s were low, this is understandable given the lack of data
available for the early part of the study period and the complexity o f these technologies.
Still, test statistics for the models for the first two cycles were significant and theoretically
correct. The last two models incorporated more variables and provided much higher
levels o f explanatory power while maintaining their significance and theoretical
correctness.
These models reveal a great deal o f information about iron steamship technological
change. Generally, the behavior of the models and the variables incorporated in them
confirm historical interpretations of steamship technological change while quantifying its
rate and direction. In addition, the behavior of the variables from one cycle to the next
provides insights into shipbuilders' technological concerns when designing ships and the
economic considerations of shipowners.
Several insights are gained when we consider the type o f register tonnage
measurement used for the dependent variables and ship power variables. The highest
amount o f explanatory power for the second cycle model was obtained using net tonnage
as the dependent variable and net tonnage per unit o f horsepower for the Ship Power
variable. Since net tonnage measures the ship's cargo-carrying capacity, its use suggests
that ships were being built to maximize earning potential in response to the primary
concern o f the shipping industry.
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However, the dependent variables were reversed for the 1866-1872 cycle. While
this could be a data artifact, it could also indicate that technological change was directed
toward m axim izing ship size while maintaining the concern for cargo-carrying potential (as
indicated by the continued use of net tonnage to derive the ship power variable). It is
especially interesting that the variable Year did not significantly load in this model. By the
fourth cycle, however, and when the variable Year again becomes significant the "best fit"
dependent variable returned to net tonnage, or cargo-carrying capacity rather than
absolute ship size. Again, this change was in response to the shipping industry’s concern
for ships that m axim ize d earning potential
The last section in the chapter presented the innovative ability r anking s constructed
using the statistically significant independent variables from the four regression models for
each shipbuilding center / year combination. These data were presented through a series
o f tables showing the innovative performance at the regional level and a series o f maps
that identified the performance of all centers that were in production during the last year
o f each shipbuilding cycle. The rankings for each center / year combination are now
carried into the final stage of this analysis that, in conjunction with the market share
rankings developed in the previous chapter, assesses the association between industrial
viability and innovative ability.
hi m any respects, the results reflected by these regional innovative ability rankings
do not substantiate the opinions of shipbuilding historians as to which regions were and
were not innovative. Based on the calculated innovative index put forward in this
research, the North East Coast can be characterized as Britain's most innovative
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shipbuilding region. This finding is contrary to the consensus historical interpretation
(with the notable exceptions of those volumes that deal exclusively with the North East
Coast industry) which considers the Clyde, Thames, and Mersey regions to have been the
most innovative. However, the assessment based on the innovative index reveals that the
performance of the Clyde and Mersey was mixed while the Thames innovative ability
declined after the first cycle.
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CHAPTER V m
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL VIABILITY
AND INNOVATIVE ABILITY

The final portion o f this study will e xam ine the relationship between every 18401880 British iron and steam shipbuilding center's industrial viability and its innovative
ability. The analysis uses a chi-square contingency table testing procedure to determ ine
whether or not a statistical association exists between a shipbuilding center's annual
market share rank and its position as either a technologically leading or lagging
shipbuilding center. In practical terms, the question to be answered is whether or not
individual shipbuilding centers reaped an economic reward for building innovative iron
steamships. Following the logic of the implicit relationship between innovation and place,
this analysis assumes that a center's ability to compete successfully in the market place was
related to the production o f innovative ships.
This chapter is organized in the following manner. The first section presents the
analytical framework that will be used to carry out the test. It briefly outlines the chisquare contingency table test, the variables used for this test, and the methods that will be
used to test for, and then assess, the association. The second section conducts a separate
test for each o f the four shipbuilding cycles and assesses the relationship between
innovative ability and industrial viability.
I. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The test for the association between a shipbuilding center's innovative ability and
its ability to compete within the national shipbuilding industrial system is conducted using
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a chi-square contingency table test. To carry out the test, the market share rank variable
developed and introduced in Chapter V is combined with the innovative ability rank
variable developed in the previous chapter. This section presents the framework that will
be used to assess this relationship.
1.1. Chi-square Contingency Table Test
The chi-square contingency table test is a non-parametric statistical procedure that
tests for an association between two sets o f categorical variables. The variable categories
are used to construct a contingency table in which the categories for one variable
represent rows in the table and the categories for the second variable form the columns.
Each joint occurrence, or frequency, o f the two variables is then entered into one o f the
cells formed by the intersection of the rows and columns The test compares the cells’
observed joint frequencies to their expected joint frequencies, with the expected
frequencies calculated based on the proportions between the total row and column
frequencies (Conover, 1980). Nonparametric statistical techniques have been used to
investigate technological change, as in Chavas and Cox’s "A Nonparametric Analysis of
Agricultural Technology" (1988).
The test's null hypothesis is that the two variables are independent or, more
specifically, that they are not associated. In this case, there will be little or no statistically
significant differences between the observed and expected frequencies in each cell o f the
contingency table. The alternative hypothesis is that the variables are not independent or,
alternatively, that an association does in fret exist. The test is carried out by calculating a
chi-square statistic. If the chi-square statistic is insignificant then any differences between
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the observed and expected frequencies is due entirely to chance and the null hypothesis of
no association must be accepted. If the statistic is significant, then the differences are real
and the alternative hypothesis of an association is accepted.
1.2. Variables and Categories
For the test between industrial viability and innovative ability, each shipbuilding
center for each year it produced at least one ship listed in the Register has been ranked in
terms of its market share and innovative ability. There are three ranks for the market
share variable based on the amount of annual output the shipbuilding center produced
relative to all other centers. A center is given a high score if it was in the top 33 percent
o f all centers in production for that year, a medium score if it was in the middle 33
percent, and a low score if it was in the bottom 33 percent.
The innovative ability variable ranks centers as to whether the combination of
technological innovations incorporated in the ship or ships built at that center for that year
were above the mean value of the index for all ships built during a given shipbuilding
cycle. A high rank indicates that the technological innovations for the ship or ships built at
a given center during a given year exceeded the mean level of technological innovations in
all ships, indicating that h was a "technological leader," while a low rank indicates that
technological innovations were below the mean and that the center was a "technological
laggard."
Again, it should be remembered that ships were built on order for shipowners, so
that the innovative ability index value also clearly reflects shipowner preferences and, as
such, can be influenced by a shipowner's technical specifications. If the shipowners’
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specifications included non-innovative technical components, then they are reflected in the
final ranking- This influence is especially strong for centers that produced only one ship
during a given year.
This method of analysis results in a three-by-two contingency table with the market
share categories forming the rows and the innovative ability rankings the columns- The six
possible joint occurrences o f the two variables are:
Low/Low
Low/High
Medium/Low
Medium/High
High/Low
High/High

-

Low market share and low innovative ability
Low market share and high innovative ability
Medium market share and low innovative ability
Medium market share and low innovative ability
High market share and low innovative ability
High market share and high innovative ability

There are four contingency tables and four sets o f association which reflect the sub
division o f the study period into four separate shipbuilding cycles.
1.3. Analytical Procedure
The analysis of the tables is conducted in the following manner. First, the test for
association is carried out. The null hypothesis for each test is that no relationship exists
between the two variables and that market share and innovative ability are not associated,
hi the event o f an in significant chi-square statistic, the null hypothesis is accepted. In the
event of a significant chi-square, the alternative hypothesis of an association between
market share and innovative ability is accepted.

If the chi-square statistic is significant, the strength and direction of the association
is measured. Since the contingency table is rectangular, rather than square, this is
accomplished using Kendall's Tau-c measure of association. Tau-c, and other measures of
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association between two ordinal-level variables makes possible a check of every possible
pair o f cases in the table to determine if their relative ordering on the first variable is the
same (concordant) or if the ordering is reversed (discordant). If a preponderance o f the
cases are ordered in the same direction on both variables, then the final statistic will be
positive and the association is positive. If not, then the final value of the test statistic is
negative and the association is negative. The Tau-c statistic is interpreted in a manner
similar to a correlation coefficient, with values ranging from a negative one (-1). indicating
a perfect negative association, to a positive one (+1) indicating perfect positive correlation
(Hettmansperger, 1984).
The final step, employed only if the chi-square statistic is significant, is to identify
which o f the six possible categories in the contingency table were the most influential to
the association and why. This is accomplished by assessing the relative contribution o f the
individual table cells to the absolute value of the chi-square statistic. If one or more table
categories made a higher relative contribution than the other table categories, then those
categories are examined in more detail to identify the characteristic or characteristics of
those shipbuilding center / year combinations which might make them more influential
than the other possible combinations.
2. THE ASSOCIATION BETWEEN INNOVATION AND PLACE
With the analytical framework established, a report on the actual association
between innovation and place can precede. The test is conducted for each shipbuilding
cycle in succession. The discussion for each cycle is organized in the following manner.
First, the variables'joint occurrence is presented and discussed through a table that
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provides regional breakdowns for the six categories and supported by a map that identifies
individual shipbuilding centers and their performance during the last year in the cycle.
Next, the results o f the contingency table test are presented. If no association exists, the
discussion must end at that point. If there is an association, its strength and direction are
assessed and the influential categories across rows and columns are identified and
discussed.
2.1. Cycle 1: 1840-1855
The first cycle represents the innovation phase o f Vernon's Product Life Cycle.
During this phase, production tends to be concentrated in a relatively few locations. That
this concentration occurred in the shipbuilding industry is demonstrated by the number of
shipbuilding center / year frequencies in the medium and high market share categories on
the Clyde (Table VUI-1). However, this concentration was not necessarily due to the
region's greater innovative ability. Granted that the innovative ability measure consists of
only one variable (ship power), there were just as many center / year frequencies
appearing in the two low innovation categories as were found in the high innovation
categories. There does appear to be a positive relationship between innovative ability and
market share for the North East Coast, Thames, and Mersey shipbuilding regions,
however, where more frequencies occur in the high and medium share categories. A
similar pattern does not exist for the other regions.
For the purposes o f illustration, Figure VH3-1 locates the shipbuilding centers and
their performance in the six categories during the year 1855, the last year in the cycle.
Only four categories are represented. The highest category, high market share and high
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innovative ability, is dominated by the Clyde, with all four of its centers in this category, as
well as the two Shields on the North East Coast and Aberdeen on the Scottish East Coast.
The medium share/high innovative ability category is made up o f Newcastle and Stockton
on the North East Coast, Liverpool and Chester on the Mersey, and Hull (Humber) and
Cork (Ireland). Four centers, including London, are in the low share/high innovative
ability category, while Preston on the Irish Sea is the only center in the low share/low
innovative ability category. Based on the map, and recognizing the exception of London,
there does appear to have been a relationship between market share and innovative ability
in 1855.

Table Vm-1: Regional Contingency Table Categories
Cycle 1: 1843 - 1855
Categories
Region

Low
Low

Low
High

Medium
Low

Medium
High

High
Low

High
High

Total

Clyde

I

1

5

6

9

8

30

N. E. Coast

3

5

1

4

1

3

17

Thames

0

1

I

2

1

2

7

Mersey

I

2

I

3

0

0

7

Ireland

2

0

3

1

I

0

7

Humber

0

0

0

2

2

1

5

Severn

3

1

0

1

0

0

5

S. E. Coast

0

1

1

0

0

1

3

Irish Sea

1

0

0

0

0

0

1

11
13.4

11
15.9

12
14.6

19
23.2

14
14.6

15
18.3

82

Total
Percent Total
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Market Share and Innovative Ability for
1855 British Shipbuilding Regions
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Figure VIII-1: Market Share and Innovative Ability Rankings: 1855

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

195

Despite the apparent positive association between market share and innovative
ability, the chi-square contingency table test resulted in a non-significant chi-square
statistic. The table and test statistics are presented in Table VDI-2. Based on the results
o f this test (x 2 - .33, df = 2, p = .847), the null hypothesis that there is no association
between market share and innovative ability is accepted.

Table VDI-2: Chi-square Contingency Table Test Results
Cycle 1: 1843 - 1855
Market Share
Innovative Ability

Low

Medium

High

Total

Low

Observed
Expected

11
10.2

12
13.2

12
11.5

35

High

Observed
Expected

13
13.8

19
17.8

15
15.5

47

24

31

27

82

Total
X2

= .33

df== 2

p = .847

Obviously, the first cycle was a period o f high innovation: after all, the first trans
oceanic iron steamship had been introduced only three years before. Three possible
reasons for this lack of association can be identified. The first, o f course, is that a model
based on only two available variables from the Register is not powerful enough to capture
technological change. There were only two independent variables used to specify the
regression model and, as discussed earlier, its explanatory power is low. Second, but
related to the first reason, innovation was going on at such a high rate that the single
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variable used to construct the innovation index, ship power, does not capture the full
range of innovations that were actually o f significance during the period. Finally, the
reason could lie in the fact that there simply was not that strong an association between
market share and innovative ability, so that the Clyde's dominance of market share can be
explained in terms of its initial and locational advantages: its pioneering role in iron and
steam shipbuilding and its established linkages to the iron and machinery industries and
ship markets.
2.2. Cycle 2
The industry had clearly entered the growth phase o f the Product Life Cycle during
the second cycle (1856-1865). As established earlier, the Clyde was again the dominant
region, but the North East Coast experienced significant growth as did, but to a lesser
extent, the Scottish East Coast, Ireland, Thames, and Humber regions. From an
examination o f Table VIII-3, it does not appear that the market share of any o f the regions
is associated with innovative ability. On the Clyde, the majority of frequencies occur in
the low innovative ability categories. With the exception o f the North East Coast, all the
other regions are characterized by the joint occurrence of low to medium market share and
low innovative ability. Although twice as many of the North East Coast's high share
center / year combinations were in the high innovative category, the highest proportion of
its frequencies was in the medium market share / high innovation category.
Figure VHI-2 maps the variables'joint occurrence for all centers that were in
production in 1865; it shows that the majority o f these centers fell into the medium market
share / high innovative ability and low market share / high innovative ability categories.
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Table VHI-3: Regional Contingency Table Categories
Cycle 2: 1856-1865
Categories
Region

Low
Low

Low
High

Medium
Low

Medium
High

High
Low

High
High

Total

Clyde

10

4

8

4

11

8

45

N. E. Coast

I

4

3

10

6

3

27

S. E. Coast

3

2

5

j

0

0

13

Ireland

0

2

1

2

4

3

12

Thames

2

0

3

1

1

1

8

Humber

3

0

2

1

1

0

7

Mersey

2

1

0

0

1

0

4

Severn

0

1

2

0

0

0

3

Irish Sea

2

0

0

0

0

0

2

23
19.0

14
18.2

24
21.5

21
11.6

24
17.4

15
12.4

100

Total
Percent Total

121

Although all six categories are represented by the fifteen centers, only Newcastle on the
North East Coast and Dumbarton on the Clyde placed in the high share / high innovative
ability category, while four centers (two on the North East Coast, and two on the Humber
and Thames) were in the medium share / high innovative ability category. Four centers
were in the low share / high innovative ability category. The remaining five centers fell
into either one o f the three market share / low innovative ability categories. The majority
o f the centers on the Clyde were in the low innovation category, with Glasgow and
Greenock in the high share / low innovation category and Port Glasgow in the medium
share / low innovation category.
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Market Share and Innovative Ability for
1865 British Shipbuilding Regions
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Figure VIII-2: Market Share and Innovative Ability Rankings: 1865
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Once again, and despite an apparent negative association between market share
and innovative ability, the chi-square contingency table test resulted in a non-significant
chi-square statistic (Table VIII-4). The test resulted in a x statistic o f .33 (d f = 2, p =
.847), so that the null hypothesis o f no association between the two variables is accepted.
The possible explanations for the lack o f association are the same as those given for the
first cycle.

Table VDI-4: Chi-square Contingency Table Test Results:
Cycle 2: 1856 - 1865
Market Share
Innovative Ability

Low

Medium

High

Total

Low

Observed
Expected

23
21.7

22
25.2

26
24.1

71

High

Observed
Expected

14
15.3

21
17.8

15
16.9

50

37

43

41

121

Total
X2= 1-57

df = 2

p =.457

2.3. Cycle 3
The Clyde was again Britain's dominant shipbuilding region during the 1866-1872
period as the industry remained in the Product Life Cycle's growth stage. The second and
third largest regions were the North East Coast and, after a significant drop-off the
Scottish East Coast (Table VDI-5). The distribution o f categories on the Clyde is
characterized by the number o f shipbuilding center / year combinations at the two
extremes: twelve frequencies in the high share / high innovative ability category; nine in
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the low share /' low innovation category; and the remaining frequencies distributed among
the other four categories. The North East Coast shows a better distribution among all
categories, but the six frequencies in the low share / low innovative ability category stand
out. Of the remaining regions, the Scottish East Coast, Thames, and Humber are the only
other regions represented in the high share / high innovative ability category.
Nevertheless, these regions are all characterized by the absolute number o f frequencies in
the low share / low innovative ability category. These results suggest a negative
association between market share and innovative ability.

Table VHI-5: Regional Contingency Table Categories
Cycle 3: 1866-1872
Categories
Region

Low
Low

Low
High

Medium
Low

Medium
High

High
Low

High
High

Total

Clyde

9

2

4

1

8

12

36

N. E. Coast

6

1

7

8

7

5

34

S. E. Coast

2

2

5

4

0

I

14

Thames

2

0

2

1

0

1

6

Mersey

2

0

I

2

0

0

5

Severn

3

0

1

0

0

0

4

Humber

1

0

I

0

0

1

3

Ireland

2

0

0

1

0

0

3

Solent

1

1

0

0

0

0

2

28
26.2

6
5 .6

21
19.6

17
15.9

15
14.0

20
18.7

100

Total
Percent Total
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The map o f 1872 shipbuilding centers (Figure VTH-3) shows that, for this year at
least, high and medium share centers were the most innovative. Eleven of the nineteen
total centers were in these two categories. Five centers were in the highest category (two
from the Clyde and three from the North East Coast), while six centers were in the
medium share / high innovative ability categories (one Clyde, three North East Coast, and
one each from the Mersey and Thames). The two remaining Clyde centers were in the
high and medium share / low innovative ability categories, while the two remaining North
East Coast centers were in the lowest category. Both centers on the Scottish East Coast
and Southwick, on the Solent, were in the low share / high innovative ability category,
while the final low share / low innovative ability center is at Northam on the Severn.
Unlike the previous two cycles, a significant association between market share and
innovative ability was identified. The existence o f this association is indicated by the
significant chi-square statistic (x 2 = 1169, df = 2, p = .003). The contingency table and
test results are given in Table VTH-6.
In addition to the information presented in the previous contingency tables, two
further pieces of information are included in this and the following table. The first is
Kendall's Tau-c statistic, a measure o f the strength of the association and its direction.
The second addition is the reporting o f the relative contribution o f each individual cell to
the overall chi-square statistic to identify the most important categories in explaining the
association.
Based on the Tau-c statistic, a positive association was identified, albeit moderate
to weak, across categories (zc = .344; p = .0003). This indicates that there was a positive
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Figure VEI-3: Market Share and Innovative Ability Rankings: 1872
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relationship between a center's market share and its innovative ability. Bearing in mind its
low value, the statistic indicates that centers that ranked high on the innovative index were
also ranked highly on market share, while centers that were low on the innovative index
were also low in terms o f market share. Therefore, the Tau-c statistic confirms the
implicit assumption that innovative shipbuilding centers enjoyed a competitive advantage
over non-innovative shipbuilding centers.

Table Vm-6: Chi-square Contingency Table Test Results:
Cycle 3: 1866 - 1872
Market Share
Innovative Ability
Low

High

Observed
Expected
Contribution to
Total x2
Observed
Expected
Contribution to
Total x2

Total
X2 = 11.69; df = 2; p = .003

Low

Medium

High

Total

28
20.3

21

15
20.9

64

22.7

25

1

14

6
13.7

17
15.3

20
14.1

37

2

21

34

38

35

43

107

Kendall's Tau c = .344; p =.0003

The reasons that the association first appears in the third shipbuilding cycle are
probably twofold. The first is statistical: the independent variables in the multiple
regression model, which were used to develop the innovation index, were much more
powerful in explaining increasing ship size than those in the previous model This results
in a much better representation o f the changes in the individual technological components
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incorporated in these ships. The second probable reason is that the shipbuilding industry
had become more competitive: initial advantages, especially for the Clyde, were eroding
and shipbuilders were building more efficient, and so more innovative, ships to attract
shipowning customers.
An examination of the differences between the observed and expected frequencies
for the individual categories reveals important information about the relationship between
market share and innovative ability. The table shows that there was no difference between
observed and expected frequencies in either the two medium share categories, indicating
that there was no association between market share and innovative ability for these
combinations. Conversely, the high share / high innovation categories performed better
than would be expected, while the low share high innovation categories did not perform as
well. This demonstrates that, for the high share centers, innovative centers received more
orders for ships than could be expected were there no relationship between innovation and
place.
However, the performance o f the two low share frequencies are the most
interesting in that they contribute the largest amount to the absolute value o f the chisquare statistic: 39 percent for the low market share / low innovative ability category and
25 percent for the high market share / high innovative ability category. This is larger than
that for the high share / high innovative ability category's 21 percent. This is because these
two categories had the highest and lowest number o f frequencies, respectively, of the six
classes. In addition, these categories combined contribution to total chi-square was
enough to produce a significant statistic.
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2.4. Cycle 4
The North East Coast surpassed the Clyde as Britain's largest shipbuilding region
during the 1873-1880 period as the industry entered the standardization phase of the
Product Life Cycle. This region was characterized during the fourth cycle by a pattern
where each high share category had twice as many frequencies as the corresponding low
share frequency (Table VIII-7). Based on this observation, it appears that there was a
strong relationship between innovation and economic viability in this region. The Clyde
was again characterized by the low share/low innovative ability and high share / high
innovative ability category extremes. The most notable change for this region from the
third cycle was the increase in the number o f frequencies in the two medium share
categories, suggesting that perhaps output was becoming more equally distributed among
the region's centers. Only two other regions, the Irish Sea and Ireland, were represented
in the high market share / high innovative ability category. Most centers on the Scottish
East Coast were in the low share / low innovative category, and the majority of centers in
the remaining regions were in either the low share / low innovation or medium share / high
innovation categories.
The sixteen centers that were in production at the end of the study period are
shown in Figure VTH-4. The majority o f these centers, fourteen out o f sixteen, were
assigned the high innovation category across the three market share ranks. The exceptions
were Greenock and Paisley on the Clyde, which were medium share / low innovation and
low share / low innovation centers. Five of the six North East Coast centers were in either
the high share / high innovation (3) or medium share / high innovation categories (3),
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while the number o f centers on the Clyde in these same categories were two and one.
Both centers on the Scottish East Coast were in the low share / high innovation category.
This is also true for Renfrew, the last Clyde center. Both Belfast in Ireland and Liverpool
on the Mersey were in the medium market share / high innovative ability category.

Table V in -7: Regional Contingency Categories, 1873-1880
Categories
Low
Low

Low
High

Medium
Low

Medium
High

High
Low

High
High

Total

N. E. Coast

2

4

6

12

9

18

51

Clyde

5

2

6

7

4

10

34

S. E. Coast

8

J

1

0

0

14

Irish Sea

3

1

0

3

0

1

8

Mersey

1

1

2

2

0

0

6

Thames

2

1

0

1

0

0

4

Ireland

0

0

0

2

0

1

3

Solent

2

0

0

1

0

0

*>

Humber

0

2

0

0

0

0

2

Severn

2

0

0

0

0

0

2

25
19.7

13
10.2

17
13.4

29
22.8

13
10.2

30
23.6

127
100

Region

Total
Percent Total

The chi-square test again indicates that there was an association between market
share and innovative ability. The contingency table and related statistics are given in Table
VTTT-R The chi-square statistic is significant (%2 = 11-57, df = 2, p = .003), and the
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Figure Vm-4: Market Share and Innovative Ability Rankings: 1880
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Kendall's Tau c statistic again shows a positive association between market share and
innovative ability ( r e = .302; p = .001).

Table VTH-8: Chi-square Contingency Table Test Results:
Cycle 4: 1873 - 1880
Market Share
Low

Medium

High

Total

Observed
Expected
Contribution to
Total x2

25
16.5

17
19.9

13
18.6

55

38

4

15

Observed
Expected
Contribution to
Total x2

13
21.5

29
26.1

30
24.4

29

3

11

38

46

43

Innovative Ability
Low

High

Total
X2= 11-57; df = 2; p = .003

72

127

Kendall's Tau c = .302; p = 001

A comparison of observed and expected frequencies and individual categoiy
contribution to total chi-square reveals the same pattern as in the previous cycle. The
medium market share categories were again little different that expected. Frequencies in
the high share / high innovative category were greater than expected and the high share /
low innovative category frequencies were less than expected. However, these differences
between the high share categories was not as great as in the third cycle.
Once again, the differences between the observed and expected frequencies for the
low market share categories are the most important in accounting for the statistical
association between innovative ability and industrial viability. Frequencies for the low
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innovation centers were fifty-two percent greater than expected, while frequencies for the
high innovation centers were forty percent less than expected. And again, their combined
contribution to total chi-square was enough to produce a significant statistic.
2.5. High and Low M arket Share Comparison
The chi-square contingency table test analysis revealed a positive association
between industrial viability and innovative during the third and fourth shipbuilding cycles
only. However, the Tau-c statistic reveals that the positive associations were only weak
to moderate. Further, the most important categories in accounting for this association
between industrial viability and innovative ability were the two low market share
categories and that the high market share categories made only a marginal contribution.
This suggests that innovative ability, while important, was not a precondition for industrial
viability during the last two shipbuilding cycles.
The results o f the chi-square analysis, especially the performance o f the low
market share categories, run counter to implicit assumptions regarding the importance o f
innovation to a production center's industrial viability. Therefore, this section examines
the low share and high share categories in greater detail. This is accomplished by
comparing the mean values for the innovative index variables and shipbuilding output for
the four categories against the values for all centers during the respective cycle and against
each other.
The analysis begins with the third shipbuilding cycle. The innovative index
variables, as identified in Chapter VI, are Ship Power (in terms of net tons), and the
Net: Gross and Length-to-Beam ratios. The output data are the number and the average
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size, in gross tons, o f ships built at each shipbuilding center / year combination.
Comparisons o f these data are presented in Table VIII-9.

Table VIII-9: Comparison of Mean Innovation Index Values and Shipbuilding
Output for Low and High Market Share Categories
Cycle 3: 1866-1872
Contingency Table Classes

Variable

Low/
L ow 1

Low/
High2

All Ships
Built

High /
Low3

High /
High4

Variable

Ship Power3

2.85

5.85

4.07

4.06

4.67

Ship Power4

Length to
Beam b

5.87

7.39

6.96

7

7.87

Length to
Beam b

Net; Gross'

0.61

0.64

0.65

0.68

0.65

Net; Gross'

Mean Tons

193.15

832.67

748.59

799.37

1463.66

Mean Tons

1.21

1

2.75

5.73

4.5

Number Built

28

6

107

15

20

Total
Frequency

Number Built
Total
Frequency

1 Low S h a re /L o w Innovative A bility

1L ow Share / High innovative A bility
1 H igh Share / Low Innovative A bility

• n e t tons / engine horsepow er
b A ip length / width
' net tons / gross tons

4H ig i Share / H igh Innovative A bility

As the table demonstrates, the low market share / low innovative combinations and
the high share / high innovative combinations represented the two extremes o f the British
shipbuilding industry. On one hand, there were a relatively large number o f combinations
producing ships that were much smaller and technologically inferior to those produced in
the high share / high innovative ability combinations. However, the latter category
dominated shipbuilding output because o f the large size (and number) o f ships they
produced in any given year. The only similarity between the other two combinations was
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that they produced ships of approximately the same size, with the low share / high
innovative combinations performing no differently or better than the high share / high
innovative combinations. The fact that there were only six o f these combinations indicates
that they were not representative of the larger industry and, perhaps, represent years in
which was down for some reason.
Differences between the two low share categories become more apparent when
differences in output are examined. Shipbuilding centers in both low market share
categories produced ships that were smaller than the industry average but, still, the ships
built at low innovation centers were much smaller (193 versus 833 gross tons). In terms
o f the number o f ships produced, none o f the high innovation centers produced more than
one ship per year while the low innovation centers averaged 1.2 ships per year. The fact
that the low innovation centers were characterized by the production of multiple ships per
year that were much smaller than average suggests that these centers occupied a distinct
market niche specializing in small, technologically backward ships. This is a significant
finding that will be discussed later in this chapter. The low number o f ships produced at
the Low market share / high innovative ability centers reinforces the supposition that these
centers experienced off years in terms o f output.
Table VHI-10 presents the same comparisons for the fourth shipbuilding cycle.
The variables incorporated in the innovative ability index for this cycle increased to five,
the additional variables being rated Boiler Pressure and the Cylinder Vohune:Net Tonnage
ratio (Vohune:Net in the table). The output variables are the same as those used in the
previous discussion.
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Table VUI-10: Comparison of Mean Innovation Index Values and Shipbuilding
Output for Low and High Market Share Categories
Cycle 4: 1873-1880
Contingency Table Classes

Variable

Low/
Low1

Low/
High2

All Ships
Built

High/
Low3

High/
High4

Variable

Ship Power4

3.45

6.11

5.12

4.99

5.60

Ship Power4

Length to b
Beam

659

7.46

7.47

7.42

7.93

Length to
Beamb

Net: Gross'

0.60

0.66

0.63

0.63

.65

Net: Gross'

Pressured

66.30

74.46

70.41

67.43

72.49

Pressure d

2527.46

1959.90

2129.00

2079.20

2003.69

Volume:Net'

377.19

1161.17

1177.20

1054.21

1721.09

Mean Tons

1.48

1.31

4.94

7.92

10.83

Number Built

25

13

127

13

30

Total
Frequency

VoIume:Net *
Mean Tons
Number Built
Total
Frequency

' L ow Share / Low Innovative Ability
1 Low S ta re / H igh Innovative Ability
’ H igh Share / L ow Innovative Ability
4High Share / High Innovative Ability

*net tons / engine horsepow er
b ship length / w idth
c net tons / gross ta n s
d rated boiler pressure
* engine cylinder volum e / net tons

The table again shows the extent of the disparities between the low share / low
innovative and high share / high innovation shipbuilding center / year combinations. The
low share / low innovation combinations were still characterized by the small size of the
average ship (although average ship size almost doubled) and their poor technological
performance relative to not only the high innovative combinations, but in fact to all ships.
The absolute number of high share / high innovation combinations increased by fifty
percent between this and the third cycle, reflecting the dominant position, in terms of
output, o f a relatively few centers as established in Chapter VI. The only point to be
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raised for the other two categories is how well the low share / high innovative ability
combinations compared in the innovation index variables relative to the high share / high
innovative combinations. Rather than representing centers that experienced off years in
production as in the previous cycle, by the fourth cycle these low market share centers
appear to represent shipbuilding centers that were not rewarded, at least in terms of
increased orders, for their ability to build innovative ships.
The results of this comparison reveals a very distinct dichotomy within the British
iron and steam shipbuilding industry. At one extreme were the large shipbuilding centers,
located primarily in the North East Coast and Clyde regions, that dominated the British
shipbuilding industry. The success of these centers, based on the historical interpretations
and an examination of the contingency tables (but not from the results of the statistical
test), would appear to owe their success as much to their access to factor inputs and major
ship markets as to their innovative ability.
At the other extreme were small centers, many but not all located in smaller
shipbuilding regions. These centers occupied a very minor but distinct market niche,
specializing in small, "technologically backward" iron steamships. Based on an
examination o f the ships produced at these low share / low innovation centers, it is safe to
say that they specialized in small coastal trading steamers. According to Waine (1976),
much o f the coasting trade at the smaller ports was conducted by local shipowners. Ships
built at these centers during both cycles were much smaller than average, allowing them to
use small, remote ports. Their small length-to-beam ratios, constrained because of their
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length, would also allow them maintain their stability during adverse sailing conditions in
deep water.
Based on these observations, it should not be surprising to find shipbuilding
centers specializing in the production of these technologically lagging ships to fit the
requirements o f small, local shipowners in peripheral ports. This would account for the
low innovative centers that specialized in these ships, as well as for the existence of low
market share / low innovative centers in the minor shipbuilding regions. Specializing
centers were located on the Clyde (Bowling and Paisley) and the Scottish East Coast
(Dundee and Montrose) and on the North East Coast (North Shields and South Shields),
as well as at Liverpool on the Mersey during the third cycle and at London on the Thames
during the fourth. In addition, the output at centers located in the minor regions was
heavily concentrated in small, technologically lagging ships.
Since the small coastal steamers were built for shipowners in localized coasting
trades, it is possible that the technological backwardness o f these ships was due to the
indifference o f shipowners to the technological changes occurring in the larger
shipbuilding and ship owning industries. These owners, and shipbuilders, could have been
more conservative, preferring established and safer technologies, so that they tended to
forgo improved propulsion systems in favor o f established systems as indicated by thenpoor performance in the NetrGross, Cylinder VolumerNet Tons, and Boiler Pressure
variables. Ships that incorporated these improved technologies could also have been more
expensive relative to the older technologies, and the smaller shipowner may not have felt
the extra cost justified their use. It could also be that the coastal steamer market, because
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of its small share of the total market, was not large enough to warrant the same level of
innovative activity as that for larger ships.
3. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This chapter presents tests of the presence of an association between market share
and innovative ability. This was accomplished using the chi-square contingency table
procedure for each shipbuilding cycle in order to test for the association of and to assess
the relationship between market share and innovative ability. The results of this analysis
reveal an association between industrial viability and innovative ability during the third and
fourth shipbuilding cycles only. It further reveals that although the associations are
moderately to weakly positive, it appears that, in general, the higher a center's innovative
ability then the higher its market share.
At the same time, the analysis reveals that the most important contributors to this
association are the two low market share categories and that the contribution o f the high
share categories was secondary. This finding runs counter to implicit assumptions in the
literature which link innovation to the industrial viability o f the production center. Of
centers in the two low share categories, the most interesting were those centers that were
able to remain economically viable despite the fact that the ships they produced were, in
relative terms, technologically backward. These centers, the evidence suggests,
specialized in the production o f small coastal steamers; in which case the shipowners for
whom these ships were built may have been indifferent to technological change and the
shipbuilders in these centers held too small a market share to warrant the levels o f
innovative activity evident in the larger markets.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

CHAPTER IX
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

Transformations of the industrial landscape, especially in the world's industrialized
countries, has heightened interest in the impacts of technological change on the economic
viability of industrial centers and regions. This interest has manifested itself in an increase
in the number of studies that investigate the interaction between technological change,
economic competitiveness, and the economic viability of industrial regions and individual
production centers. The one feature common to these studies is their implicit assumption
that a direct and positive relationship exists between innovative ability and industrial
viability: that the more innovative a place, then the greater its economic competitiveness.
Unfortunately, the field of economic geography has not explicitly examined
technological change in detail and then attempted to relate those changes back to the
individual firms within the industrial system. Two reasons for this failure can be identified.
First, the majority o f these studies either assume that one industry is more innovative than
others or they rely on proxy measures, such as employment growth or the number of
patents issued, to identify innovative industries. Second, theoretical constructs within the
discipline of geography do not allow for the analysis of the interaction between large scale
economic spatial systems and their individual spatial components. The result is that actual
technological change and the full extent of its impacts are not explicitly incorporated into
the examination of technologically-induced spatial change.

216
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The over-riding purpose o f this dissertation has been to address this neglect.
Using real data for an industry which seems to fit the Product Life Cycle during the years
in question, it has measured technological change and then related those changes back to
the spatial industrial restructuring process. This was accomplished through a case study of
the 1840-1880 British iron and steam shipbuilding industry. This industry introduced and
perfected the ocean-going iron screw steamship and experienced a profound spatial
reorientation in the process while accounting for remarkable growth in related measures
such as employment, productivity, and profitability.
1. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK
The methodological framework developed for this study offers an analytical
procedure to assess the interaction between technological change and the economic
viability of individual production centers within larger spatial industrial systems.
Measuring technological change and its linkages to the performance of individual centers
within an industrial system, however, create serious problems for researchers. These
problems require a multi-stage methodology that establishes and locates technological
changes and then subsequently relates those changes back to a center's industrial viability.
Any geographical study o f technological change and spatial industrial change
requires the development o f two key site- and temporally-specific variables that measure
industrial viability and innovative ability. Industrial viability, regardless of the measure
used, represents a center's growth or stability within the larger related industrial system,
while innovative ability is a locationally specific attribute which reflects the proclivity of
any particular place for initiating or rapidly adopting technological change. The

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

218

generation of legitimate measures for these two variables allow for the assessment o f the
performance of any production center within the larger industrial system for any year in
which the firms within the region were in operation.
1.1. Industrial Viability
The industrial viability index is based on each center's annual market share. This
study utilized total national shipbuilding output reported in the Lloyds Register o f British
and Foreign Shipping. Since the vast majority of ships built during the study period were
ordered directly by shipowners and were not built on speculation, a shipbuilding enter’s
annual share of national output can legitimately be viewed as a measure of its market
share. As a result, the market share index was constructed by dividing each center’s
annual output of ships registered with Lloyds by all ships built and registered during that
given year. Each center’s market share was then classified and assigned to one o f three
relative categorical ranks—high, medium, or low—based on their proportions o f the
production scale for each and every year.
1.2. Innovative Ability
The corresponding innovative ability index was constructed from actual iron
steamship measurements also obtained from the Register. Important technological
changes were identified from the historical literature on the nineteenth century British
shipbuilding industry. Technical measurements obtained from the Lloyds Register were
then used to construct variables that measured these technological changes. At the same
time, the 1840-1880 study period was sub-divided into four shipbuilding cycles that also
correspond to industrial innovation cycles first described by Kuznets (1930).
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Once the technical variables were identified, a series o f multiple regression models,
one for each cycle, were used to identify those variables that made statistically significant
contributions to explaining the increasing size o f iron steamships. In a sense, this tested
the qualitative assumptions reflected in the work o f previous scholarship. Those variables
which were identified as significant were then used to construct a series o f innovation
indices that scored each ship based on its component technologies. These indices were
collapsed into a simple measure of innovative ability which could be ranked for each
shipbuilding center and for each year it produced at least one ship. A center with a mean
innovation index for a given year that was greater than the mean index value for the entire
cycle was considered, technologically, to be a leader and assigned to the high category. A
technological laggard, conversely, was one whose mean innovative index score was below
the cycle mean. These centers were assigned to the low category.
1.3. Testing For The Relationship Between Industrial Viability and Innovative
Ability
Once the two site-specific variables were constructed, the relationship between
innovation and place was conducted. This was accomplished using a series of chi-square
contingency table tests to assess the relationship between industrial viability and innovative
ability. The three market share categories were combined with the two innovative ability
categories to produce a three-by-two contingency table. The analysis was conducted by
first testing for the existence of an association between the six categories in the table.
Next, Kendall's Tau-c statistic was used to measure the association between the categories
and the direction o f that association. Finally, the relative contribution of each category to
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the total chi-square statistic was used to identify important categories for further and more
detailed analysis.
2. SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS
The analytical framework employed in this research provided a procedure for
assessing the relationship between innovation and place. At the same time, it allowed for
an investigation into one o f if not the, most important industries that keyed Britain's
nineteenth century dominance o f the world economy. The findings o f this analysis provide
important insights into key aspects o f technological change. These insights apply not only
to the nineteenth century British shipbuilding industry, but to contemporary issues related
to industrial restructuring as well The most significant of these findings are discussed in
the following section.
2.1. Cycles
The first of the finding s discussed concerns the identification o f separate sub-cycles
within the larger 1840-1880 technological change cycle. British shipbuilding output
during the 1840-1880 study period consisted o f four separate and distinct shipbuilding
cycles. These cycles are characterized by alternating periods of rising output followed by
market saturation and glut. As their correspondence to cyclical fluctuations in interest
rates demonstrated, these cycles fit within larger British economic cycles, referred to in
Britain as trade cycles and which are analogous to the industrial cycles first identified by
Kuznets (1930). The existence o f these cycles confirm the observations of shipbuilding
historians and researchers o f the contemporary industry regarding the volatility in output

associated with this industry.
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More importantly in regard to the process o f technological change, however, is the
way in which major shipbuilding innovations fit within these cycles. As important ship
component innovations were identified and dated from the historical literature, this study
revealed that important innovations were introduced at either the beginning or end o f each
shipbuilding output cycle and that the innovation was not fiilly incorporated until the
following cycle. The existence of these innovation cycles demonstrates that the innovation
process was clearly not continuous, but was accomplished through net gains from one
cycle to the next. Further, the performance of the technical indicators revealed that their
changes tracked those for shipbuilding output, indicating that the innovation process was
related to periods o f economic expansion and depression within the shipbuilding and
shipping industries. This strongly indicates that innovations introduced in one sub-cycle
were not fiilly exploited in commercial terms until the following sub-cycle. This particular
finding offers concrete evidence and support for similar arguments made by Schumpeter
(1939 and 1950) and Hyde (1977).
2.2. Technological Change Models
Perhaps the most satisfying, and certainly the most challenging, aspect o f this
research was the identification of the variables required to construct the innovative ability
index. As should be clear by now, one of this study's primary goals has been to directly
incorporate changing technology into economic geographic research. To accomplish this
required extensive reading in the historical and economic historical literature to identify
and date important innovations. It also required a full summer in Scotland developing and
compiling the required database.
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The measure of innovative ability was constructed from variables identified by
multiple regression analysis. This technique allowed for the testing o f hypotheses about
the contributions o f individual iron construction and steam propulsion innovations
identified in the literature using actual technical measurements available in the Lloyds
Register. The Register is not an exhaustive source for all the measurements needed to
assess the technical components of the iron steamship and their change through time, nor
is it realistic to expect it to be such a source of data given the very different goals
associated with its creation and continuation as a resource. However, the sub-division of
the study period into four distinct technological change cycles and the use o f the two stage
model specification approach resulted in sets of technical measurements that were
statistically proven to be theoretically correct and significant. For the last two cycles,
these variables were proven to be very powerful in explaining increasing ship size.
This approach provides valuable insights into the underlying rationale behind iron
steamship technological change. Specifically, it reveals the economic considerations of
shipowners which, in turn, guided shipbuilders' technological concerns in ship design and
construction. These insights are provided by the behavior o f the register tonnage
measurements for both absolute size (gross tonnage) and cargo-carrying capacity (net
tonnage).
hi the model for the 1856-1865 shipbuilding cycle, the highest amount of
explanatory power was obtained using net tonnage as the dependent variable and net
tonnage per unit o f horsepower for the independent variable Ship Power. Since net
tonnage measures the ship's cargo-carrying capacity, the importance o f this variable
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suggests that ships were being designed to maximize earning potential. This, after all. was
the primary concern o f the shipping industry at this time.
By the 1866-1872 cycle, however, the dependent variable that maximized model
explanatory power was gross tonnage: the ship's absolute volume. When we recall that
this was the only cycle in which the variable Year was significant it strongly suggests that
the period represents one of technological consolidation, that the pace of change had
slowed. The innovation process continued, however, as indicated by introduction of the
surface condenser and Scotch boiler during this period. These facts, plus the performance
of net tonnage in deriving the variable for Ship Power, suggest that the innovation process
was directed toward maintaining its cargo-carrying potential while maximizing engine
power.
By the fourth cycle, when the variable Year was again significant, the dependent
variable returned to net tonnage, or cargo-carrying capacity rather than absolute size.
This reversal strongly suggests a renewed emphasis on innovations that maximized earning
potential and explicitly reflects the economic concerns of the shipping industry.
2.3. Regional Innovative Ability
The primary purpose of the innovative ability index, constructed from the
statistically significant independent variables o f the multiple regression models, was to
develop a variable to test for the association between market share and innovative ability.
The index also serves another purpose. When the resulting regional innovative ability
rankings are compared, they allow for the assessment of the accuracy o f popularly held
opinions about the relative technological sophistication o f individual shipbuilding regions.
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Contrary' to the consensus of both contemporaries and shipbuilding historians
(except for regional champions), the North East Coast compared very well to regions
which are considered to be technologically superior. In fact, and again based on the
rankings., this region can be characterized as the most innovative during the entire 1840-

1880 study period. At the same time, the results indicated that the technological
performance of the Clyde, considered to be the country's most innovative region, did not
actually compare favorably to the North East Coast. At the least, if the Clyde was the
most innovative region, then its technological contributions are not reflected in the
technical measurements available from the Register. Nor do the Thames and Mersey
regions, also considered highly innovative, compare favorably; the performance of the
Mersey was mixed across cycles, while the Thames's innovative ability most certainly
declined after the first cycle.
2.4. The Relationship Between Innovation and Place
The ultimate goal o f this dissertation was to test the assumption that there is a
positive association between an individual production center's innovative ability and its
ability to compete successfully within its larger industrial system. This assumption is
implicit in most studies in the field of economic geography. To explore this issue,
statistical tests for association between the two site-specific variables were conducted.
This determined whether or not a shipbuilding center was rewarded economically for its
ability to produce technologically superior ships for each o f the four shipbuilding cycles
within the larger study period.
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The results of these tests indicated that there was no association between market
share and innovative ability during the first two periods, from 1840 to 1855, but that one
did in fact exist during the two later periods covering the years 1856 to 1880. Since the
first two periods were obviously ones of high innovative activity, two possible reasons for
the lack o f an association can be identified.
The first reason for the lack of association is that the two models do not capture
the actual innovations that were attracting orders for ships. These two cycles represent
innovation periods during which the component technologies incorporated in the iron
steamship were still evolving and during which innovative activity was occurring at a high
rate. That this was indeed the case is suggested by the Register's failure to recognize the
importance of many technical measurements until later in the study period. This lack of
recognition results in a serious lack o f data with which to construct the innovative ability
index. Recall that the models for these two cycles included only two and three
independent variables, respectively, and that their explanatory power was low.
The second possible reason could be that there simply was not that strong an
association between market share and innovative ability. If this was the case, then initial
and later locational advantages in terms o f factor inputs and access to ship and capital
markets were more important to success than was innovative ability. Again recall that the
variables used to construct the second cycle's innovation index were basically the same as
those used for the third cycle, which produced a much more powerful model Therefore,
data constraints do not necessarily account for the lack of a statistical association during
the second cycle. This leads to the plausible conclusion that initial advantages were just
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as important (and perhaps more so), relative to innovative ability, for a center's industrial
viability during the first two cycles. This is especially true when explaining the dominance
of the Clyde, the region that in many ways pioneered the new ship and its component
technologies. The importance o f access to factor inputs during the second cycle is
indicated by the continued dominance of the shipbuilding centers on the Clyde, despite
their low innovative rankings, and the rapid rise o f the North East Coast during the second
cycle. Both o f these regions were located in new iron and machinery producing regions.
By the time of the last two cycles, 1866-1872 and 1873-1880. there is a clear and
significant association between innovative ability and industrial viability. Further, there
was a positive relationship, albeit moderate to weak, between the two. The reason for this
shift, from no association to a positive association, is most likely due to the industry’s
transition from the innovative or early growth stages o f the Product Life Cycle to full
blown growth and the standardization stages o f the cycle.
During the third and fourth shipbuilding cycles, the iron steamship overtook the
traditional wooden sailing ship to become the British merchant fleet's dominant cargo
carrier. At the same time, the industry made the transition from the innovation (first
shipbuilding cycle) stage to the growth (second and third shipbuilding cycles) and
standardization stages (fourth shipbuilding cycle) o f the Product Life Cycle. Shipbuilders
and shipowners, by now thoroughly familiar with the new ship, were more concerned with
incorporating greater power and cargo-carrying efficiencies for ships designed for
particular trade routes. Those centers best able to produce the ships required by their
particular ship owning customers, or those centers that specialized in particular ship types,
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did indeed enjoy economic advantages over their less innovative competitors. This is the
reason why the low market share shipbuilding centers were so important in contributing to
the association revealed in the chi-square tests for the third and fourth shipbuilding cycles.
Although innovative centers outperformed less innovative centers in the high market share
categories, the statistical association was due to centers that had the smallest share of the
market irrespective of their innovative ability.
2.5. Continued Viability of Low Innovation Centers
In addition to testing for an association and then measuring its strength and
direction, the contingency tables provided a means for identifying those categories that
made the greatest contribution to the overall strength o f the identified association.
Analysis revealed that centers assigned to the low and high market share categories made
the greatest contribution to the overall association. Further, the centers in low share
categories, whether innovative or not, made the largest contribution to this relationship.
Based on these results, the mean values for the innovative index variables and shipbuilding
output were compared to explore differences and similarities between the four categories.
The subsequent analysis revealed a sharp dichotomy within the shipbuilding
industry from 1840 to 1880. At one extreme were the large shipbuilding centers, located
mostly in the North East Coast and Clyde regions, that dominated the British shipbuilding
industry. Due to their relatively low contribution to the association, it can be speculated
that these center's owed their success as much to their locational advantages, in terms of
access to factor inputs and major ship markets, as to their innovative ability.
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At the other extreme were small centers, many of which were located in the small,
peripheral shipbuilding regions. In truth, the ships built at these centers do not compare
favorably with ships built at the major shipbuilding centers: they were much smaller and
much less efficient. The obvious conclusion is that the British shipbuilding industry
operated at two distinct levels: one specializing in larger, trans-oceanic cargo-carriers; the
other specializing in the small steamers that carried the bulk o f the British seaboard trade.
However, the centers that built these smaller, technologically conservative ships were just
as numerous as the larger centers and often immediately adjacent to them, as witnessed by
the proximity o f Renfrew and Paisley to Glasgow on the Clyde and the two Shields to
Stockton on the North East Coast. The reasons for these ships' technological lag are
probably due to either the indifference of their owners to the technological advances in the
larger industry or, alternatively, that the market was either not large or lucrative enough to
justify the same levels of innovative activity displayed in the larger ships.
This dichotomy can be seen today in the contemporary shipbuilding industry
located on the US Gulf Coast. At one level are the large shipyards at coastal ports from
Biloxi, Mississippi to New Orleans and further west. These shipyards produce large,
ocean-going freighters, container ships, and off-shore oil rigs. At the same time, and at a
distinctly smaller scale of operations, are the small yards on the region's rivers and bayous.
These yards, often associated with ship repair and refitting facilities, produce towboats
used in the inland and ocean-going barge fleets. These yards remain in operation precisely
because the demand from local fleet owners is large enough to warrant the additional costs
o f assembling the needed raw materials and machinery while innovations are deemed
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unnecessary. While they are probably not as innovative as the larger yards, they are
obviously viable as clearly proven by their continued presence.
3. CONTRIBUTION OF RESEARCH
This dissertation has examined the relationship between industrial viability and
innovative ability in the 1840-1880 British iron and steam shipbuilding industry. This
industry has provided an excellent opportunity to examine this relationship because of the
importance which shipbuilding analysts and historians place on technological change in the
industry's periodic spatial restructuring. In addition to the insights it provides into the
spatial impacts of technological change on the British shipbuilding industry, the study also
makes two major contributions to the fields of economic geography, historical geography,
and economic history.
First, it presents an analytical framework that directly incorporates technological
change into the examination o f technologically-induced spatial change. Rather than simply
examining the relationship between technological change and industrial regions using
proxy measures, this study posits a possible approach for assessing the relationship
between actual innovations and individual production centers—the place where innovations
emerge and where spatial changes are most directly felt. Such an approach reconciles the
broad macro-scale concerns o f the new economic development theories with the placespecific focus o f the more traditional regional scientists. This reconciliation would seem
important because technological change is both initiated at and imposed upon individual
production centers which compose the larger spatial industrial system. The development
o f two site-specific variables, industrial viability and innovative ability, allows for the
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assessment o f the interaction between the larger economic structure and the individual
production center. Implicit in this research is the hope that others might build on these
efforts to create measures more suitable for contemporary industries.
The benefits o f the analytical approach presented in this study are not confined to
studies o f the contemporary industrial landscape, however. This is especially true for the
fields o f historical geography and economic history. Historical geographical scholarship
can be especially enriched by an analytical approach that recognizes the inter-relationship
between the overall economic structure and the individual place. The same can be said for
studies in economic history concerned with the individual firm. For both disciplines,
understanding the full consequences of change requires the recognition that change is
initiated at and imposed upon individual places and firms. At the same time, research by
historical geographers and economic historians can often profit from the adoption o f more
rigorous analytical methods: as the North East Coast's performance on the innovative
ability index revealed, subjective historical interpretations do not always bear up to
objective analysis.
At a broader level, this study bridges the two fundamental theoretical constructs
within the field of economic geography. At one level, it has placed technological change
within the context of the larger industrial system and the economic forces that shape it,
while retaining a concern for place. While the two constructs are often presented as
antithetical, this study demonstrates that they can be joined to offer a better understanding
of the spatial impacts o f technological change. The result is a more realistic analysis of the
spatial restructuring process and a more effective analytical approach.
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